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(1) Legislation providing for a waiting period and background chec k 
prior to the purchase of handguns such as provided by H.R. 975 and 
Section 3 of H.R. 155 is needed to implement previously enacted 
federal legislation which prohibits sales of handguns to cer t a in 
categories of ineligible individuals. Signed sworn statements a lone , 
as presently required of those purchasing handguns, are an inadequate 
safeguard aga i nst handgun purchases by individuals legally i ncompetent 
to possess or own them. A seven-day or fifteen-da y waiting peri o d 
will assist law enforcement agencies in preventing crime by pr o v iding 
an opportunity for federal or local screening to prevent those who 
have been convicted of a crime or who are under age or mental ly 
incompetent from purchasing handguns; 
(2) A federal response is required to overcome self-defeating 
inconsistencies between state laws; provision for a waiting peri od a nd 
records check in one state is rendered ineffective by purchase wit hout 
any check in the next; 
(3) Legislation providing for a waiting period and reasonable 
background check imposes an insignificant burden upon law abid ing 
handgun purchasers. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 
My name is Peter F. Vaira. I am a member of the Council of the 
American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section. I appear today 
on behalf of the Association at the request of its President, Robert 
Macerate. 
I served as an attorney in the u. S. Department of Justice for 15 
years. During that time, I served as attorney in charge of both the 
Philadelphia and Chicago strike forces on organized crime. From 1978 
through 1983, I was the United States Attorney for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. I am now a partner in the law firm of Fox, 
Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. I am 
very pleased to appear today on behalf of the American Bar 
Association to voice our strong support for the passage of 
legislation providing for a waiting period and background check 
before the purchase of handguns, as is proposed in H.R. 975 and in 
Section 3 of H.R. 155. 
The American Bar Association, since 1973, has supported amendments to 
strengthen the Gun Control Act. It has consistently opposed measures 
that would loosen restrictions, particularly those dealing with 
record keeping and the interstate sale of firearms. 
As early as 1965, the ABA expressed support for effective legislation 
to control the importation, sale, possession and transportation of 
firearms. This position was reaffirmed by the Association in 1973. 
1 
A fundamental purpose of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was to reduce violent 
crime, including (or by) preventing the possession of handguns by 
proscribed groups of people. Under those Acts certain categories of 
individuals are ineligible to receive firearms that have been shipped 
in interstate commerce. These include: 
Fugitives from justice 
Persons under federal or state felony indictment 
Persons convicted of a federal or state felony 
Persons ineligible by state or local law to possess a firearm 
Minors, under 18 years of age for rifles and shotguns, and 
under 21 years of age for handguns 
Adjudicated mental defectives or persons committed to a mental 
institution; mental incompetents 
Unlawful users of or addicts to any depressant, stimulant, or 
narcotic drug 
Persons dishonorably discharged from the United States Armed 
Forces 
Former United States citizens 
Illegal aliens. 
3 
law merely by purchasing it in a neighboring state. There is need for 
a federal strategy that would provide consistency and uniformity 
across state boundaries. Federal gun laws have failed to achieve 
their intended purpose due in part to this unintended loophole and the 
lack of an adequate enforcement mechanism. 
Opponents of this bill argue that legislative controls on criminal 
purchases of handguns are futile. They maintain that most previously 
convicted criminals do not obtain the handguns they use in commission 
of further crimes through legitimate commercial channels. They point 
to continued recent growth in crimes with guns and single out gun 
control laws as futile or resulting somehow in more crime. They urge 
abandonment of efforts to control the purchase of handguns. This is a 
flawed and dangerous line of argument. 
Efforts by some states to screen felons and other inelibible classes 
of persons from purchasing handguns in fact do show that large numbers 
of criminals are prevented from obtaining weapons through such 
background checks. Clearly, limiting access to handguns by those 
deemed by Congress most likely to misuse them should help reduce their 
use in violent crimes. The need to address and reduce violent crime 
itself in the United States is not in doubt, even among the most 




This background check would be one that is mandated for the Federa l 
Bureau of Investigation under H.R. 155; H.R. 975 would provide 
information and time to make a background check possible by loca l and 
state law enforcement but not mandate this check. H.R. 975 also 
provides for the destruction of the purchaser's application within 
sixty days. It does not provide for a permanent record of any ki nd, 
as opponents have alleged. 
These bills go far to minimize any potential impact on the millions of 
lawful gun purchasers, while meeting the important public purpose of 
preventing handgun purchases by those currently proscribed by federa l 
law. The proposal for a short waiting period under either bill does 
not broaden the limitations on handgun ownership contained in existing 
law; it simply enables the intent of the law to be fulfilled - an 
intent that has wide public support. In addition, a waiting per iod 
and reasonable background check provision has the overwhelming suppo r t 
of law enforcement officers throughout the country. 
Handguns should be kept out of the hands of those who Congress has 
already determined should not have them. H.R. 975 and Section 3 of 
H.R. 155 provide a carefully-drawn and limited method to insure 
Congressional intent will be carried out. These bills deserve you r 
strong support. I want to again thank the Subcommittee for th i s 
opportunity to testify and I will be pleased to answer any quest ion s 
you may have. 
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Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to ,appear before this 
committee to present the views of the Department of Justice on 
the need for reform of federal habeas corpus, and .on the . 
particularly acute problems of obstruction and delay that have 
arisen from the abuse of habeas corpus in capital cases. Before 
turning to a specific discussion of these issues, let me direct 
your attention briefly to two general assessments. The first is 
an observation of Justice Lewis F. Powell, delivered at an 
American Bar Association meeting in 1982. In commenting on the 
major contemporary problems of the federal judicial system, 
Justice Powell observed: 
Another cause of overload of the federal 
system is (28 U.S.C.] § 2254, conferring 
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review 
state court criminal convictions. There is 
no statute of limitations, and no finality of 
federal review of state convictions. Thus, 
repetitive recourse is commonplace. I know 
of no other system of justice structured in a 
way that assures no end to the litigation of 
a criminal conviction. Our practice in this 
respect is viewed with disbelief by lawyers 
and judges in other countries. Nor does the 
Constitution require this sort of 
redundancy. l/ 
The second observation I wish to bring to your 
attention was made by Attorney General William French Smith in 
1983. In the course of a general critique of the current federal 
habeas corpus jurisdiction, Attorney General Smith stated: 
l/ Address of Justice Lewis F. Powell before the American Bar 
Association Division of Judicial Administration, Aug. 9, 1982. 
( · . . ~· 
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A • •• final criticism is that the 
present system of habeas corpus review 
creates particularly acute problems in 
capital cases •••. The •public interest• 
organizations that routinely involve 
themselves ... in capital cases have fully 
exploited the system's potential for 
obstruction. Delay is maximized by deferring 
collateral attack until the eve of execution. 
Once a stay of execution has been obtained, 
the possibility of carrying out the sentence 
is foreclosed for additional years as the 
case works its way through the multiple 
layers of appeal and review in the state and 
federal courts. 
The solution to this problem lies in 
part in the reform of state court procedures 
•..• The efficacy of state reforms is 
severely limited, however, by the 
availability of federal habeas corpus, which 
cannot be limited by the state legislatures 
...• It ••• prevents correction of the 
practical '~ ullification\~ f all capital 
punfshm~legi s ! a t1on that has r e sulted from 
li iga 1 ea d obstruction. V 
In my testimony today, I will discuss how we have come 
to have a system that •assures no end to the litigation of a 
criminal conviction• -- a system that is *viewed with disbelief 
by lawyers and judges in other countries,• and that results in 
the *practical nullification• of the judgment of the vast 
majority of Americans that capital punishment is the appropriate 
penalty for the most egregious crimes. I will also discuss the 
means of correcting these anomalies. 
y Proposals for Habeas Corpus Reform in P. McGuigan & R. 
Rader, eds., Criminal Justice Reform: A Blueprint 137, 145-
46 (1983) [hereafter cited as •Proposals for Habeas Corpus 
Reform*] . 
-
• - -~ 
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The initial portion of my testimony will address the 
historical development of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. 
' 
A review of the relevant history shows clearly that the current 
statutory "habeas corpus" remedy by which the lower federal 
~~ . 
courts review state judgments has no relationship to the 
..,. .,____a .. C: - - ~
traditional writ of habeas corpus whose susp__!Jlsig n l§_ prohibited - . --
Whether state prisoners should have a post-
conviction remedy in the lower federal courts, and if so, how 
broadly, is entirely within Congress's discretion. 
Second, I will discuss the contemporary problems of 
abuse arising from expansive habeas corpus review, and respond to 
the argument that the interests of justice require the endless 
second-guessing of state judgments it produces. 
Third, I will review the history of congressional 
~ ction aimed at curbing excessive habeas corpus review. This 
~ history shows that there is ample precedent for Congress's 
~ Wercise of its authority to regulate the scope of federal habeas 
'1.J)~ • • 
~ 
corpus in order to deal with the general problem of habeas corpus 
abuse and the specific problem of abuse in capital cases. 
Finally, I will discuss pending habeas corpus reform 
legislation -- title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform 
Act (H.R. 3777 ands. 1970) -- which would provide effective 
responses to many of the current problems of abuse and delay. 
I . ... 
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I. The History of Habeas Corpus 
. ~ 
~f Federal review of the judgments of state courts 1\-a-s 
~ ;rLtraditionally{ ~ n limited to direct review in the Supreme Court. 
~ \ . 
µ11 Under contemporary practice, however, a state prisoner who has 
()/ '< 
ttr sll I exhausted his avenues of appeal ' in the state court system may 
Sf continue to litigate the validity of his conviction or sentence 
by applying for habeas corpus in a federal district court. In 
the habeas corpus proceeding, the prisoner may raise and secure a 
redetermination of the same claims of federal right that have 
already been fully litigated and rejected at multiple levels of 
the state court system. In practical effect, this procedure 
p~ es federa,: 3 ria~ s" in ___ the position of reviewing courts, 
with authority to overturn the considered judgments of state 
courts of appeals and state supreme courts in criminal cases. 
A review of the relevant history shows that Congress -~~never decided to give the lower federal courts this extraordinary 
~ power, and that ~ basis in the Constitution or the common 
t:1-'_.C ;,: tradition. ~t habeas corpus was essentially a 
J/v: ~r, means of securing judicial review of the existence of grounds for 
¥ If a person was taken into custody by 
executive authorities, he could petition a court to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus, which would order the custodian to produce the 




prisoner and state the cause of his commitment. If the 
government made an adequate return stating that the petitioner 
was being held on a criminal charge, the court 'would set bail for 
the petitioner, or allow him to remain in detention pending 
trial, depending on whether the offense charged was bailable or 
non-bailable. If the government could state no charge against 
the petitioner, the court woula order his release. V 
The importance of habeas corpus in this character -- as 
a safeguard against indefinite detention without charges or trial 
-- was recognized by the Framers, who included in the 
Constitution a prohibition of suspending the writ of habeas 
corpus, •unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
safety may require it.• The writ of habeas corpus referred to in 
the suspension Clause of the Constitution, however, differed in 
two fundamental respects from the contemporary statutory writ by 
which the lower federal courts review state criminal judgments. 
First, the right to habeas corpus set out in the 
Constitution was only intended as a check on abuses of authority 
by the federal government, and was not meant to provide a 
V See, ~, ~ ks, Habeas Corpus in the States -- 1776-1865, 
32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243, 243-45, 262 (1965) ;v6aks, Legal 
Histo in the Hi h Court -- Ha as Co us, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 
451, 451, 460-61, 468 (1966); art & Wechsler's The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System 1513 (2d ed. 1973); R. Rader, 
Bailing Out a Failed Law: The Constitution and Pre-Trial 
Detention in P. McGuigan & R. Rader, eds., Criminal Justice 





judicial remedy for unlawful detention by state authorities. 
This point is evident, to begin with, from the placement of the 
Suspension Clause in Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution, 
which is an enumeration of limitations on the power of the 
federal government. The corresponding enumeration of 
restrictions on state authority in Section 10 of Article I 
contains no right to habeas corpus • .i/ Shortly after the 
ratification of the Constitution, the First Congress in 1789 made 
the limitation of the federal habeas corpus right to federal 
prisoners explicit, providing in the First Judiciary Act {ch. 14, 
§ 20, 1 Stat. 81-82): 
~l)pl-
l 1 i 1 
(T]he justices of the supreme court, as well 
as judges of the district courts, shall have 
power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the 
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of 
commi t ment. Provided, That writs ofh abeas 
corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners 
in gaol [i.e., jail], unless where they are 
in custody, under or by colour of the 
authority of the United States, or are 
committed for trial before some court of the 
same ••.• 
Second, the writ referred to in the Constitution, as 
noted above, was the common law writ of habeas corpus, a J2ll-
trial remedy whose essential function was to serve as a check on 
arbitrary executive detention. Recognition of the common law 
scope of the writ is reflected in the Constitution's 
!/ See generally 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, at 438 {1966); 3 .ig. at 157, 213, 290 
(assumption in debate at the Constitutional Convention that 
the states would retain the authority to suspend the writ). 
-
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authorization of the suspension of the writ in cases of rebellion 
or invasion, whose obvious purpose is to permit in . such 
' 
circumstances executive detention unconstrained by normal legal 
processes and standards . .2,/ Similarly, the First Judiciary Act 
..- ----
described the function of the writ as 6 inquiry into the cause of 
commitment# and referred to its availability to federal prisoners 
6 committed for trial.w 
The restriction of federal habeas corpus to federal 
prisoners was qualified by the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act 
of 1867, which extended the availability of the writ to persons 
6 retrained of ••• liberty# in violation of federal law, without 
any requirement of · federal custody. The legislative history of 
the Act indicates that it was meant to provide a federal remedy 
for former slaves who were being held in involuntary servitude in 
the states in violation of the wartime emancipation decrees and 
the recently enacted Thirteenth Amendment. Thus, Congress acted 
with a narrow purpose in extending the availability of federal 
habeas corpus beyond persons in federal custody, and the initial 
judicial applications of the enlarged jurisdiction were also 
quite narrow.~ The courts continued to follow the common law 
rule that a prisoner could not challenge his detention pursuant 
.21 
y 
See generally isL_; 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 131-32 (1765). 
See Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme 
court as Legal Historian, 33 u. Chi. L. Rev. 31 (1965). 
I • 
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to the judgment of a court by applying for habeas corpus unless 
the judgment was void because the court lacked jurisdiction. 1J 
Following the decision of Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 
86 {1923), a somewhat broader approach emerged under which a 
claimed violation of a federal right could be asserted on federal 
habeas corpus if no meaningful process for considering such a 
claim was provided in the state courts. However, federal habeas 
review in this period generally depended on the absence of 
meaningful state remedies, and the habeas corpus jurisdiction of 
the federal courts did not become a general means for reviewing 
the substantive accuracy of state court determinations of federal 
claims • .a,/ 
The final stage in the expansion of the federal habeas 
corpus jurisdiction came in innovative judicial decisions of the 
w~~ 
1950's and l960's wKich abrogated the traditional limitations on -the habeas corpus remedy. V In conjunction with the expansion 
of substantive federal rights by decisions of the 1960's, this 
effectively created a general reviewing jurisdiction of the lower 
11 See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
corpus for state Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 465-84 
{1963). 
V See ML. at 463-65, 488-99. 
V See ~ wnsend v. Sain, 372 
u.s. 391 {1963); Brown v. 
supra note 7, at 499-507. 
----u. s. 293 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 
Allen. 344 U.S. 443 (1~~3); Bator, 
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federal courts over the judgments of state courts in criminal 
cases. l.Q/ 
II. Assessment ot the Current System of Review 
Defenders of the current system of broad habeas corpus 
review often advance confused arguments that proposed reforms 
would interfere with the Great Writ of the common law, whose 
suspension is prohibited by the Constitution outside of extreme 
situations of public emergency. On the basis of the foregoing 
discussion, it is clear that such arguments are without merit. 
The traditional reverence for the Great Writ provides 
no support for the continuation of federal habeas corpus in its 
present character as a post-conviction remedy providing 
additional levels of review on claims that have been repeatedly 
adjudicated and rejected in state proceedings. As noted earlier, 
this use of habeas corpus would have appeared totally alien to 
the Framers, and to common law jurists generally prior to the 
middle of the twentieth century. The common law has revered 
habeas corpus as a safeguard against executive oppression, not as 
a mechanism by which one set of courts second-guesses the 
judgments of another set of courts. 
10/ See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judg1t1ents, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 154-57 (1970). 
, 
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The same consideration is a sufficient response to the 
objection that proposed reforms would run afoul of .the 
Constitution's prohibition of the suspension of habeas corpus. 
As discussed above, the statutory *habeas corpus* remedy that is 
currently available to state prisoners in the lower federal 
courts -- a quasi-appellate mechanism for reviewing state 
judgments -- is simply not the writ of habeas corpus referred to 
in the Constitution. These two writs have fundamentally 
different functions and are directed against the actions of 
different governments. They have nothing in common but a 
name. l.l/ 
The existing system of federal habeas corpus review 
also cannot be justified as a necessary safeguard against 
injustices that would otherwise result from violations of federal 
rights by the state courts. The essential function of 
maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of federal law is 
carried out through direct review of the judgments of state ----courts and lower federal courts by the Supreme Court. state 
courts and federal courts are equally bound to uphold the 
Constitution and follow Supreme Court precedent in their 
decisions, and every state prisoner has the right to apply for 
l.l/ It is also clear that no subsequent amendment to the 
Constitution requires review of state judgments by the lower 
federal courts. State prisoners have no constitutional 
right of access to a feder-a~--f-orum. See Allen v. Mccurry. 
449 U.S. 90, 102-03 (1980); Bator, The, State Courts and 
Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
605, 627-28 {1981). 
. 
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direct review by the Supreme Court following the affirmance of 
his conviction by the state courts. There is no adequate basis 
• 
for believing that there is currently any general insensitivity 
to claims of federal right in the state courts, or that broad 
habeas corpus review by the lower federal courts -- provided in 
addition to the Supreme Court's traditional oversight through 
direct review -- has any value •in protecting defendants' rights 
that outweighs its very substantial costs. l.V 
As a practical matter, a state prisoner who properly 
presents an application for federal habeas corpus has typically 
been tried and convicted of a serious offense in state court, has 
already had the conviction affirmed by a state appellate court on 
appeal, and has had an application for review denied or decided 
adversely by a state supreme court. Many habeas petitioners have 
also had additional review in state collateral proceedings . .11/ 
l1J See Bator, supra note 11, at 630-34 (disputing, in relation 
to habeas corpus review, alleged superiority of federal 
judges in sensitivity and competence under contemporary 
conditions); Friendly, supra note 10, at 165 n. 125 
(similar); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the 
Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State 
Court Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 812-14 (1981) 
(similar); Proposals for Habeas Corpus Reform, supra note 2, 
at 149 (unlikelihood under contemporary circumstances of 
state court misapplication or resistance to Supreme Court 
precedent); .§il also Neuborne, The Myth of Parity. 90 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1105, 1119 (1977) (#We are not faced today with 
widespread state judicial refusal to enforce clear federal 
rights.*). 
.u; An extensive empirical study of habeas corpus litigation 
carried out for the Department of Justice found that most 
petitioners had been convicted of serious, violent offenses . 
(continued .•. ) 
" • j 
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The incremental benefits of affording even more levels 
of mandatory review in the lower federal courts through habeas 
corpus are difficult to discern. In most habeas cases the 
federal courts agree with the conclusion of the state courts, 
though considerable time and effort at both the district court 
and circuit court levels is often expended in reaching this 
result. In the relatively few cases in which relief is granted, 
it is likely to reflect disagreement with the state courts on 
arguable or unsettled issues in the interpretation or application 
of federal law on which the lower federal courts may disagree 
among themselves . .li/ 
The questionable value of this type of review is 
=== --- ......... 
emphasized by the ~ xperience in the In 
.l.1/( ••• continued) 
Over 80% had been convicted after trial, and practically the 
same proportion had had, or were having, direct appellate 
review of their cases in the state system. Moreover, about 
45% of petitioners had pursued collateral remedies in the 
state courts, including over 20% who had filed two or more 
previous state petitions. Over 30% had filed one or more 
previous federal petitions. See P. Robinson, An Empirical 
Study of Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court 
Judgments 4(a), 7, 15, 20 (Federal Justice Research Program 
1979). Even where a petitioner has not had prior state 
court review of his claims, this does not imply that means 
for raising such claims are unavailable in the state courts, 
since prisoners frequently by-pass state remedies and file 
procedurally defective habeas corpus petitions. See id. at 
13. 
1i/ See Friendly, supra note 10, at 144 n. 10, 148 n. 25, 165 n. 
125; Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearing on s. 238 Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 
(1985); The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearing on 
S. 2216 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 42-44 (1982) • 
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establishing a separate court system for the District of Columbia 
in 1970, Congress barred D.C. prisoners from applyinq for habeas ---- - ---
corpus in the federal courts, limiting them instead to a 
collateral remedy in the D.C. courts. No adverse effect on the 
quality or fairness of criminal proceedings in the District of 
Columbia has been observed to result from this restriction . .l.2J 
When the preclusion of federal 'habeas corpus review in_ one major 
jurisdiction has caused no evident problems over a period of 
nearly twenty years, it becomes difficult to believe that 
reasonable limitations on such review would adversely affect the 
quality of justice in the substantially similar judicial systems 
of the states. 
-
While the benefits of the current system of federal 
habeas corpus are, to say the least, nebulous, its costs are 
substantial and obvious. The exercise by individual federal 
trial judges of the authority to review and overturn the 
considered judgments of state supreme courts is a perennial 
source of tension in the 'relationship of the federal and state 
judiciaries. While most habeas corpus applications are wholly 
lacking in merit, they continue to impose substantial burdens on 
judges and prosecutors in carrying out a review function that is 
essentially redundant in relation to state review processes. 
~ 
.W See Pro Habeas us Refo , supra note 2, at 
148-49 cGowa, The View From an Inferior Court, 19 San 
Diego Re. 659, 667-69 (1982). The Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionalityo1'"° this reform in Swain v. Pressley, · 
430 U.S. 372 {1977). 
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This burden is increasing. The number of habeas corpus petitions 
filed by state prisoners in the federal district courts over the 
past ten years is as follows: W 
'--------
l27f! 1972 l280 1281 198~ 1983 
7,033 7,123 7,031 7,790 8,059 8,532 J/1.--~ 
~~~ 
uf ~ rrf4) 
1984 l2f!S 19~~ 1987 Lr/ ~ 
~,.,._, 
8,349 8,534 9,040 9,524 
lr-V-U-~ 
~
Habeas corpus petitions, in common with other prisoners 
suits, are all too frequently filed as a type of recreational 
activity, which provides prisoners with a cost-free means of 
striking out at the system and passing time in prison. l1/ The 
implicit message of permitting endless challenges to convictions 
and sentences is that the system never really regards the 
prisoner's guilt as an established fact, and that he need never -~-~ ----
accept and deal with it. Judges and writers have frequently 
~
expressed the view that the exaggerated lack of confidence in the 
possibility of just conviction and punishment which this open-
.W These figures are drawn from the Annual Reports of the 
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
In addition to reporting 9,524 habeas corpus petitions by 
state prisoners, the most recent report (1987) noted 1,808 
habeas corpus petitions and 1,664 wmotions to vacate 
sentence• by federal prisoners (Table C2). 
l1J See Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearing on s. 238 before the 




ended review system reflects is in conflict with the corrective 
and deterrent functions of the criminal justice system . .W 
The difficulty of dealing with these cases is increased 
by the absence of any definite time limit on habeas corpus 
applications, which can result in the need to reconstruct events 
after a lapse of years or decades. Data collected in an 
extensive study conducted for the Department of Justice showed 
that about 40 percent of habeas corpus petitions were filed more 
than five years after the state conviction, and nearly one-third 
were filed more than a decade after the state conviction. Still 
longer delays were noted in some cases in the study, up to more 
than fifty years from the time of conviction • .W 
committe 
There is no need for me to inform the members of this 
U he of delay is particularly acute in 
In such cases, the continuation of 
the sentence from being carried out. Thirty-
seven states now authorize capital punishment, and about 2,000 
.W See Bator, supra note 7, at 452; Mackey v. United States, 
401 U.S. 667, 690-91 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, 
J.); Friendly, supra note 10, at 146; Spalding v. Aiken, 
460 U.S. 1093, 1096-97 (1983) (statement of Burger, c.J.). 
lV See Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and 
its Reform: An Empirical Analysis, 13 Rutgers L. J. 675, 
703-04 ( 1982) . 
r see, ~, Address of Justice Lewis F. Powell before the Eleventh Circuit Conference, Savannah, · Georgia, May 8-10, 1983, at 9-14; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment, 1986 (Dept. of Justice, Sept. 1987). 
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prisoners are currently under sentence of death, but the typical 
capital case is characterized by interminable litigation and re-
litigation, and fewer than a hundred executions have been carried 
out in the past twenty years. 1.1/ While the constitutionality of 
capital punishment under appropriate standards and procedures has 
now been settled for many years, and the popular and legislative 
judgment overwhelmingly supports the death penalty for the most 
serious crimes, the open-ended system of review has largely 
nullified this judgment as a practical matter. The federal 
habeas corpus jurisdiction, in particular, provides an avenue for 
obstruction and delay in these cases which the states are 
powerless to address. W The general problem was cogently 
described by Justice Lewis F. Powell in an address in 1983 before 
the Eleventh Circuit Conference: 
As capital cases accumulate, they add a 
new dimension to the problem of repetitive 
litigation .•.• Gregg v. Georgia decided 
that capital punishment is constitutional. 
Some 37 states have authorized it. Murders 
continue, many of incredible cruelty and 
barbarity, as mindless killings increase in 
much of the world. We now have more than 
1,000 convicted persons on death row, an 
intolerable situation. 
Many of these persons were convicted 
five and six years ago. Their cases of 
repetitive review move sluggishly through our 
dual system. We have found no effective way 
l.1/ NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Death Row. U.S.A. 
(NOV. 1, 19 8 7) • 





to assure careful and fair and yet 
expeditious and final review. 
So far this Term, we have granted and 
heard arguments in four capital cases, and 
have agreed to hear a fifth next Term. We 
have received 28 applications for stays of 
execution, about half of which have come at 
the eleventh hour •••• 
Perhaps counsel should not be criticized 
for taking every adva~tage of a system that 
irrationally permits the now familiar abuse 
of process. The primary fault lies with our 
permissive system, that both Congress and the 
courts tolerate •••. [There is) need for 
legislation that would inhibit unlimited 
[habeas corpus) filings .... .W 
In the few years since Justice Powell's remarks, the 
*intolerable* figure of 1,000 prisoners awaiting execution has 
roughly doubled, and the need for remedial legislation remains 
unmet. 
III. Legislative Restrictions of Habeas Corpus 
The Supreme Court, in its current habeas corpus 
jurisprudence, has given weight to considerations of finality and 
federalism that were ignored or shrugged off in the expansive 
decisions of the 1960's. A number of the Justices have been 
openly critical of excessive habeas corpus review, and recent 
decisions have effected several limitations on its scope and 
.W Citation in note 20 supra. 
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availability. liJ However, the Court's ability to make changes 
in this area is constrained by precedent and existing statutory . 
provisions, by the need to proceed on a piecemeal basis in 
deciding particular cases, and by the absence of unanimity among 
the Justices concerning the particular reforms that should be 
adopted. An adequate response to the current problems of abuse 
and delay will require legislative action. 
Congress has in fa~t repeatedly expressed concerns 
about the expansion of the habeas corpus jurisdiction, and has 
endorsed corrective measures on a number of occasions. As early 
as 1884, a House Judiciary Committee Report strongly criticized 
the practice that had emerged in some lower federal courts of 
entertaining challenges to state convictions under the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867. The Report stated that the Act had been 
adopted as a response to the unique problems of Reconstruction, 
and was not meant to empower the inferior federal courts to 





See.~, Tollett v. Henderson. 91 U.S. 258 (1973); Stone 
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) ; ~ nwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72 (1977); "5umner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 u.s. 880 (1983); s. Rep. No. 226, 
98th Cong.; 1st Sess. 5-6 & nn. 13-16 (1983) (citation to 
critical statements by Justices). 
See H.R. Rep. No. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884). The 
Committee did not recommend direct action against this type 
of review because it believed that restoring the Supreme 
Court's jurisdiction to review decisions under the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867 might suffice to secure a satisfactory 
construction of the Act. Congress had divested the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction to hear appeals under the Habeas 
(continued ... ) 
-
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In the course of the present century, Congress has 
adopted a number of limitations on the federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction. Without attempting a complete description of 
existing legislative restrictions, the following examples may be 
of interest to the committee: 
First, under 28 u.s.c. § 2553 and Fed. R. App. P. 22, a 
state prisoner is barred from appealing the denial of habeas 
A~ rpus by a district court unless a ci~cuit or district judge 
~- y ies that there is probable cause for the appeal, This 
~~requirement currently serves the general purpose of avoiding the 
~
d for a full-dress appeal where the petitioner cannot make a 
'' stantial showing of a denial of a federal right. It 
' 
(...~originated in 1908 as a specific response to delay in capital 
cases which resulted from the pre-existing rule that state 
proceedings (including execution of a death sentence) were 
automatically stayed while habeas corpus litigation continued. 
The remarks of the floor manager in the House of Representatives 
in support of this reform have a strikingly contemporary ring: 
[T]he occasion for this legislation arises 
from the fact that .•• there is a large 
number of groundless appeals .•• in habeas 
corpus proceedings in capital cases .•.. 
£2/( ... continued) 
Corpus Act in 1868 to prevent the Court from interfering 
with the military governance of the defeated Confederacy. 




(IJt is only necessary in the proceedings to 
suggest a frivolous or fictitious federal 
question, have the petition overruled, and 
then take an appeal ... which delays the 
execution ••. from one to two years •... 
And there is no power •.• to prevent 
the prosecution of these groundless appeals. 
If a man has been there once he can go right 
back, start his habeas corpus proceedings 
again, and go right over the same 
case •.•• (Attorneys] now wait, until 
about the last minute, and then ••• 
prosecute (an] appeal ••.. .W 
Second, in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, 
Congress replaced the post~conviction habeas corpus remedy for 
federal prisoners with a statutory motion remedy (28 u.s.c. 
§ 2255) in the sentencing court. This reform was motivated in 
part by a desire to redress the litigative disadvantages that 
resulted to the government when federal prisoners sentenced in 
one district were permitted to mount collateral attacks on their 
convictions and sentences in other districts in which they were 
incarcerated. nJ 
Third, in 1966, Congress enacted 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d), 
which creates a presumption of correctness for state court fact-
finding in habeas corpus proceedings if certain conditions are 
.W 42 Cong. Rec. 608-09 (1908). The certificate of probable 
cause requirement remains available as a constraint on 
dilatory habeas corpus appeals in capital cases, see 
generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 u.s. 880 (1983), though 
it has obviously proven inadequate by itself to prevent 
gross abuse and interminable litigation in such cases. 
nJ See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D . 
171, 175, 178 (1949); see also United States v. Hayman, 342 
U.S. 205 (1952). 
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satisfied, and provides that the petitioner has the burden of 
overcoming this presumption by wconvincing evidence.w This went 
considerably beyond the pre-existing caselaw standards, which 
only held that a habeas court could forego an evidentiary hearing 
in certain circumstances. 2.,V 
Fourth, as noted earlier, Congress in 1970 barred 
access to federal habeas corpus for prisoners in the District of 
Columbia. The practical effect of this reform is that 
convictions and sentences imposed by the o.c. courts are not 
subject to review in the lower federal courts, but such review 
remains available in relation to the substantially similar court 
systems of the states. 
In addition to the various legislative reforms that are 
currently in effect, there have been efforts in Congress on a 
number of occasions to enact more complete solutions to the 
problems of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, often with 
the institutional support of the federal judiciary. 
For example, a provision enacted in the 1948 revision 
of the Judicial Code -- now 28 u.s.c. § 2254(c) -- generally bars 
access to federal habeas corpus by a state prisoner wif he has 
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 
1,Y See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (prior standard); 
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (strong interpretation 
of statutory presumption in favor of state fact-finding). 
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procedure, the question presented.• The enactment of this 
provision was the culmination of efforts by the Judicial 
Conference in the course of the 1940's to secure the limitation 
of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. 1V Judge Parker, 
who played the leading role in the Conference's work on this 
legislation, explained that the provision would generally bar 
access to federal habeas corpus · in any state that permitted 
repetitive recourse to its collateral remedies, and expressed the 
view that it would have the practical effect of abolishing 
federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state 
prisoners. 2.Q/ Notwithstanding the unequivocal language of the 
provision and Judge Parker's observation concerning its meaning, 
the supreme Court in Brown v. Allen. 344 u.s. 443, 447-50 (1953), 
refused to give it effect, stating that it was unwilling to 
accept so radical a change from prior habeas corpus practice 
without •a definite congressional direction.• 
Shortly after Brown v. Allen, the Judicial Conference 
tried again. The legislation it proposed this time would have 
barred raising a claim on federal habeas corpus so long as there 
had been a fair and adequate opportunity to raise the claim and 
have it determined in the state courts. The legislation would 
also have barred raising in federal habeas corpus proceedings any 
1V see generally Parker, supra note 27; Reports of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States 22-23 (1943), 22 (1944), 28 
(1945), 21 (1946), 46 (April 1947), 17-18 (Sept. 1947)~ 
1.Q/ See Parker, supra note 27, at 175-78. 
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claim that had actually been determined by the state . courts or 
that could still be raised and determined in state ·proceedings. 
As a further safeguard against prolonged proceedings and dilatory 
litigation, the legislation provided that review of a denial of a 
habeas corpus application could only be obtained by applying to 
the Supreme Court for certiorari within thirty days of the 
denial. 2l/ 
In addition to the Judicial Conference, the Department 
of Justice, the Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the 
National Association of Attorneys General, and the section on 
judicial administration of the American Bar Association endorsed 
this proposal. Following hearings and committee consideration, 
the House of Representatives passed this legislation on Jan. 19, 
1956, and passed it a second time on March 18, 1958 • .W 
In the course of Congress's consideration of this 
proposal, its proponents pointed out that the use of habeas 
corpus as a writ of review was a recent development that was 
unrelated to the historical function of the habeas corpus remedy. 
It was argued that the reforms would generally correct the 
increased caseload burdens, indefinite prolongation of 
21/ See Habeas Corpus: Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcomm. 
No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st 
Sess. l (1955) [hereafter cited as -Hearings*]. 
.1Y See id.; H.R. Rep. No. 1200, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); 
102 Cong. Rec. 935-40; 104 Cong. Rec. 4668, 4671-75. 
-
- 24 -
l~tigation, and conflict between the state and federal 
judiciaries that had resulted from the recent expansions of 
federal habeas corpus. It was also noted that the proposed 
reforms were responsive to the particular problem of delay in 
capital cases: 
Another evil to which the (Judicial 
Conference) committee addressed itself was 
the delay in executing State court sentences 
in capital cases as the result of appeals in 
habeas corpus proceedings •.•• [A] man 
could be convicted of a capital offense in a 
State court and be sentenced to death and his 
execution stayed while he exhausts State 
court remedies, then after having his 
conviction affirmed by the highest court in 
the State he can seek to have the lower 
Federal court review the action of the State 
courts. If the lower Federal court denies 
the relief sought, he can then make an 
application to the United States Court of 
Appeals. If the United States Court of 
Appeals affirms the action of the lower 
Federal court ••• and if certiorari is 
denied by the Supreme Court he can then go to 
another Federal court and ask for a writ of 
habeas corpus and go through the same 
procedure. There are cases where execution 
has been delayed for years and years by that 
practice • .W 
A final example of a far-reaching reform proposal that 
made substantial progress in Congress was the habeas corpus 
provision of title II of the proposed Omnibus Crime control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968. Title II of that legislation was 
formulated as a general response to innovative judicial decisions 
of the 1960's which were -thought to pose unwarranted impediments 
.W Hearings, supra note 31, at 6-7; see also~ at 9-10. 
• 
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to effective law enforcement. It included a provision that would 
have limited federal review of state judgments to -direct review 
in the supreme Court, thereby abolishing federal habeas corpus as 
a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners. 1.i/ 
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on the 
legislation stated that the proposal relating to habeas corpus 
would correct the problems of delay and abuse resulting from 
recent Supreme Court decisions that had transformed habeas corpus 
into a quasi-appellate mechanism. In supporting the 
constitutionality of the reform, the Report noted that the 
constitutional writ of habeas corpus was only a means of 
eliciting a statement of the grounds for detention and could not 
be used to challenge a conviction by a court with jurisdiction; 
that the Constitution's preservation of the habeas corpus right 
only operates against the federal government and not the states; 
and that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was only enacted as a 
means of enforcing the abolition of slavery • .W 
The Judiciary Committee sent this proposal to the 
Senate floor. However, it was ultimately deleted as part of a 
2!/ see 114 Cong. Rec. 14182 (1968). 
.W See 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2150-53. 
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broader compromise relating to the fonnulation of title II of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act . .W . 
IV. Pending Refonn Legislation 
Up to this point I have been discussing the historical 
expansion of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and past 
efforts by congress to curb its excesses. The final portion of 
my testimony will focus on the( mo~ promising vehicl~ r dealing ---with its contemporary problems. 
The President has recently transmitted to Congress the 
proposed 3777 ands. 1970). In 
brief, the main provisions of the proposed Act are as follows: 
Title I of the legislation would provide for the 
admission in federal judicial proceedings of evidence obtained 
under circumstances justifying an objectively reasonable belief 
that the search or seizure by which it was obtained was in 
conformity with the Fourth Amendment. Very similar exclusionary 
rule reform legislation was passed by the Senate ass. 1764 in 
the 98th Congress and by the House of Representatives as section 
673 of H.R. 5484 in the 99th Congress. lJ.../ 
.W See generally Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of 
Pre-Trial Interrogation 62-63 (Feb. 12, 1986). 
lJ..J See generally s. Rep. No. 350, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) 
(Senate Judiciary Committee Report on s. 1764). 
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would effect a variety of reforms in federal 
• 
habeas state prisoners and the corresponding 
collateral remedy for federal prisoners. Very similar habeas ? 
corpus reform legislation w 
the 98th Congress by a vote 
.------ __________ sS.1763in 
same 
\ 
proposals have also been introduced with broad sponsorship in 
various bills in the House of Representatives (e.g., H.R. 5594 of 
the 98th Congress). ,lV &--LL jJ 
Title III of the bill would restore an enforceable 
federal death penalty for the most egregious federal crimes of 
murder, treason, and espionage. Very similar death penalty 
legislation was passed by the Senate ass. 1765 in the 98th 
Congress. In the 99th Congress, the House of Representatives 
passed as part of H.R. 5484 legislation authorizing capital 
punishment under similar standards and procedures for killings in 
the course of a continuing drug enterprise offense. JV 
lY 
A' 
see generally s. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st sess. ( (1983 
(Senate Judiciary Committee Report on s. 1763); Habeas 
Corpus Reform: Hearing on s. 238 Before th,_sen~e Comm. 
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-59 ~ (most 
recent testimony of Department of Justice in support of 
habeas corpus reform legislation}. 
on 
1.2/ See generally s. Rep. No. 251, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 
s. Rep. No. 282, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986} (Senate 
Judiciary Committee Reports on capital punishment 
proposals}. 
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The habeas corpus reform proposals of title II of the -
proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act are obviou~ly ' most germane 
to the subject of this hearing. These proposals have the support 
of the Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the National 
Association of Attorneys General, the National District Attorneys 
Association, and the National Governors Association • .iQ/ As 
noted above, they have already been the Senate 
proposed 
comprises a moderate and balanc~d set of 
in habeas corpus standards and procedures. 
does not go as far as the legislation that was twice passed 
the House of Representatives in the 1950's or the legislati 
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1968 
have virtually abolished federal habeas corpus for 
prisoners -- but it does provide effective responses to 
clearest problems of the current system. 
foreclose all possibilities of abuse and delay in 
punishment litigation, it would bring about basic 
that context, as well as in non-capital cases. The specific ---reforms proposed are as follows: 
.iQ/ See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on 
s. 829 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 226-27, 
235-36, 287-88, 309-11, 1111-12 (1983). The formal 
resolution of the National Governors Association, -.i.g. at 




First, there is currently no time limit on habeas 
corpus applications. This reflects a failure of the procedures 
associated with federal habeas corpus to keep pace with its 
expanding scope. By way of comparison, other remedies for 
reviewing or re-opening judgments in the federal courts are 
subject to definite time limitations. Federal defendants, for 
example, generally must decide whether to appeal within ten days 
(Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)); state convicts seeking direct review of 
their convictions in the Supreme Court generally must apply 
within 60 days (Sup. ct. R. 20); and even a federal prisoner who 
claims to have new evidence of his innocence discovered after 
trial is subject to a two-year time limit under Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 33. 
The specific corrective proposed in title II is a one-
year limitation period for habeas corpus applications, normally 
running from exhaustion of state remedies . .ill State remedies 
would be exhausted with respect to a claim, and the time limit 
would begin to run, if the claim had once been taken up to the 
.4.1/ The legislation provides for deferral of the start of the 
time limitation period in certain extraordinary situations 
involving claims which could not have been discovered at an 
earlier point through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
retroactively applicable new rights which are subsequently 
recognized by the Supreme Court, or unlawful state 
interference with filing. However, these qualifications are 
narrowly and specifically defined in the legislation and the 
related legislative materials, and would not undermine the 
value of the time rule as a safeguard against unjustifiable 
delay. See generally s. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 8-10, 16-18 (1983). 
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highest court ot the state on review. State remedies would also 
be exhausted with respect to a claim in the relevant sense if the . 
direct review process were completed and state law barred raising 
such a claim in state collateral proceedings, or if the time 
provided by state law for raising such a claim in state 
collateral proceedings had expired • .W This would provide state 
convicts with a reasonable period within which to seek federal 
habeas corpus review, but would provide protection against the 
delays of years or decades beyond the normal conclusion of state -
proceedings that now frequently occur in habeas corpus 
litigation. 
A time limitation is obviously of particul 
~
importance 
......._ _____ ______ 
in capital cases. The incentives of the current system favor -
by capital punishment litigants in habeas 
corpus proceedings. There is generally no particular 
r 
disadvantage in filing a petition later rather than earlier, and 
delaying until the last moment makes it more likely that the 
continuation of litigation will prevent an execution from being 
.W ~~at 17, 20. Since state rules generally bar raising 
on collateral attack claims that were raised or that could 
have been raised on direct review, the time limitation 
period would begin to run with respect to most types of 
claims -- i.e., those not allowed on collateral attack --
when direct review of the case was completed or the time for 
seeking direct review expired. If a state replaced the 
traditional bifurcated system of direct review and 
collateral attack with a unitary review system, the 
completion of unitary review or the expiration of the time 
for seeking such review would similarly start the running of 
the time limitation period. See id. at 17 n. 63. 
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carried out. In contrast, the proposed time rule would provide 
capi~ gants wj th an incentive to seek federa·1 habeas corpus 
• 
review promptly, and to present all available claims in initial 
~
habeas corpus applications . .i.l/ A failure to do so would risk 
having delayed or omitted claims dismissed as time-barred if 
presented at a later point. 
The second major reform proposed in the legislation is 
a general narrowing and simplification of the standard of review 
in federal habeas corpus- proceedings. Under the current system, 
state court fact-finding is presumed to be correct if a number of 
poorly-defined conditions set out in 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (d) are 
satisfied, but the federal habeas court is required to make an 
independent determination of questions of law and to apply the 
law independently to the facts. This can result in the 
overturning of a state judgment -- following the passage of years 
and affirmance by the appellate courts of the states -- on 
grounds which the habeas court recognizes as close or unsettled 
questions on which courts may reasonably differ, and on which the 
lower federal courts themselves may disagree. The legislation 
would substitute a relatively simple and uniform standard under ------which the federal habeas would generally defer to the state 
determination of a claim if it was reasonable in its resolution 
.!l/ Once a claim has been presented in a federal petition and 
rejected on the merits, it may be dismissed if it i~ 
presented again in a subsequent petition. See Habeas Corpus 
Rule 9(b). 
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of legal and factual issues and was arrived at by procedures 
consistent with due process. i.4./ 
Like the other reforms of the legislation, this change 
in the standard of review would reduce the dilatory potential of 
habeas corpus litigation in capital cases, as well as curbing 
excessive review in non-capital habeas cases. A capital sentence 
predicated on a clear violation of the defendant's federal rights 
would remain subject to correction on habeas corpus. But the 
invalidation of a capital sentence would no longer be required or 
permitted simply because the state courts reasonably resolved a 
close or unsettled question in a manner different from a lower 
federal court in the same geographic area. 
A third reform in the legislation is a codification of 
the caselaw standards governing the consideration in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings of claims that were not properly ra i sed 
before the state courts (the standard for excusing •procedural 
defaults•). This would bring greater definiteness and clarity to · 
the law in this area and would help ensure that lower courts 
consistently resolve this issue in conformity with the properl y 
restrictive standards that have been articulated by the Supreme 
Court. W 
!.!/ see generally s~ Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 , 
22-28 (1983). 
W See generally is;L_ at 7-8, 12-16; Murray v. Carrier. 106 s. 





A fourth reform is providing that a federal habeas 
court can deny a petition on the merits, even if state remedies 
have not been exhausted. In capital cases, as in other cases, 
this would enable district judges to deny frivolous claims 
promptly, without the delay and waste of resources involved in 
sending the petiti~ner back to state court to pursue state 
remedies • .!.21 
A fifth reform proposed in the legislation would vest 
the authority to issue certificates of probable cause for appeal 
in habeas corpus proceedings exclusively in the judges of the 
courts of appeals. This would correct inefficient and wasteful 
features of current procedure under which a petitioner is given 
repetitive opportunities to attempt to persuade first a district 
judge and then a circuit judge to authorize an appeal, and under 
which a court of appeals is required to hear an appeal on a 
district judge's certification, though it believes that the 
certificate was improvidently granted. 47/ 
Finally, title II of the Criminal Justice Reform Act 
would institute comparable reforms relating to time limitation, 
excuse of procedural defaults, and certification of probable 
~ See generally s. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 
21-22 (1983). 
47/ See generally id. at 10, 18-19. 
f I • ) . . 
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cause tor appeal in relation to the collateral remedy for federal 
prisoners under 28 u.s.c. § 2255. Collateral litigation by 
federal prisoners, like habeas corpus litigation by state 
prisoners, frequently involves frivolous and repetitive 
applications; the enactment of these reforms in the§ 2255 remedy 
would be ot comparable value in limiting this abuse. ill In 
conjunction with the proposed restoration of an enforceable 
federal death penalty by title III of the Criminal Justice Reform 
Act, it would also guard against efforts to obstruct the 
execution of federal death sentences through dilatory§ 2255 
litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, I hope that my remarks today have been of 
use to the committee in its consideration of this important 
national problem. It is intolerable that the cumbersomeness and 
redundancy of the process of review have largely thwarted the 
constitutionally valid judgments of most state legislatures to 
impose capital punishment for the most atrocious crimes. 
Needless to say, no one would countenance a •rush to 
judgment• in capital cases, or in criminal cases generally. But 
there is a fundamental difference between reasonable review 
processes which ensure that a sentence is justly imposed, and 
W See generally .i9..:.. at 19, 30-31. 
' > 
~ I • 
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irrationally excessive processes which ensure that it will never 
be carried out. 
The Constitution only require s that a defendant be 
given a fair trial. A convicted defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to appellate review, but we believe, of 
course, thar an appeal should b~ allowed as a matter of fairness, 
and the states regularly provide the right to appeal under their 
procedures. Beyond the initial state appeal, the defendant will 
at least have the right to seek discretionary review by the 
highest court of the state, and review by the state supreme court 
may be mandatory in capital cases. 
Beyond the whole process of direct review, state 
collateral remedies are available for claims which could not be 
raised on direct review, and these remedies are regularly 
resorted to in capital cases. In cases where innocence can be 
proven, and in capital cases generally, the state executive -=-----clemency process provides an important, ultimate safeguard 
against injustice. Finally, beyond all state remedies, a 
~
defendant can seek direct review by the Supreme Court at the 
conclusion of any trip up to the highest state court on review. 
Review in the lower federal courts by habeas corpus 
comes on top of this abundant -- and in capital cases, super-
abundant -- panoply of remedies and review mechanisms. If it 
-
,I-. I I " J 
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were rarely utilized or insignificant in its effects, the 
provision of a possibly superfluous additional review mechanism 
' 
would be a lesser concern. In reality, however, it fundamentally 
distorts the criminal justice system by precluding any definite 
end to the litigation of a criminal case while the defendant 
remains in custody, and by multiplying the potential avenues of 
obstruction in capital punishment litigation. 
These problems will continue only if we permit them to. 
Congress is free to decide whether or not the judgments of the 
state courts should be reviewed by the lower federal courts, and 
if so, subject to what conditions and limitations. In the past, 
Congress has been willing to limit federal -habeas corpus review 
when it ceased to further the interests of justice and became in 
itself an impediment to justice. Congress should be willing to 
do so today in response to the extreme problems of abuse and 
delay that now characterize federal habeas corpus litigation, and 
the virtually incredible effects of this abuse in capital cases. 
The most practical and readily achievable response to 
these problems would be enactment of the proposed Criminal 
Justice Reform Act, and particularly the habeas corpus reforms 
proposed in title II of that legislation. In the words of 
Attorney General William French Smith, these reforms would wgo 
far toward correcting the major deficiencies of the present 
system of federal habeas corpus in terms of federalism, proper 
.... • ) ' ..l-
J ~ .. 
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regard for the stature of the state courts, and the needs of 
criminal justice.• .4.2/ 
.4.2/ Proposals for Habeas corpus Reform, supra note 2, at 153. 
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Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before this 
committee to present the views of the Department of Justice on 
the need for reform of federal habeas corpus, and on the 
particularly acute problems of obstruction and delay that have 
arisen from the abuse of habeas corpus in capital cases. Before 
turning to a specific discussion of these issues, let me direct 
your attention briefly to two general assessments. The first is 
an observation of Justice Lewis F. Powell, delivered at an 
American Bar Association meeting in 1982. In commenting on the 
major contemporary problems of the federal judicial system, 
Justice Powell observed: 
Another cause of overload of the federal 
system is (28 U.S.C.] § 2254, conferring 
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review 
state court criminal convictions. There is 
no statute of limitations, and no finality of 
federal review of state convictions. Thus, 
repetitive recourse is commonplace. I know 
of no other system of justice structured in a 
way that assures no end to the litigation of 
a criminal conviction. our practice in this 
respect is viewed with disbelief by lawyers 
and judges in other countries. Nor does the 
Constitution require this sort of 
redundancy • .l/ 
The second observation I wish to bring to your 
attention was made by Attorney General William French Smith i rl 
1983. In the course of a general critique of the current federal 
habeas corpus jurisdiction, Attorney General Smith stated: -✓ 
.l/ Address of Justice Lewis F. Powell before the American Bar 
Association Division of Judicial Administration, Aug. 9, 1982 . 
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A • •• final criticism is that the 
present system of habeas corpus review 
creates particularly acute problems in 
capital cases •••• The •public interest• 
organizations that routinely involve 
themselves ••• in capital cases have fully 
exploited the system's potential for 
obstruction. Delay is maximized by deferring 
collateral attack until the eve of execution . 
Once a stay of execution has been obtained, 
the possibility of carrying out the sentence 
is foreclosed for additional years as the 
case works its way through the multiple 
layers of appeal and review in the state and 
federal courts. 
The solution to this problem lies in 
part in the reform of state court procedures 
•••• The efficacy of state reforms is 
severely limited, however, by the 
availability of federal habeas corpus, which 
cannot be limited by the state legislatures 
•••• It ••• prevents correction of the 
practical nullification of all capital 
punishment legislation that has resulted from 
litigational delay and obstruction. V 
In my testimony today , I will discuss how we have come 
to have a system that •assures no end to the litigati on of a 
criminal conviction• -- a system that is •viewed with disbelief 
by lawyers and judges in other countries,• and that results in 
the •practical nullification• of the judgment of the vast 
majority of Americans that capital punishment is the appropri~te 
penalty for the most egregious crimes. I will also discuss the 
means of correcting these anomalies. 
V Proposals for Habeas corpus Reform in P. McGuigan & R. 
Rader, eds., criminal Justice Reform: A Bluepri nt 137, 145-





The initial portion of my testimony will address the 
historical development of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. 
A review of the relevant history shows clearly that the current 
statutory •habeas corpus• reme~y by which the lower federal 
courts review state judgments has no relationship to the 
traditional writ of habeas corpus whose suspension is prohibited 
by the Constitution. Whether state prisoners should have a post-
conviction remedy in the lower federal courts, and if so, how 
broadly, is entirely within Congress's discretion. 
second, I will discuss the contemporary problems of 
abuse arising from expansive habeas corpus review, and respond to 
the argument that the interests of justice require the endless 
second-guessing of state judgments it produces. 
Third, I will review the history of congressional 
action aimed at curbing excessive habeas corpus review. This 
history shows that there is ample precedent for Congress's 
exercise of its authority to regulate the scope of federal habeas 
corpus in order to deal with the general problem of habeas corpus 
abuse and the specific problem of abuse in capital cases. 
Finally, I will discuss pending habeas corpus reform 
legislation -- title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform 
Act (H.R. 3777 ands. 1970) -- which would provide effective 
responses to many of the current problems of abuse and delay. 
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I. The History of Habeas corpus 
Federal review of the judgments of state courts has 
traditionally been limited to direct review in the Supreme Court. 
Under contemporary practice, however, a state prisoner who has 
exhausted his avenues of appeal in the state court system may 
continue to litigate the validity of his conviction or sentence 
by applying for habeas corpus in a federal district court. In 
the habeas corpus proceeding, the prisoner may raise and secure a 
redetermination of the same claims of federal right that have 
already been fully litigated and rejected at multiple levels of 
the state court system. In practical effect, this procedure 
places federal trial judges in the position of reviewing courts, 
with authority to overturn the considered judgments of state 
courts of appeals and state supreme courts in criminal cases. 
A review of the relevant history shows that Congress 
never decided to give the lower federal courts this extraordinary 
power, and that it has no basis in the Constitution or the co~on 
law tradition. At common law, habeas corpus was essentially a 
means of securing judicial review of the existence of grounds for 
executive detention. If a person was taken into custody by 
executive authorities, he could petition a court to i ssue a writ 




prisoner and state the cause of his commitment. If the 
government made an adequate return stating that the petitioner 
was being held on a criminal charge, the court would set bail for 
the petitioner, or allow him to remain in detention pending 
trial, depending on whether the offense charged was bailable or 
non-bailable. If the government could state no charge against 
the petitioner, the court would order his release. l/ 
The importance of habeas corpus in this character -- as 
a safeguard against indefinite detention without charges or trial 
-- was recognized by the Framers, who included in the 
Constitution a prohibition of suspending the writ of habeas 
corpus, •unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
safety may require it.• The writ of habeas corpus referred to in 
the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, however, differed in 
two fundamental respects from the contemporary statutory writ by 
which the lower federal courts review state criminal judgments. 
First, the right to habeas corpus set out in the 
Constitution was only intended as a check on abuses of authority 
I 
by the federal government, and was not meant to provide a 
1/ S.U, LS.s., Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States -- 1776-1865, 
32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243, 243-45, 262 (1965); Oaks, Legal 
History in the High court -- Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 
451, 451, 460-61, 468 (1966): Hart & Wechsler's The Federal 
courts and the Federal System 1513 (2d ed. 1973); R. Rader, 
Bailing out a Failed Law; The Constitution and Pre-Trial 
Detention in P. McGuigan & R. Rader, eds., Criminal Justice 
Reform: A Blueprint 91, 94-96 (1983). 
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judicial remedy for unlawful detention by state authorities. 
This point is evident, to begin with, from the placement of the 
suspension Clause in Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution, 
which is an enumeration of limitations on the power of the 
federal government. The corresponding enumeration of 
restrictions on state authority in Section 10 of Arti cle I 
contains no right to habeas corpus. J./ Shortly after the 
ratification of the Constitution, the First Congress in 1789 made 
the limi tation of the federal habeas corpus right to federal 
prisoners explicit, providing in the First Judiciary Act {ch. 14, 
§ 20, 1 Stat. 81-82): 
[T]he justices of the supreme court, as well 
as judges of the district courts, shall have 
power to grant writs of habeas corpus for t he 
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of 
commitment. Provided, That writs of habeas 
corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners 
in gaol [i.e., jail], unless where they a r e 
in custody, under or by colour of the 
authority of the United States, or are . 
committed for trial before some court of the 
same . ... 
Second, the writ referred to in the Constitution, as 
noted above, was the common law writ of habeas corpus, a~- . , 
trial remedy whose essential function was to serve as a check on 
arbitrary executive detention. Recognition of the common law 
/ 
scope of the writ is reflected in the Constitution's 
J./ see generally 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
convention of 1787, at 438 {1966): 3 il- at 157, 213, 290 
{assumption in debate at the Constitutional Convention that 




authorization of the suspension of the writ in cases of rebellion 
or invasion, whose obvious purpose is to permit in such 
circumstances executive detention unconstrained by normal legal 
processes and standards.~ Similarly, the First Judiciary Act 
described the function of the writ as •inquiry into the cause of 
commitment• and referred to its availability to federal prisoners 
•committed for trial.• 
The restriction of federal habeas corpus to federal 
prisoners was qualified by the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act 
of 1867, which extended the availability of the writ to persons 
•retrained of ••• liberty• in violation of federal law, without 
any requirement of federal custody. The legislative history of 
the Act indicates that it was meant to provide a federal remedy 
for former slaves who were being held in involuntary servitude in 
the states in violation of the wartime emancipation decrees and 
the recently enacted Thirteenth Amendment. Thus, Congress acted 
with a narrow purpose in extending the availability of federal 
habeas corpus beyond persons in federal custody, and the initial 
judicial applications of the enlarged jurisdiction were also 
i 
i 
quite narrow. Y The courts continued to follow the common law 
rule that a prisoner could not challenge his detention pursuant 
_ / 
~ see generally .isL.: 1 Blackstone, commentaries on the Laws of 
England 131-32 (1765). 
Y ~ Mayers, The Habeas corpus Act of 1867: The supreme 
court as Legal Historian. 33 u. Chi. L. Rev. 31 (1965). 
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to the judgment of a court by applying for habeas corpus unless 
the judgment was void because the court lacked jurisdiction. 1J 
Following the decision of Moore y. Dempsey. 261 u.s. 
86 (1923), a somewhat broader approach emerged under which a 
claimed violation of a federal right could be asserted on federal 
habeas corpus if no meaningful process for consideri ng such a 
claim was provided in the state courts. However, federal habeas 
review in this period generally depended on the absence of 
meaningful state remedies, and the habeas corpus jurisdiction of 
the federal courts did not become a general means for reviewing 
the substantive accuracy of state court determinations of federal 
claims • .§/ 
The final stage in the expansion of the federal habeas 
corpus jurisdiction came in innovative judicial deci sions of the 
1950's and 1960's which abrogated the traditional l i mitations on 
the habeas corpus remedy. V In conjunction with the expansion 
of substantive federal rights by decisions of the l960's, this 
effectively created a general reviewing jurisdiction of the lower 
1/ ~ Bator, Finality in criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
corpus for state Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 465-84 
(1963). 
.§I ~ isL.. at 463-65, 488-99. 
,, 
V ~ Townsend v. Sain. 372 u.s. 293 (1963): Fay v. Noia. 372 
U.S. 391 (1963): Brown y. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Bator, 
supra note 7, at 499-507 • 
~ 
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federal courts over the judgments of state courts in criminal 
cases. l.Q/ 
II. Assessment of the current System of Review 
Defenders of the current system of broad habeas corpus 
review often advance confused arguments that proposed reforms 
would interfere with the Great Writ of the common law, whose 
suspension is prohibited by the Constitution outside of extreme 
situations of public emergency. on the basis of the foregoing 
discussion, it is clear that such arguments are without merit. 
The traditional reverence for the Great Writ provides 
no support for the continuation of federal habeas corpus in its 
present character as a post-conviction remedy providing 
additional levels of review on claims that have been repeatedly 
adjudicated and rejected in state proceedings. As noted earlier, 
this use of habeas corpus would have appeared totally alien to 
the Framers, and to common law jurists generally prior to the ] 
middle of the twentieth century. The common law has revered 
habeas corpus as a safeguard against executive oppression, not✓as 
a mechanism by which one set of courts second-guesses the 
judgments of another set of courts • 
.l.Q/ ~ Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
criminal Judgments, JS u. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 154-57 (1970). 
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The same consideration is a sufficient response to the 
objecti on that proposed reforms would run afoul of the 
Constitution's prohibition of the suspension of habeas corpus. 
As discussed above, the statutory •habeas corpus• remedy that is 
currently available to state prisoners in the lower federal 
courts -- a quasi-appellate mechanism for reviewing state 
judgments -- is simply not the writ of habeas corpus referred to 
in the Constitution. These two writs have fundamentally 
different functions and are directed against the actions of 
different governments. They have nothing in common but a 
name • .11/ 
The existing system of federal habeas corpus review 
also cannot be justified as a necessary safeguard against 
injustices that would otherwise result from violations of federal 
rights by the state courts. The essential function of 
maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of federal l aw is 
carried out through direct review of the judgments of state 
courts and lower federal courts by the Supreme Court . State 
courts and federal courts are equally bound to uphold the 
Constitution and follow Supreme Court precedent in their 
decisions, and every state prisoner has the right to apply for 
ll/ It is also clear that no subsequent amendment to the 
Constitution requires review of state judgments by the lower 
federal courts. State prisoners have no constit utional 
right of access to a federal forum. ~ Allen v. Mccurry, 
449 u.s. 90, 102-03 (1980); Bator, The state courts and 
Federal constitutional Litigation. 22 wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
605, 627-28 (1981). 
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direct review by the Supreme Court following the affirmance of 
his conviction by the state courts. There is no adequate basis 
for believing that there is currently any general insensitivity 
to claims of federal right in the state courts, or that broad 
habeas corpus review by the lower federal courts -- provided in 
addition to the Supreme Court's traditional oversight through 
direct review -- has any value in protecting defendants' rights 
that outweighs its very substantial costs. l.2/ 
As a practical matter, a state prisoner who properly 
presents an application for federal habeas corpus has typically 
been tried and convicted of a serious offense in state court, has 
already had the conviction affirmed by a state appellate court on 
appeal, and has had an application for review denied or decided 
adversely by a state supreme court. Many habeas petitioners have 
also had additional review in state collateral proceedings . .W 
l.2/ ~ Bator, supra note 11, at 630-34 (disputing, in relation 
to habeas corpus review, alleged superiority of federal 
judges in sensitivity and competence under contemporary 
conditions); Friendly, supra note 10, at 165 n. 125 
(similar); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the 
Federal and state courts from the Perspective of a state ; 
Court Judge. 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 812-14 (19-81) 
(similar); Proposals for Habeas corpus Reform. supra note 2, 
at 149 (unlikelihood under contemporary circumstances of 
state court misapplication or resistance to Supreme Court / 
precedent);™ A.ilQ Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1105, 1119 (1977) c•we are not faced today with 
widespread state judicial refusal to enforce clear federal 
rights.•). 
lJ./ An extensive empirical study of habeas corpus litigation 
carried out for the Department of Justice found that most 
petitioners had been convicted of serious, violent offenses. 
(continued .•• ) 
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The incremental benefits of affording even more levels 
of mandatory review in the lower federal courts through habeas 
corpus are difficult to discern. In mo$t habeas cases the 
federal courts agree with the conclusion of the state courts, 
though considerable time and effort at both the district court 
and circuit court levels is often expended in reaching this 
result . In the relatively few cases in which relief is granted, 
it is likely to reflect disagreement with the state courts on 
arguable or unsettled issues in the interpretation or application 
of federal law on which the lower federal courts may disagree 
among themselves. li/ 
The questionable value of this type of review is 
emphasized by the experience in the District of Col umbia. In 
l.J./( ••• continued) 
over 80% had been convicted after trial, and practically the 
same proportion had had, or were having, direct appellate 
review of their cases in the state system. Moreover, about 
45% of petitioners had pursued collateral remedies in the 
state courts, including over ·20% .who had filed two or more 
previous state petitions. over 30% had filed one or more 
previous federal petitions. a,n P. Robinson, An Empirical 
study of Federal Habeas corpus Review of state court 
Judgments 4(a), 7, 15, 20 (Federal Justice Research Progr.am 
1979). Even where a petitioner has not had prior state 
1 
court review of his claims, this does not impl y that means 
for raising such claims are unavailable in the state courts, 
since prisoners frequently by-pass state remedies and file 
procedurally defective habeas corpus petitions. ~~at 
13. 
li/ a,n Friendly, supra note 10, at 144 n. 10, 148 n. 25, 165 n. 
125; Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearing on s. 238 Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 
(1985); The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearing on 
s . 2216 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 42-44 (1982 ) . 
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establishing a separate court system for the District of Columbia 
in 1970, Congress barred D.C. prisoners from applying for habeas 
corpus in the federal courts, limiting them instead to a 
collateral remedy in the D.C. courts. No adverse effect on the 
quality or fairness of criminal proceedings in the District of 
Columbia has been observed to result from this restriction. l.2J 
When the preclusion of federal habeas corpus review in one major 
jurisdiction has caused no evident problems over a period of 
nearly twenty years, it becomes difficult to believe that 
reasonable limitations on such review would adversely affect the 
quality of justice in the substantially similar judicial systems 
of the states. 
While the benefits of the current system of federal 
habeas corpus are, to say the least, nebulous, its costs are 
substantial and obvious. The exercise by individual federal 
trial judges of the authority to review and overturn the 
considered judgments of state supreme courts is a perennial 
source of tension in the relationship of the federal and state 
judiciaries. While most habeas corpus applications are wholly 
lacking in merit, they continue to impose substantial burdens on 
judges and prosecutors in carrying out a review function that is 
essentially redundant in relation to state review processes. 
.W .S.U Proposals for Habeas Corpus Reform, supra note 2, at 
148-49; McGowan, The View From an Inferior Court. 19 San 
Diego L. Rev. 659, 667-69 (1982). The Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of this reform in Swain v. Pressley. 
430 U.S. 372 (1977). 
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This burden is increasing. The number of habeas corpus petitions 
filed by state prisoners in the federal district courts over the 





















Habeas corpus petitions, in common with other prisoners 
suits, are all too frequently filed as a type of recreational 
activity, which provides prisoners with a cost-free means of 
striking out at the system and passing time in prison. lJ./ The 
implicit message of permitting endless challenges to convictions 
and sentences is that the system never really regards the 
prisoner's guilt as an established fact, and that he need never 
accept and deal with it. Judges and writers have frequently 
expressed the view that the exaggerated lack of confidence in the 
possibility of just conviction and punishment which this open-, 
.W These figures are drawn from the Annual Reports of the 
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
In addition to reporting 9,524 habeas corpus petitions by 
state prisoners, the most recent report (1987 ) noted 1,808 
habeas corpus petitions and 1,664 •motions to vacate 
sentence• by federal prisoners (Table C2). 
ll./ .S.U Habeas corpus Reform: Hearing on s. 238 before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 
(1985). 
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ended review system reflects is in conflict with the corrective 
and deterrent functions of the criminal justice system. l.aJ 
The difficulty of dealing with these cases is increased 
by the absence of any definite time limit on habeas corpus 
applications, which can result in the need to reconstruct events 
after a lapse of years or decades. Data collected in an 
extensive study conducted for the Department of Justice showed 
that about 40 percent of habeas corpus petitions were filed more 
than five years after the state conviction, and nearly one-third 
were filed more than a decade after the state conviction. Still 
longer delays were noted in some cases in the study, up to more 
than fifty years from the time of conviction • .li/ 
There is no need for me to inform the members of this 
committee that the problem of delay is particularly acute in 
capital cases . .W In such cases, the continuation of 
litigation prevents the sentence from being carried out. Thirty-
seven states now authorize capital punishment, and about 2,000 
l.a/ ~ Bator, supra note 7, at 452; Mackey v, united states ; 
401 U.S. 667, 690-91 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, 
J.); Friendly, supra note 10, at 146; Spalding v, Aiken, 
460 U.S. 1093, 1096-97 (1983) (statement of Burger, C.J.). 
.li/ SU Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and 
its Reform: An Empirical Analysis. 13 Rutgers L. J. 675, 
703-04 (1982). 
.W See, L.Su, Address of Justice Lewis F. Powell before the 
Eleventh Circuit Conference, Savannah, Georgia, May 8-10, 
1983, at 9-14; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital 
Punishment. 1986 (Dept. of Justice, Sept. 1987). 
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prisoners are currently under sentence of death, but the typical 
capital case is characterized by interminable litigation and re-
litigation, and fewer than a hundred executions have been carried 
out in the past twenty years • .2.1/ While the constitutionality of 
capital punishment under appropriate standards and procedures has 
now been settled for many years, and the popular and legislative 
judgment overwhelmingly supports the death penalty for the most 
serious crimes, the open-ended system of review has largely 
nullified this judgment as a practical matter. The federal 
habeas corpus jurisdiction, in particular, provides an avenue for 
obstruction and delay in these cases which the states are 
powerless to address. 1,V The general problem was cogently 
described by Justice Lewis F. Powell in an address in 1983 before 
the Eleventh Circuit Conference: 
As capital cases accumulate, they add a 
new dimension to the problem of repetitive 
litigation •••• Gregg v, Georgia decided 
that capital punishment is constitutional. 
Some 37 states have authorized it. Murders 
continue, many of incredible cruelty and 
barbarity, as mindless killings increase in 
much of the world. We now have more than 
1,000 convicted persons on death row, an 
intolerable situation • 
Many of these persons were convicted 
five and six years ago. Their cases of 
repetitive review move sluggishly through our 
dual system. We have found no effective way 
.2.1/ NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Death Row. U.S.A . 
(Nov. 1, 1987). 
.W ~ Proposals for Habeas corpus Reform, supra note 2, at 
145-46. 
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to assure careful and fair and yet 
expeditious and final review. 
So far this Term, we have granted and 
heard arguments in four capital cases, and 
have agreed to hear a fifth next Term. We 
have received 28 applications for stays of 
execution, about half of which have come at 
the eleventh hour •••• 
Perhaps counsel should not be criticized 
for taking every advantage of a system that 
irrationally permits the now familiar abuse 
of process. The primary fault lies with our 
permissive system, that both Congress and the 
courts tolerate •••• [There is) need for 
legislation that would inhibit unlimited 
(habeas corpus) filings •••• .2,V 
In the few years since Justice Powell's remarks, the 
•intolerable• figure of 1,000 prisoners awaiting execution has 
roughly doubled, and the need for remedial legislation remains 
unmet. 
III. Legislative Restrictions of Habeas Corpus 
The Supreme Court, in its current habeas corpus 
jurisprudence, has given weight to considerations of finality and 
federalism that were ignored or shrugged off in the expansive 
' decisions of the 1960's. A number of the Justices have been ; 
openly critical of excessive habeas corpus review, and recent 
decisions have effected several limitations on its scope and 
.2.J1 Citation in note 20 supra. 
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availability. 1.i/ However, the Court's ability to make changes 
in this area is constrained by precedent and existing statutory 
provisions, by the need to proceed on a piecemeal basis in 
deciding particular cases, and by the absence of unanimity among 
the Justices concerning the particular reforms that should be 
adopted. An adequate response to the current problems of abuse 
and delay will require legislative action. 
Congress has in fact repeatedly expressed concerns 
about the expansion of the habeas corpus jurisdiction, and has 
endorsed corrective measures on a number of occasions. As early 
as 1884, a House Judiciary Committee Report strongly criticized 
the practice that had emerged in some lower federal courts of 
entertaining challenges to state convictions under the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867. The Report stated that the Act had been 
adopted as a response to the unique problems of Reconstruction, 
and was not meant to empower the inferior federal courts to 
overturn the judgments of state courts • .a.2f 
1.i/ ~, .L.S.a., Tollett v, Henderson. 411 u.s. 258 (1973); stone 
y, Powell, 428 u.s. 465 (1976); wainwright v. Sykes, 433 ; 
u.s. 72 (1977); Sumner v. Mata, 449 u.s. 539 (1981); . 
Barefoot v, Estelle. 463 u.s. 880 (1983); s. Rep. No. 226, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 & nn. 13-16 (1983) (citation to 
critical statements by Justices). 
.a.2f ~ H.R. Rep. No. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884). The 
Committee did not recommend direct action against this type 
of review because it believed that restoring the Supreme 
Court's jurisdiction to review decisions under the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867 might suffice to secure a satisfactory 
construction of the Act. Congress had divested the Supreme 
court of jurisdiction to hear appeals under the Habeas 
(continued .•• ) 
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In the course of the present century, Congress has 
adopted a number of limitations on the federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction. Without attempting a complete description of 
existing legislative restrictions, the following examples may be 
of interest to the committee: 
First, under 28 u.s.c. § 2553 and Fed. R. App. P. 22, a 
state prisoner is barred from appealing the denial of habeas 
corpus by a district court unless a circuit or district judge 
certifies that there is probable cause for the appeal. This 
requirement currently serves the general purpose of avoiding the 
need for a full-dress appeal where the petitioner cannot make a 
substantial showing of a denial of a federal right. It 
originated in 1908 as a specific response to delay in capital 
cases which resulted from the pre-existing rule that state 
proceedings (including execution of a death sentence) were 
automatically stayed while habeas corpus litigation continued. 
The remarks of the floor manager in the House of Representatives 
in support of this reform have a strikingly contemporary ring ~ 
[T]he occasion for this legislation arises 
from the fact that ••• there is a large 
number of groundless appeals ••• in habeas 
corpus proceedings in capital cases •••• 
~( ••• continued) 
I 
/ 
Corpus Act in 1868 to prevent the Court from interfering 
with the military governance of the defeated Confederacy. 
~ generally Mayers, supra note 6, at 41 & n. 44, 51 & n. 
76. 
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(I]t is only necessary in the proceedings to 
suggest a frivolous or fictitious federal 
question, have the petition overruled, and 
then take an appeal ••• which delays the 
execution ••• from one to two years • • • • 
And there is no power ••• to prevent 
the prosecution of these groundless appeals. 
If a man has been there once he can go right 
back, start his habeas corpus proceedings 
again, and go right over the same 
case •••• [Attorneys] now wait, until 
about the last minute, and then ••• 
prosecute [an] appeal . •.• .2§/ 
Second, in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, 
Congress replaced the post-conviction habeas corpus remedy for 
federal prisoners with a statutory motion remedy (28 u.s.c. 
§ 2255) in the sentencing court. This reform was motivated in 
part by a desire to redress the litigative disadvantages that 
resulted to the government when federal prisoners sentenced in 
one district were permitted to mount collateral attacks on their 
convictions and sentences in other districts in which they were 
incarcerated. W 
Third, in 1966, Congress enacted 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d), 
which creates a presumption of correctness for state court fact-
i 
finding in habeas corpus proceedings if certain conditions are' 
.2§/ 42 Cong. Rec. 608-09 (1908). The certificate of probable 
cause requirement remains available as a constraint on 
dilatory habeas corpus appeals in capital cases, All 
generally Barefoot y, Estelle, 463 u.s. 880 (1983), though 
it has obviously proven inadequate by itself to prevent 
gross abuse and interminable litigation in such cases. 
W b§ Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 
111, 175, 178 (1949): ™ li§.2 united states v, Hayman, 342 
U.S. 205 (1952). 
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satisfied, and provides that the petitioner has the burden of 
overcoming this presumption by •convincing evidence.• This went 
considerably beyond the pre-existing caselaw standards, which 
only held that a habeas court could forego an evidentiary hearing 
in certain circumstances • .2,.a/ 
Fourth, as noted earlier, Congress in 1970 barred 
access to federal habeas corpus for prisoners in the District of 
Columbia. The practical effect of this reform is that 
convictions and sentences imposed by the o.c. courts are not 
subject to review in the lower federal courts, but such review 
remains available in relation to the substantially similar court 
systems of the states. 
In addition to the various legislative reforms that are 
currently in effect, there have been efforts in Congress on a 
number of occasions to enact more complete solutions to the 
problems of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, often with 
the institutional support of the federal judiciary. 
For example, a provision enacted in the 1948 revision 
of the Judicial Code -- now 28 u.s.c. § 2254(c) -- generally bars 
, / 
access to federal habeas corpus by a state prisoner •if he has 
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 
.2..a/ Sll Townsend v, Sain. 372 u.s. 293 (1963) (prior standard); 
Sumner y, Mata. 449 u.s. 539 (1981) (strong interpretation 
of statutory presumption in favor of state fact-finding). 
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procedure, the question presented.• The enactment of this 
provision was the culmination of efforts by the Judicial 
Conference in the course of the 1940's to secure the limitation 
of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners • .a..2./ Judge Parker, 
who played the leading role in the Conference's work on this 
legislation, explained that the provision would generally bar 
access to federal habeas corpus in any state that permitted 
repetitive recourse to its collateral remedies, and expressed the 
view that it would have the practical effect of abol i shing 
federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state 
prisoners • .W Notwithstanding the unequivocal language of the 
provision and Judge Parker's observation concerning i ts meaning, 
the supreme court in Brown v, Allen, 344 u.s. 443, 447-50 (1953), 
refused to give it effect, stating that it was unwill ing to 
accept so radical a change from prior habeas corpus practice 
without •a definite congressional direction.• 
Shortly after Brown v. Allen, the Judicial conference 
tried again. The legislation it proposed this time would have 
barred raising a claim on federal habeas corpus so long as there 
I 
had been a fair and adequate opportunity to raise the claim and 
have it determined in the state courts. The legislation would 
also have barred raising in federal habeas corpus proceedings any 
.a..21 see generally Parker, supra note 27: Reports of the Judicial 
conference of the united states 22-23 (1943), 22 (1944), 2s 
(1945), 21 (1946), 46 (April 1947), 17-18 (Sept . 1947) • 
.W ~ Parker, supra note 27, at 175-78. 
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claim that had actually been determined by the state courts or 
that could still be raised and determined in state proceedings. 
As a further safeguard against prolonged proceedings and dilatory 
litigation, the legislation provided that review of a denial of a 
habeas corpus application could only be obtained by applying to 
the Supreme Court for certiorari within thirty days of the 
denial • .W 
In addition to the Judicial Conference, the Department 
of Justice, the Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the 
National Association of Attorneys General, and the section on 
judicial administration of the American Bar Association endorsed 
this proposal. Following hearings and committee consideration, 
the House of Representatives passed this legislation on Jan. 19, 
1956, and passed it a second time on March 18, 1958. 1V 
In the course of Congress's consideration of this 
proposal, its proponents pointed out that the use of habeas 
corpus as a writ of review was a recent development that was 
unrelated to the historical function of the habeas corpus rem~dy. 
It was argued that the reforms would generally correct the 
increased caseload burdens, indefinite prolongation of 
.W ~ Habeas Corpus: Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcomm. 
No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1 (1955) [hereafter cited as •Hearings•]. 
1V ~ ~; H.R. Rep. No. 1200, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); 
102 Cong. Rec. 935-40; 104 Cong. Rec. 4668, 4671-75. 
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litigation, and conflict between the state and federal 
judiciaries that had resulted from the recent expansions of 
federal habeas corpus. It was also noted that the proposed 
reforms were responsive to the particular problem of delay in 
capital cases: 
Another evil to which the [Judicial 
Conference] committee addressed 'itself was 
the delay in executing State court sentences 
in capital cases as the result of appeals in 
habeas corpus proceedings •••• [A] man 
could be convicted of a capital offense in a 
State court and be sentenced to death and his 
execution stayed while he exhausts State 
court remedies, then after having his 
conviction affirmed by the highest court in 
the State he can seek to have the lower 
Federal court review the action of the State 
courts. If the lower Federal court denies 
the relief sought, he can then make an 
application to the United States Court of 
Appeals. If the United States Court of 
Appeals affirms the action of the lower 
Federal court ••• and if certiorari is 
denied by the Supreme Court he can then go to 
another Federal court and ask for a writ of 
habeas corpus and go through the same 
procedure. There are cases where execution 
has been delayed for years and years by that 
practice. ll/ 
A final example of a far-reaching reform proposal that 
made substantial progress in Congress was the habeas corpus 
provision of title II of the proposed Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968. Title II of that legislation was 
formulated as a general response to innovative judicial decisions 
of the 1960's which were thought to pose unwarranted impediments 
ll/ Hearings, supra note 31, at 6-7: llil .All.Q JJL.. at 9-10. 
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to effective law enforcement. It included a provision that would 
have limited federal review of state judgments to direct review 
in the Supreme Court, thereby abolishing federal habeas corpus as 
a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners • .J.i/ 
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on the 
legislation stated that the proposal relating to habeas corpus 
would correct the problems of delay and abuse resulting from 
recent Supreme Court decisions that had transformed habeas corpus 
into a quasi-appellate mechanism. In supporting the 
constitutionality of the reform, the Report noted that the 
constitutional writ of habeas corpus was only a means of 
eliciting a statement of the grounds for detention and could not 
be used to challenge a conviction by a court with jurisdiction; 
that the Constitution's preservation of the habeas corpus right 
only operates against the federal government and not the states; 
and that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was only enacted as a 
means of enforcing the abolition of slavery • .W 
The Judiciary Committee sent this proposal to the 
Senate floor. However, it was ultimately deleted as part of a 
.J.i/ Sil 114 Cong. Rec. 14182 (1968). 
.W ~ 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2150-53 • 
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broader compromise relating to the formulation of title II of the 
omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act • .W 
IV. Pending Reform Legislation 
Up to this point I have been discussing the historical 
expansion of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and past 
efforts by congress to curb its excesses. The final portion of 
my testimony will focus on the most promising vehicle for dealing 
with its contemporary problems. 
The President has recently transmitted to Congress the 
proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act (H.R. 3777 ands. 1970). In 
brief, the main provisions of the proposed Act are as follows: 
Title I of the legislation would provide for the 
admission in federal judicial proceedings of evidence obtained 
under circumstances justifying an objectively reasonable belief 
that the search or seizure by which it was obtained was in 
conformity with the Fourth Amendment. Very similar exclusionary 
rule reform legislation was passed by the Senate ass. 1764 in 
the 98th Congress and by the House of Representatives as section 
673 of H.R. 5484 in the 99th congress. ll/ 
.W ~ generally Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of 
Pre-Trial Interrogation 62-63 (Feb. 12, 1986) . 
n.J See generally s. Rep. No. 350, 98th Cong., 2d sess. (1984) 
(Senate Judiciary Committee Report on s. 1764 ) . 
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Title II would effect a variety of reforms in federal 
habeas corpus for state prisoners and the corresponding 
collateral remedy for federal prisoners. Very similar habeas 
corpus reform legislation was passed by the Senate ass. 1763 in 
the 98th Congress by a vote of 67 to 9. Substantially the same 
proposals have also been introduced with broad sponsorship in 
various bills in the House of Representatives (e.g., H.R. 5594 of 
the 98th Congress) • .W 
Title III of the bill would restore an enforceable 
federal death penalty for the most egregious federal crimes of 
murder, treason, and espionage. Very similar death penalty 
legislation was passed by the Senate ass. 1765 in the 98th 
Congress. In the 99th Congress, the House of Representatives 
passed as part of H.R. 5484 legislation authorizing capital 
punishment under similar standards and procedures for killings in 
the course of a continuing drug enterprise offense • .W 
.W see generally s. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st sess. (1983) 
(Senate Judiciary Committee Report on s. 1763); Habeas 
Corpus Reform: Hearing on s. 238 Before the Senate Comm. _, on 
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-59 (1985) (most 
recent testimony of Department of Justice in support of 
habeas corpus reform legislation). 
.W see generally s. Rep. No. 251, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 
s. Rep. No. 282, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (Senate 
Judiciary Committee Reports on capital punishment 
proposals). 
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The habeas corpus reform proposals of title II of the 
proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act are obviously most germane 
to the subject of this hearing. These proposals have the support 
of the Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the National 
Association of Attorneys General, the National District Attorneys 
Association, and the National Governors Association. !.QI As 
noted above, they have already been passed by the Senate. 
Title II comprises a moderate and balanced set of 
proposed reforms in habeas corpus standards and procedures. It 
does not go as far as the legislation that was twice passed by 
the House of Representatives in the 1950's or the legislation 
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1968 -- which would 
have virtually abolished federal habeas corpus for state 
prisoners -- but it does provide effective responses to the 
clearest problems of the current system. While it would not 
foreclose all possibilities of abuse and delay in capital 
punishment litigation, it would bring about basic improvements in 
that context, as well as in non-capital cases. The specific 
reforms proposed in title II are as follows: 
!.QI Sil comprehensive crime control Act of 1983: Hearings on 
s. 829 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 226-27, 
235-36, 287-88, 309-11, 1111-12 (1983). The formal 
resolution of the National Governors Association,~- at 
235-36, related to an earlier but generally similar set of 
reform proposals. 
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- First, there is currently no time limit on habeas 
corpus applications. This reflects a failure of the procedures 
associated with federal habeas corpus to keep pace with its 
expanding scope. By way of comparison, other remedies for 
reviewing or re-opening judgments in the federal courts are 
subject to definite time limitations. Federal defendants, for 
example, generally must decide whether to appeal within ten days 
(Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)): state convicts seeking direct review of 
their convictions in the supreme court generally must apply 
within 60 days (Sup. ct. R. 20); and even a federal prisoner who 
claims to have new evidence of his innocence discovered after 
trial is subject to a two-year time limit under Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 33. 
The specific corrective proposed in title II is a one-
year limitation period for habeas corpus applications, normally 
running from exhaustion of state remedies • .ill State remedies 
would be exhausted with respect to a claim, and the time limit 
would begin to run, if the claim had once been taken up to the 
.ill The legislation provides for deferral of the start of th~ 
time limitation period in certain extraordinary situations 
involving claims which could not have been discovered at an 
earlier point through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
retroactively applicable new rights which are subsequently 
recognized by the Supreme Court, or unlawful state 
interference with filing. However, these qualifications are 
narrowly and specifically defined in the legislation and the 
related legislative materials, and would not undermine the 
value of the time rule as a safeguard against unjustifiable 
delay. ~ generally s. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. a-10, 16-18 (1983). 
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highest court of the state on review. State remedies would also 
be exhausted with respect to a claim in the relevant sense if the 
direct review process were completed and state law barred raising 
such a claim in state collateral proceedings, or if the time 
provided by state law for raising such a claim in state 
collateral proceedings had expired • .W This would provide state 
convicts with a reasonable period within which to seek federal 
habeas corpus review, but would provide protection against the 
delays of years or decades beyond the normal conclusion of state 
proceedings that now frequently occur in habeas corpus 
litigation. 
A time limitation is obviously of particular importance 
in capital cases. The incentives of the current system favor 
dilatory tactics by capital punishment litigants in habeas 
corpus proceedings. There is generally no particular 
disadvantage in filing a petition later rather than earlier, and 
delaying until the last moment makes it more likely that the 
continuation of litigation will prevent an execution from being 
.W ~~at 17, 20. Since state rules generally bar raising 
on collateral attack claims that were raised or that could 
have been raised on direct review, the time limitation 
period would begin to run with respect to most types of 
claims -- i.e., those not allowed on collateral attack --
when direct review of the case was completed or the time for 
seeking direct review expired. If a state replaced the 
traditional bifurcated system of direct review and 
collateral attack with a unitary review system, the 
completion of unitary review or the expiration of the time 
for seeking such review would similarly start the running of 
the time limitation period. ill~ at 17 n. 63. 
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carried out. In contrast, the proposed time rule would provide 
capital litigants with an incentive to seek federal habeas corpus 
review promptly, and to present all available claims in initial 
habeas corpus applications • .i.J./ A failure to do so would risk 
having delayed or omitted claims dismissed as time-barred if 
presented at a later point. 
The second major reform proposed in the legislation is 
a general narrowing and simplification of the standard of review 
in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Under the current system, 
state court fact-finding is presumed to be correct if a number of 
poorly-defined conditions set out in 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d) are 
satisfied, but the federal habeas court is required to make an 
independent determination of questions of law and to apply the 
law independently to the facts. This can result in the 
overturning of a state judgment -- following the passage of years 
and affirmance by the appellate courts of the states -- on 
grounds which the habeas court recognizes as close or unsettled 
questions on which courts may reasonably differ, and on which the 
lower federal courts themselves may disagree. The legislation ) 
would substitute a relatively simple and uniform standard under 
which the federal habeas court would generally defer to the state 
determination of a claim if it was reasonable in its resolution 
.i.J.1 Once a claim has been presented in a federal petition and 
rejected on the merits, it may be dismissed if it is 
presented again in a subsequent petition. ~ Habeas Corpus 
Rule 9(b). 
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of legal and factual issues and was arrived at -by procedures 
consistent with due process. ill 
Like the other reforms of the legislation, this change 
in the standard of review would reduce the dilatory potential of 
habeas corpus litigation in capital cases, as well as curbing 
excessive review in non-capital habeas cases. A capital sentence 
predicated on a clear violation of the defendant's federal rights 
would remain subject to correction on habeas corpus. But the 
invalidation of a capital sentence would no longer be required or 
permitted simply because the state courts reasonably resolved a 
close or unsettled question in a manner different from a lower 
federal court in the same geographic area. 
A third reform in the legislation is a codification of 
the caselaw standards governing the consideration in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings of claims that were not properly raised 
before the state courts (the standard for excusing •procedural 
defaults•). This would bring greater definiteness and clarity to 
the law in this area and would help ensure that lower courts 
consistently resolve this issue in conformity with the properly 
restrictive standards that have been articulated by the Supreme ✓ 
Court. ~ 
il/ ~ generally s~ Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., lat Seas. 6-7, 
22-28 (1983). 
!21 see generally~ at 7-8, 12-16; Murray v, carrier. 106 s. 
Ct. 2639, 2644-50 (1986). 
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A fourth reform is providing that a federal habeas 
court can deny a petition on the merits, even if state remedies 
have not been exhausted. In capital cases, as in other cases, 
this would enable district judges to deny frivolous claims 
promptly, without the delay and waste of resources involved in 
sending the petitioner back to state court to pursue state 
remedies. ill 
A fifth reform proposed in the legislation would vest 
the authority to issue certificates of probable cause for appeal 
in habeas corpus proceedings exclusively in the judges of the 
courts of appeals. This would correct inefficient and wasteful 
features of current procedure under which a petitioner is given 
repetitive opportunities to attempt to persuade first a district 
judge and then a circuit judge to authorize an appeal, and under 
which a court of appeals is required to hear an appeal on a 
district judge's certification, though it believes that the 
certificate was improvidently granted. £1./ 
Finally, title II of the Criminal Justice Reform Act 
would institute comparable reforms relating to time limitation, 
excuse of procedural defaults, and certification of probable 
~ See generally s. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 
21-22 {1983). 
£1./ See generally i.sL. at 10, 18-19. 
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cause for appeal in relation to the collateral remedy for federal 
prisoners under 28 u.s.c. § 2255. Collateral litigation by 
federal prisoners, like habeas corpus litigation by state 
prisoners, frequently involves frivolous and repetitive 
applications; the enactment of these reforms in the§ 2255 remedy 
would be of comparable value in limiting this abuse. il/ In 
conjunction with the proposed restoration of an enforceable 
federal death penalty by title III of the Criminal Justice Reform 
Act, it would also guard against efforts to obstruct the 
execution of federal death sentences through dilatory§ 2255 
litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, I hope that my remarks today have been of 
use to the committee in its consideration of this important 
national problem. It is intolerable that the cumbersomeness and 
redundancy of the process of review have largely thwarted the 
constitutionally valid judgments of most state legislatures to 
impose capital punishment for the most atrocious crimes. 
Needless to say, no one would countenance a •rush to 
judgment• in capital cases, or in criminal cases generally. But 
there is a fundamental difference between reasonable review 
processes which ensure that a sentence is justly imposed, and 
ill see generally isL. at 19, 30-31. 
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irrationally excessive processes which ensure that it will never 
be carried out. 
The Constitution only requires that a defendant be 
given a fair trial. A convicted defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to appellate review, but we believe, of 
course, than an appeal should be allowed as a matter of fairness, 
and the states regularly provide the right to appeal under their 
procedures. Beyond the initial state appeal, the defendant will 
at least have the right to seek discretionary review by the 
highest court of the state, and review by the state supreme court 
may be mandatory in capital cases. 
Beyond the whole process of direct review, state 
collateral remedies are available for claims which could not be 
raised on direct review, and these remedies are regularly 
resorted to in capital cases. In cases where innocence can be 
proven, and in capital cases generally, the state executive 
clemency process provides an important, ultimate safeguard 
against injustice. Finally, beyond all state remedies, a 
defendant can seek direct review by the Supreme Court at the 
conclusion of any trip up to the highest state court on review. 
Review in the lower federal courts by habeas corpus 
comes on top of this abundant -- and in capital cases, super-
abundant -- panoply of remedies and review mechanisms. If it 
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were rarely utilized or insignificant in its effects, the 
provision of a possibly superfluous additional review mechanism 
would be a lesser concern. In reality, however, it fundamentally 
distorts the criminal justice system by precluding any definite 
end to the litigation of a criminal case while the defendant 
remains in custody, and by multiplying the potential avenues of 
obstruction in capital punishment litigation. 
These problems will continue only if we permit them to. 
Congress is free to decide whether or not the judgments of the 
state courts should be reviewed by the lower federal courts, and 
if so, subject to what conditions and limitations. In the past, 
Congress has been willing to limit federal habeas corpus review 
when it ceased to further the interests of justice and became in 
itself an impediment to justice. Congress should be willing to 
do so today in response to the extreme problems of abuse and 
delay that now characterize federal habeas corpus litigation, and 
the virtually incredible effects of this abuse in capital cases. 
The most practical and readily achievable response tp 
these problems would be enactment of the proposed Criminal 
Justice Reform Act, and particularly the habeas corpus reforms 
proposed in title II of that legislation. In the words of 
Attorney General William French Smith, these reforms would •go 
far toward correcting the major deficiencies of the present 
system of federal habeas corpus in terms of federalism, proper 
l 
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regard for the stature of the state courts, and the needs of 
criminal justice.• .!.ii 
.!.ii Proposals for Habeas corpus Reform, supra note 2, at 153. 
.. ~ 
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Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Congressmen, and Other Participants 
in this Hearing: 
I am grateful for the opportunity to present my statement on 
capital habeas corpus procedures. My views have been shaped by 
five years as a Florida circuit judge for the Nineteenth Judicial 
Circuit, serving Indian River,- St. Lucie, Martin and Okeechobee 
counties, and five years as a federal district judge for the 
Middle District of Florida in Orlando. I have imposed the death 
penalty in state court, and I have dealt with collateral attacks 
in death cases in federal court. Consequently, I share the 
frustration of state circuit judges, who wait years to see their 
sentences executed and who must reevaluate aspects of trials or 
sentences. I also know the frustration of federal district 
judges, who must interrupt busy dockets to review massive records 
from state trial courts in federal habeas corpus proceedings, who 
may be required to conduct evidentiary hearings, and who write 
opinions, exhaustively analyzing each appeal issue. Decisions 
not to grant a stay likely will be stayed by the Circuit Court of 
Appeals or the United Stat es Supreme Court. Constitutional due 
process in capital habeas cases at the state and federal level is 
essential, but redundant adjudication serves no useful purpose. 
In Florida, capital habeas appeals place a great strain on 
state and federal judicial systems. Florida leads the nation in 
death-row inmates, presently with 286. Pursuant to Rule 3.850 of 
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, a convicted defendant 






commence st&te collateral review proceedings. Upon denial by the 
circuit court, the petitioner has the right of direct appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Florida, which spends 30 percent of its time 
on death cases. Appeals from the Florida Supreme Court generally 
are not considered by the United States Supreme Court because of 
the preliminary posture of the overall, state-federal habeas 
corpus procedures to which the -petitioner is entitled. 
Denial of a stay by the Supreme Court requires the 
petitioner to begin the second round of habeas appeals again in 
the state court where he/she was tried and sentenced. The 
petitioner may raise any appeal issue that has not been raised 
previously. If the state trial court is again not persuaded to 
set aside the conviction or stay, then the petitioner may appeal 
the new issues to the Florida Supreme Court. 
If the Florida Supreme Court is not convinced, then state 
collateral rev i ew procedures have been exhausted, and the 
petitioner may tap into the federal system, pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 
§§ 2254 and 2255. The court of first instance is the federal 
district court, where constitutional issues are raised. These 
grounds generally are similar, if not identical, to those raised 
in state court. If a stay is denied in a Florida federal 
district court, then the petitioner may appeal to the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which handles more habeas petitions 
than any other circuit. With one clerk, who oversees death cases 
solely, the Eleventh Circuit adjudicates at least one death 







entitles the condemned inmate to petition for a stay to· the 
United States Supreme Court, which hears every death penalty case 
in the nation at least twice. 'f As of last Fri'day, February 19, 
1988, there were 37 death appeals pending in the Eleventh 
Circuit, where stays had been granted, and 16 Eleventh Circuit 
habeas death appeals pending in the Supreme Court, which had 
granted stays. 
The state-federal habeas process can become convoluted, 
protracted and inscrutable. From letters that I receive, I can 
tell you that the lengthy appeals process has made the general 
public disillusioned and despondent about the criminal justice 
system, a feeling that can only be compounded in victims' 
families and friends. Stays can occur in any court along the / 
habeas route. For example, Governor Martinez signed 23 death 
warrants in 1987, and one execution transpired. Many of these 
warrants were not the first for the particular inmate. The stays 
that occurred were in the Florida circuit and Supreme courts, 
Florida federal district courts and the Eleventh Circuit. The 
execution that took place, that of Beauford White on August 28, 
1987, was the result of White's third death warrant. His first 
appeal was on June 6, 1978. 
The duration of White's state-federal habeas corpus 
proceedings is not atypical. The initial, direct appeal from 
the state circuit court to the United States supreme Court can 
take as long as five years before collateral appeals begin. Even 






process more efficient, such as signing more death warrants, his 
death-penalty aide has reported that the best that can be 
expected is to reduce the delay from eight to ~en years to six to 
eight. 
Last month, January, 1988, Willie Darden evaded an 
unprecedented sixth death warrant after the United States Supreme 
Court granted a stay of execution to review his latest appeal. 
Darden, who was convicted of shooting to death a Lakeland 
furniture-store owner and who has been on Florida's death row 
since 1974, reportedly has had 95 judges consider his case~ More 
judges will be added to that number because the Supreme Court 
wants the lower courts to consider again evidence that suggests 
that Darden may not have committed the crime. When evidentiary 
hearings are required as much as ten years after the initial 
trial where conviction was obtained, it is obvious that 
witnesses' memories have faded, they may die or disappear, and 
evidence may be lost or become contaminated and, therefore, 
unusable for its intended purpose. 
The delays in habeas corpus proceedings and my concerns 
about the system can best be demonstrated by a recent habeas 
death case in my court, that of Theodore Robert (Ted) Bundy. He 
has two simultaneous federal habeas proceedings pending, which 
relate to three murder convictions in Florida. One case is the 
collateral attack of his conviction for the murders of Margaret 
Bowman and Lisa Levy as they were sleeping in their beds at the 
Chi Omega sorority house in Tallahassee, Florida, early Sunday 
4 




indefinite s.tay of execution after evading two death warrants in 
the case relating to the Tallahassee murders. Their rationale 
was that Bundy could not finish litigating that case if he were 
executed for the Leach murder first. The Eleventh Circuit denied 
a stay on November 13, and ruled that the two cases were 
separate. Therefore, his death resulting from one of the cases 
would necessarily terminate litigation in the other. 
Consequently, Bundy's lawyers went to Lake City on November 
13, and asked the trial judge, who presided over the Leach trial 
and who sentenced Bundy to death, Columbia County Circuit Judge 
Wallace Jopling, to grant a stay of execution on procedural 
grounds. Following a hearing, Judge Jopling denied the request. 
On November 14, Bundy's lawyers filed in the state circuit court 
a petition, which addressed new issues attacking Bundy's former 
trial as they are entitled to do under Rule 3.850. These issues 
included whether or not Bundy was adequately defended at his 
trial and whether or not he was competent to stand trial. Judge 
Jopling scheduled a hearing for November 17, 1986, the day 
before Bundy's scheduled execution. 
Hearing nothing that changed his prior decision to sentence 
Bundy to death, the circuit court denied the stay. Bundy's 
lawyers then proceeded to t he Florida Supreme Court in 
Tallahassee, where advance documents had been lodged. They 
appealed the circuit judge's denial of the procedural issue and 
the Rule 3. 850 petition. In an emergency session, the Florida 
6 




Supreme Court found no merit to Bundy's pleas and denied the stay 
of execution, scheduled for the following morning. 
At approximately 2:30 p.m., November 17, 1986, Bundy's 
lawyers filed a 183-page petition for writ of habeas corpus in my 
court. The petition, based upon fifteen constitutional grounds, 
such as ineffective assistance of counsel and incompetence to 
stand trial, requested that the execution be stayed. The grounds 
usually are the same or similar in all habeas death cases. 
Prev iously, on November 5, 1986, the district court had received 
an advance appendix, weighing 153 pounds, and containing 
thousands of pages, consisting of the trial transcripts, hearing 
transcripts, voir dire transcripts, pleadings and motions. Not 
only had I and my law clerks reviewed the voluminous advance 
appendix, but also we carefully reviewed the petition. All other 
work of the court came to a standstill. The issues were not 
novel, and the law is definitive. Furthermore, most of the 
issues had been raised in the state courts. My office, already 
prepared for the issues raised, worked consistently from the time 
that the petition was filed to produce a twenty-page order 
denying relief to Bundy on all g rounds. 
My opinion was transmitted to the Eleventh Circuit, where 
Bundy's lawyers also had lodged advance papers in their 
anticipation of rejection in all other courts. Copies of my 
opinion were disseminated to the three Eleventh Circuit judges 
who considered the appeal by conference call. At 12:40 a.m., the 






•The limit4;ld period of time remaining until the scheduled 
execution is insufficient to allow this Court to fully consider 
petitioner's claims. For that reason, a stay of execution is 
mandated. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).• The 
Eleventh Circuit did promise that the appeal would be 
"EXPEDITED,• an adjective that has lost its meaning in habeas 
corpus proceedings. 
Still in the early hours of November 18, and hours before 
Bundy was scheduled for execution, an Eleventh Circuit clerk 
notified the prison officials at Florida State Prison in Starke 
that Bundy had obtained a stay of execution, and they immediately 
notified him. The Eleventh Circuit also notified the United 
States Supreme Court of the stay that they had granted. 
Bundy had escaped his third death warrant. 
Ted 
The death warrant, however, was his first in the Leach case. 
No death-row inmate has been executed on the first death warrant 
in a case since the Supreme Court legitimized the death penalty 
in 1976. It appears that no matter what the district court does 
in addressing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief on the 
first warrant, an appellate stay will result. 
Following the November 17-18, 1986, marathon by lawyers, 
judges and staff, the Bundy federal habeas petition came to an 
abrupt halt, awaiting the ruling of the Eleventh Circuit. On 
April 2, 1987, amended April 27, 1987, the Eleventh Circuit 
issued its opinion, remanding the Leach case back to my court for 






was competent to stand trial approximately a decade ago. 
~leventh Circuit advised: 
A defendant cannot waive his right• not to 
stand trial if he is incompetent. Thus, a 
defendant can challenge his competency to 
stand trial for the first time in his initial 
habeas petition and, "if he presents facts 
raising a legitimate doubt as to his 
competency to stand trial, he is entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing in the district 
court. . 
We do not suggest in any way, however, 
that Bundy was incompetent to stand trial. 
That determination can be made only after a 
full and fair evidentiary hearing. 
The 
Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 564, 567-68 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) 
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 198 (1987). The 
Eleventh Circuit also ordered a stay and similar competency 
hearing in Bundy's case regarding the Tallahassee murders. Bundy 
v, Wainwright, 808 F.2d 1410, 1422 (11th Cir. 1987). In that 
case, the Eleventh Circuit remarked: 
We do not imply in even the slightest 
degree that Bundy is entitled to succeed on 
the merits of any of his claims. But, 
without analyzing all of his numerous claims, 
the petition demonstrates a likelihood of 
success in at least some respects sufficient 
to justify a stay. 
Bundy. 808 F.2d at 1421. 
Pursuant to the instructions of the Eleventh Circuit, I 
conducted a competency hearing on October 22, 1987, and December 
14-17, 1987. The hearing had to be split because of the 
availability of certain witnesses. I was somewhat incredulous 
that Bundy's lawyer requested a continuance to allow more 






psychiatris~s, who examined Bundy for the initial trial, was 
unavailable. Quite obviously, Bundy's present competence is not 
the issue, but his competence to stand trial at his original 
trial. 
Both sides presented eminent psychiatrists, who gave 
conflicting and contradictory expert: opinions on Bundy's 
competency, which cancelled o~t each other. Perhaps the most 
impressive witness at the hearing was Judge Jopling, the state 
trial judge in the Leach case. He testified that Bundy was •one 
of the most intelligent, articulate and coherent defendants I 
have ever seen.• Of the portions of his case that Bundy 
presented himself, Judge Jopling said that he presented legal 
arguments •cogently, logically and coherently.• He also observed 
no indications of drunkenness, such as slurred speech, as had 
been alleged. At the end of the hearing, I found Bundy 
competent to stand his original trial in the Leach case. My 
finding of Bundy's competence is currently on appeal before the 
Eleventh circuit. 
Following the Bundy competency hearing, I commented that if 
every death-row inmate •milked the system• as Bundy has done, 
then it would shut down the civil side of the courthouse. 
Information that I have received as of February 17, 1988, for the 
Middle District of Florida shows 180 potential death-warrant 
signings for the Middle District of Florida, comprising Tampa/Ft. 
Myers, Jacksonville/Ocala, and Orlando. Thirty-seven of the 
potential death-warrant signings are for the Orlando Division 
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alone. Unl~ss restrictions are imposed on Bundy-style appeals, 
it is apparent that habeas corpus appeals could occupy an 
inordinate amount of judicial time to the detriment of other 
cases. 
Death cases are not only costly in time, but also in money. 
As of October, 1987, the state of Florida had spent six million 
dollars attempting to e xecute _Bundy. Interestingly, by the end 
of December, 1987, Bundy's Washington lawyers, a firm that the 
average person could not afford, had spent $750,000.00 worth of 
their fee time defending Bundy because they are representing him 
pro bono. Al though a widely viewed television mini-series has 
documented the Tallahassee killings, Bundy is proceeding in his 
Leach appeal in forma pauperis. 
Moreover, as a former state trial judge and now as a federal 
district judge, I feel strongly that the deterrent effect of 
sentences is diminished when individuals, sentenced to death, can 
pursue appeals through the state and federal habeas systems for 
ten years or more. It is no wonder that the victims' families 
and friends as well as the general public are angry with the 
process. I firmly believe that due process should be rendered 
t hroughout all criminal proceedings. I also believe that special 
safeguards are warranted in capital cases in order to be assured 
that innocent people are not executed. Capital habeas 
proceedings, however, have become far removed from determinations 
of guilt or innocence. They have become out-of-proportion 







of portions_of those proceedings far too long after the crime to 
~e accurate. If a particular judge is opposed philosophically to 
the death penalty, then the scrutiny can be knit-picking. The 
drain upon judicial time as well as state funds are serious 
concerns in terms of ultimate service to society. 
With the background of capital habeas corpus proceedings as 
they exist, I do have some specific suggestions addressing the 
efficiency of federal collateral habeas proceedings. First, set 
time limitations for filing federal, capital habeas corpus 
petitions as some states have set for state habeas proceedings. 
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, a convicted 
individual sentenced to death has two years from final judgment 
and sentence to file his/her habeas corpus petition, unless the 
claim upon which the appeal is predicated was unknown to the 
petitioner and his counsel and could not have been ascertained by 
due diligence, or the fundamental constitutional right asserted 
was not established within that period and has been held to apply 
retroactively. Other states have definite time limitations for 
filing for capital habeas relief in state courts. 1 None of t hese 
1 Arkansas is three years from commitment date, unless the 
conviction is absolutely void, Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2; Idaho is 
five years from determination of direct appeal, Idaho Code§ 19-
4902; Illinois is ten years from final judgment, unless 
petitioner shows lac k of culpable negligence in delay, 38 Ill. 
Rev. Stat. p 122-1; Iowa is three years from final judgment 
unless the ground of attack could not have been raised in that 
period, Iowa Code§ 663A.3; Mississippi is three years from final 
judgment unless there is conclusive evidence, not reasonably 
discoverable at trial, which would have yielded a different 
verdict or sentence, Miss. Code§ 99-39-5; Montana is five years 
from conviction, Mont. Code§ 46-21-102; Nevada is one year from 






state sta~utes has been significantly challenged for 
constitutional infirmity. 
To have no time limitations for filing federal habeas 
petitions is unreasonable and in the not-too-distant future will 
become unworkable. If a petitioner has viable grounds for habeas 
relief, he/she should present them well before a death warrant is 
signed. Petitioners purposely wait until the eleventh hour to 
file capital habeas petitions with the hope that one of the 
reviewing courts will stay the execution on the basis of lack of 
time to consider the petition fully. In his statement changing 
his procedures for signing death warrants, Governor Martinez 
clarified: 
I want to make it clear that I am not 
condemning defense lawyers who raise 
legitimate claims on behalf of their clients. 
But I do condemn the dilatory tactics and 
other obstructionist ploys that are being 
used to effectively prevent the sentences of 
the court from being carried out. 
. . . 
Such tactics appear to be employed 
solely for the purpose of delay and often 
result in a disruption of the judicial 
process at the court where the case is 
considered. 
Statement of Governor Martinez, August 13, 1987. 
One method of effectuating a statute of l imitations is to 
amend to Habeas Corpus Rule 9(a), which provides: 
Stat. § 177.315; New Jersey is five years from judgment absent 
excusable delay and an illegal sentence may be challenged at any 
time, N.J. Court Rule 3:22-12; and Wyoming is five years from 








Delayed petitions. A petition may be 
dismissed it it appears that the state of 
which the respondent is an officer has been 
prejudiced in its ability to respond to the 
petition by delay in its filing unless the 
petitioner shows that it is based on grounds 
of which he could not have had knowledge by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence before 
the circumstances prejudicial to the state 
occurred. 
Fed. Habeas Corpus R. 9(a). As the rule presently is stated, the 
government is required to show prejudice and the petitioner is 
allowed to demonstrate that he could not have discovered grounds 
for relief before the government was prejudiced. Therefore, it 
is difficult for the district court to justify dismissal. Rule 
9(a) could be changed to include a presumption of untimeliness 
after a specified period, and to require the petitioner to show 
exceptional circumstances to overcome that presumption. 
Second, petitioners should have to raise all their grounds 
for habeas relief in their initial petition. There is a 
judicially developed doctrine of abuse of the writ for 
intentionally delaying grounds for habeas relief. See Antone v. 
Dugger. 465 U.S. 200 (1984); Booker v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1371 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 975 (1985); Witt v. 
Wa inwright, 755 F.2d 1396 (11th Cir. 1985). Petitioners and 
their attorneys should not be able to postpone executions merely 
by reserving known grounds for subsequent petitions. Federal 
appellate courts tend to allow condemned inmates to raise new 
issues in successive appeals. We need a legislative counterpart 
for the Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) test 







as Strickl&nd disposed of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. Florida's attorney general has observed that, generally, 
the issues that the appellate courts send back to lower courts 
for hearings and reconsideration, are ultimately decided to be 
without merit. Thus, petitioners and their lawyers are utilizing 
this strategic delaying tactic reinforced by the federal 
appellate courts. Justice Powell has recognized this abuse: 
A pattern seems to be developing in 
capital cases of multiple review in which 
claims that could have been presented years 
ago are brought forward---often in a 
piecemeal fashion---only after the execution 
date is set or becomes imminent. Federal 
courts should not continue to tolerate---even 
in capital cases---this type of abuse of the 
writ of habeas corpus. 
Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b) could be amended to limit 
successive, capital habeas petitions, which are major tactical 
delays in collateral review cases. , 
provides: 
Currently, Rule 9(b) 
Successive petitions. A second or 
successive petition may be dismissed if the 
judge finds that it fails to allege new or 
different grounds for relief and the prior 
determination was on the merits or, if new 
and different grounds are alleged, the judge 
finds that the failure of the petitioner to 
assert those grounds in a prior petition 
constituted an abuse of the writ. 
Fed. Habeas Corpus R. 9(b). Rule 9(b) could prove more useful if 
it were written to provide strong presumptions against the 
validity of a new petition. The rule should state that 
15 




of remedies._ requirement for death petitioners. The exhaustion 
doctrine presently requires complete state exhaustion in all 
federal habeas cases. Modifying exhaustion requirements in 
federal, capital habeas petitions would reduce the overall time 
involved in executing valid death sentences. Total elimination 
of the exhaustion requirement, however, has been criticized as a 
potential, significant conflict between state and federal courts. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has overturned a rule allowing 
exhausted claims to be added on petitions combining both 
exhausted and unexhausted claims . Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 
(1982). 
Even if a habeas death petition could be heard in federal 
court while an appeal was pending in state court, the two 
tribunals could reach different results on federal constitutional 
issues. This could cause substantial problems in capital cases. 
To minimize this occurrence, commentators have suggested a 
compromise that would allow limited habeas corpus review of non-
exhausted claims. This proposal would allow merit dismissal of 
unexhausted death petitions •plainly lacking in merit.• Pagano, 
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners-Present and Future, 49 
Albany L. R. 1, 46-47 (1984). In support of limited habeas 
review of non-exhausted claims, another comment ator has 
suggested: 
[I)t seems unnecessary and even inappropriate 
to dismiss for lack of exhaustion when a 
petition is plainly lacking in merit. Unlike 
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, the exhaustion requirement in 




- successive - petitions are presumptively invalid unless the 
petitioner demonstrates that the subsequent petition provides new 
or different grounds for relief. 
-
' 
Third, deference should be given to full and fair trials in 
state courts. It is irrational to believe that a federal -
district court, as much as ten years after the state trial when, 
at worst, witnesses or evidence may have disappeared and, at 
best, memories have faded, can conduct a fuller or fairer 
adjudication no matter how obscure the issue. The ultimate 
result is generally the same, after much delay. In his criticism 
of this protracted process, Florida's attorney general has said 
that the effect is that federal appeals courts are ignoring the 
findings of state courts, making state appellate review virtually 
meaningless. •The time has come to consider limitations on the 
availability of the writ of habeas corpus in federal courts, 
especially for prisoners pressing stale claims that were fully 
ventilated in state courts. • Relief on claims presented 
many years after conviction should be limited to cases in which 
the petitioner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or a 
colorable claim of innocence.• Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093, 
1094 (1983) (statement of Burger, C.J. concerning the denial of 
certiorari); .§.ll Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral 
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). 
Fourth, Congress could enact statutes, specifically making 
federal, capital habeas corpus review more efficient by 







benefit of the expertise of a specialized 
tribunal. Rather, it seeks to further 
federal-state comity by allowing the states 
ample opportunity to consider, and if 
necessary, to correct their alleged 
constitutional errors. It is clear that if 
there has been no such error, no deferral ot 
the federal decision should be required. 
Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus; A Study in Massachusetts, 87 
Harv. L. R. 321, 359 (1973). Accordingly, 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (b) 
could be amended to include a piainly-lacking-in-merit test. 
As an alternative to modifying the exhaustion prerequisite, 
Congress could enact legislation requiring that death-row 
petitioners elect either state or federal remedies. This is 
feasible in states like Florida that provide habeas corpus and 
post-conviction relief procedures for capital petitioners. ~ 
Fla. stat. § 79.01 et seg,: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. Death-row 
inmates now have the option of filing for collateral relief in 
state court and, subsequently, filing for the same remedy in 
federal court. An amendment, conforming to this proposal, would 
permit a capital petitioner the choice of either filing for 
collateral review under state procedures, with an opportunity to 
petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, or 
filing a habeas pe tition in federal district court with 
entitlement to the federal appeals process. A capital 
petitioner, therefore, would not be deprived of federal review, 
but he/she would be precluded from collaterally attacking a 
conviction and sentence on substantially the same grounds in both 
the state and federal court systems. 
18 





Fifth,_ strict time parameters should be set for advance 
lodging of voluminous appendices and records, and even habeas 
petitions with the three federal courts, even if they cannot yet 
be filed. This massive paperwork is not assembled overnight, and 
often is held until the last possible minute for filing with the 
obvious hope that the court will have to grant a stay for review. 
If the district court does. not stay the execution, such 
petitioners rather ~onfidently reason, then the appellate court 
will. Our clerk's office has had petitioners' counsel wait until 
moments before 5:00 p.m. to file the petition and an unwieldy 
record for the court's review. This delaying tactic should be 
eliminated, with the result that fewer stays would be granted for 
lack of time for review. 
~ believe that it is well overdue that the writ of habeas 
corpus be put back into its intended use: to prevent unlawful 
detentions and not to delay lawfully imposed sentences. Congress 
and the appellate courts have the power to change the system; the 
procedure should be expedited or the death penalty should be 
abolished. I must administer the law as it is, but, with no 
changes in the present system, I foresee an inordinate amount of 
my time being spent on duplicative review. 
19 
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 
My name. is Pat Higginbotham, I am u judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. I am here at 
the request of the Cornmi ttea. While I am also an r1dj unct 
professor of constitutional law at the Southern Methodist 
university School of Law, my work and experience hils been 
predominantly in the courtroom. I devoted the first f 1>urteen 
years of my practice excl ueively to trials and appealE, with 
an emphasis on complex cases in the areas of antitrust, 
securities, and civil rights. This is my fourteenth year on 
the federal bench. I served on the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas from 1975-1982, when 
I was appointed to the Court of Appeal~. 
I am presently the Chair of the Appellate Judges 
Conference of the American Bar Associrltion, the ABA home of 
state and federal appellate judges. I am also a membAr of the 
Federal-State Relations Corn.mi ttec of the. Judicia 1 Conf crence 
of the United st~tes. I mention these to emphasize th~t I am 
not here to state the views of these groups. 
I have struggled with habeas corpus and capital cases, 
both as a trial judge and as an appellat~ judge. I have 
lectured to the judicial workshops of every circui1. with 
current death cases_ 
1 
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I welcome the interest in r~form demonstrated by the fact 
of this henring. It is particularly welcome because the 
reform has been slow in arrival despite the remdrkable 
consensus that federal habeas review of state convictions is -------- ... :..,.......,, , 
in need of a complete overhaul. 
There are significant differences in views on thjs 
subject, but I am encouraged by the fact that there js also 
much common ground, I have gre~t respect for this committee 
-----
and each of the parsons testifying before you today. We share 
the task of striking for a fair and just system, all bound t.o 
administer fairly our courts and to protect the rights of the 
state and the accused. This is not hyperbole; it is a bedrock 
statement of our devotion to our constitutional or1th and to 
the rule of law. 
It is fit that we sit today in the halls of Congress. 
The federal writ of habeas corpus i n its present form is 
primarily the creature of the j 1.1d icia. ry. Our case-by-case 
efforts have failed to yield guiding principles fr e ed of 
con fusion. we are plodd i ng through mi n~ of our own doing. 
The language of procedur e and proc e s s runs through these 
issues, but, as is often the case, t h e choices r eflect 
constitution~l values and vision s o f fa i r ness. Bchi :i d t he 
nigh arcane language of the law of habeas corpus lie li mi t i ng 
principles of our federalism. They inform not only outc omes 
2 
of questions we may ask, but the distinct and earlier ~1estion 
of who decides. I am persuaded that the roads from here are 
best cut by you, the representative branch. 
I support the reconunendation::; of the Powel 1 Connni ttee . . 
In this opening, I want to make two points. 6 r§ , when put 
in perspective, the Powell Bill JS by no means radical in its 
restriction of federnl review of state imposed capital 
sentences. To the contrary, the Bill concedes the r~ach of 
the writ in its present full flower. 
is far-reaching in its effort to provide competent cour,sel to 
indigent prisoners. In my opinion, the fundrtmental 
contribution of the Powell Bill is its linkage of competency 
of counsel and control over successive writs while ke~pi.ng the 
faith of federnl ism. There arc many questions, but they are 
subsidiary to the ultimate jssue before us: the definition of 





cases. In turn, compf-:'.tency 
decision to limit federal 
of counsel is 
courts from 
reviewing twice in a single case the decision of federal 
issues by state courts. 
Let me turn first to the historical perspective. The 
recent doctrinal history of fede:r.-a 1 habeas corpus petitions 
brought by state prisoners describes a continuing qu~st for a 
golden equilibrium between finality and c~rtainty. The modern 
3 
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history of habeas law dates from the supreme Court's 1953 
decision in Brown v. Allen. 'A series of decisions took the 
writ, created by Reconstruction legislation enacted in 1867, 
from a narrow means o~ relief for those detained withou~ legal 
process, and transformed it into a rnuch broader rernec1y that 
would prote'!ct federal constitutio11al rights left unvincHcated 
by the state process. In essence, the body of law controlling 
the federal writ was created by the conrts upon a n,,rrow) y 
stated statute. It is this reformed writ which has generated 
the vast flow of habeas petitions now handled by the federal 
court, and which has instiguted the debate about habeas 
reform. The modern writ is not the Great writ of the Magna -Carta and it is not the writ protected by the Cons ti tut ion 
from suspension. It is ~ ly a body of ....__ _______________ ____ case law 36 
years old. This history, short though it is, is imporlant to 
the question of reform, I suggest that several cross currents 
have contributed to this phenomRnal change in functlon, a 
Ehift such that the writ today functions largely as a means of 
federal appellate review of state decisions of federal 
questions, 
These chi.lnges in the character of th~ habeas writ are 
procedural manifestations of two much more cornpre~·,ens i ve 
currents in American legal history: the expansion of 







states, and the effort to achieve equality in the promise of 
process in criminal cases. The modern habeas writ shares its 
history with these two great substantive movements. The 
Fourteenth Amendment and the federal hnbe ~s statutes were both . ---, ...,__________. 
---:------=----
children of Reconstruction. It is not surprising that their 
developments should run parallel, That is not to say, 
however, that the writ was intended to serve anything l J.ke the 
purpose it serves today. 
The federal judiciary's efforts to vindicate in court the 
constitutional promise of equality reinvigorated tlie old 
federal distrust of state courts. The states were pGrceived 
as unfriendly fora for freshly announced con~titutional 
rights, and as potential instruments of the discrirn.inatory 
animus which those rights aimed to extirpnte. The habeas writ 
was seen as the saving mechanism by which supervision of the 
state judiciary was to be had. 
The Court's constitutional pro t ections for those within 
the criminal process, black American~ in particular, and those 
with small purses in general, i n ~ a ny instanc ~s informed 
ge i,eral rights· designed to ensure the accuracy of the c:r iminal 
process for all. The habeas ¼·r it became the means for 
challenging convictions that did not meet this general idea of 
neutrality in the criminal ~rocess. 
5 
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By still further but equally natural evolution, lTiany of 
the lnost recent developments in habeas law proceed from one 
more particulnr concern, the rights of prisoners convict~d 
without the benefit of adequate counsel. Ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a problem that may dog a litigant up 
through the. appellate process: thE:i same lawyer who rQpresents 
a defendant at trial might do so on appeal. The possibility 
of a collateral attack, not subject to the tim~ limits 
governing appeals, perrni ts a pr.i son er t.o correct counsel's 
errors later on, when, whether by dint of naw counsel, the 
prisoner's own persistence, or sheer good fortune, those 
errors became apparent. 
The state habeas docket of the federal courts today is 
the product of these overlapping themes nnd problems -- the 
guest for equality, the expansion of individllal constitutional 
rights, concern with ineffective counsel, distrust of state 
criminal processes, and the rc~ulting pressure upon the 
Supreme Court's appellate docke~. 
This mix is what we must deal with today. One who 
believes that the section 2254 habAas writ simply reflects our 
' . 
society's con-eern that innocent pe.ople not be incarcerated is 
m8t with a glaring difficulty: as Judge Friendly has observed ..._ - ____,. 
with 5pecial clarity, the writ nejther re no_r--in many 
instances--provides a foru --------------- or, a simple claim o 1 
~C-<.,......_<-e-
6 
innocence. The federal courts do have siqnificant factfinding 
---------------powers that may be invoked to inve5tigate the factual 
predicate for constitutional claims, although the habeas 
statute now requires deference to the states absent 
exceptional circumstances. A prisoner might be able to 
challenge a conviction on factual grounds through a mot:ion 
-
basc,d on newly discovered evidence., or on oth~r state law 
grounds, but section 2254 for the most part does not aid an _..., 
innocent prisoner who is simply the victim of a jury's Hqu a lly 
~
innocent but nonetheless damning mistakr~. Simply put, the 
modern habeas writ only offers appellate relief. We tend to 
forget that arguments to retain the trump card role of habeas, 
that is, a process freed of the usual rules of preclusion, are 
asking that the petitions retain their expanded appellate 
character without losing the precluslve rules attending 
appeals. The arguments accept the evolution to an appellate 
function while urging the retention of the writ's open-ended 
character despite the historical fact that its test i ng of 
executive power did not include r~v iew of criminal trials, 
There is substantial criticism of tha judicial expansion 
of the writ. 
developed writ. 
---- -
Nonetheless, the Powell Bill accept .s the 
It makes no chanqe in its substantive reach. 
Rather, its direction is to give prisoners access to the 






issues, with competent counsel and without the pressur.es of an U~ 
~ - 0 
outstanding warrant of execution. Its premise is that so ------
long as the petitioner is competently represented, the balance 
between finality, fairness and efficiency has been properly 
struck. When we turn to the reforms that have been orooosed 
in earlier years, the Powell Bill appears modest. Indeed, the 
current recommendations fit comfortably with earlier po~;itions 
of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 
Fifteen years ago, the Judicial Conference -:::,f the 
~
United States approved and sent to the Congress a proposed 
bill reforming federal habeas procedures. That bill rPquired 
complete exhau5tion of state remedies unless state prc)ccsscs 
were shown to be inadequate, and would bar habeas relief 
absent application within 120 days of certain stated 
triggering events. As you know, that bill was drafted by a 
committee comprised of Judges Wade H. McCrea, William H. -Webster, Frank M. JohnsQn, Jr., Alfonso J. Zirpole and Walter -
E. Hoffman. This committee of th,~ Judicial Conference listed 
its defined objectives. 'I'hey included the elimination of 
restrictive petitions, the avoiding of piecemeal applications 
by requiring that all grounds for relief, subject to stated 
exceptions, be included in one petition, and, in general, 
sought to achieve a reasonable degree of finality to criminQl 
8 
sentences. This language certainly suggests that we are 
playing today on a worn field. 
Far more restrictive proposals have been proposed in 
the past and at least one twice passed the House of 
Representatives. 
The Powell Bill, unlike. many earlier efforts, leaves the 
~
writ in its present forrn rather than turning the clock back to 
1953. My point is not the wisdom of narrowing its scope. 
Rather, my point is that the Powell Bill docs not do so. As I 
have explained, with the federal writ today functioning 
virtually as a right of appeil 1 ,=ddad by fact-finding 
functions, it is difficult to _see why a prisoner with 
competent counsel should as a matter of fairne~5 require two 
appeals into the federal system. At least it is difficult so 
long as one accepts the ability of our adversary system, 
unblemished by incompetent counsel, t c. produce fair rfcsul ts. 
With competent counsel, errors of constitutional magnitude 
will be brought forward for review. Unquestionably, the 
system proposed by the Powell Co~mittee, with its linchpin of 
7 L-- ,, 
co_mpetent counsel, assures greater federal protection of 
constitutional rights than the present system that tolerates 
multiple writs filed on the eve of exacutions and weakened by 
the absence of mechanisms to assure competent and fre5h 
counsel, 
9 
Under the Powell Bill, a person charged with a capital 
offense has all the constitutional rights of trial, His 
conviction will be reviewed by the courts of his state, 
usually including its Supreme Court. At that po J.nt, a 
prisoner may ask for a review by the Supreme Court. If 
unsuccessful, he will be i ven n8W and competent counsel to 
pursue an attack on his conviction through the state courts. 
If the state rejects his arguments it second time, he can 
petition the United States District Court, with the right to 
appeal any adverse decision to the Court of Appeals, and then 
seek review by the Supreme Court. Of course, at this 
juncture, the federal courts' role in all except extraordinary 
cases, usually involving questions of factual innocence, will 
come to an end. If we assume that counsel is competent, the 
assertion that this system is inadequate becomes a striking 
indictment of our entire state and federal judiciu.l system. 
This procedural scheme offers sign ifica ntly greater attention 
than we giv~ to virtually all ma j or disputes. This c;ire is 
proper because death is a different punishment in many ways, 
Nonetheless I there is a point at which the criticism is so 
insistent on perfection that it becomes little more than a 
surrogate argument for the abolition of the death penalty, 
The Biden and Powell Bills in essence differ over the 
C -=::.----..._..----





Both allow a second review to avoid an 
injustice. The Biden Bill does not define it~ term 
"miscarriage of justice." The Powell Bill effectively defines 
injustice to exclude any constitutional violations that do not 
implicate actual innocence. The Powell Bill rests on the 
assertion that at this late juncture the price of instnbility 
and absence of finality is too great for the further review of 
claimed constitutional violations that do not implicate actual 
innocence. The Biden npproach would allow these claims to be 
pursued. In my judgment, a ''mi$carriage of justice'' st.andard 
would not be a significant limit nn the obtaining of a second 
federal review. On the other hand, we have long been of the 
view that finality and repo$e must give way to preve!'.lt the 
punishment of innocent persons. 
Throughout these discussions, the adequacy of the Bar's 
performance in defending capital cases has been at issue. I 
share the view that competent counsel is critical. I z.lso am 
persua ded that the quality of representation has often been 
much l E. ss than it should be i"l nd is sometimes below the 
constitutional minimu m. At the sa me tim~, it would be unfair 
to ignore the extraordinary p~rforma n ce of so many of the 
lawyers h~ndling death cases. There are many lawyers working 
very hard for very little comr:,ensation, and in the highest 
traditions of the Bar. I have been puzzled by cri ticisrn 
11 
against these lawyers. The frust.rations of the system with 
its multiple writs and last minute requests has lead somQ to 
the view that the lawyers are the culprits. With rare 
exception, this is not so. I apprec:i ute the opportun 1 ty to 
appear today. You ¥ ve judgments to make, ar;d I am persuaded 
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~ Mr, Chairman, I am pleased to accept the invitation f r om you 
Lf, ~ ; Z.2 S-'J(c)('3) ~~./-~~~~ ~ 
to testify at this important hearing of the Senate Comm i ttee on ~ ~ 
the Judiciary. I feel it fortunate and commendable that y ~ 
Committee is giving this special attention to habeas corpus 
procedures, particularly those dealing with the subject of 
paramount importance - constitutional litigation concerning death 
sentences. 
I am Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit and have been a Judge of that Court since September 1968, 
However, as my reply to your letter requesting that I testify 
stated, my testimony and responses to you are submitted as my own 
f 
oonscientious views as an individual judge; they are not submitted 
as the views of my Court, or my Circuit, and I do not submit my 
statements as representing the views of any other judges or 
Members of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 
In particular, I will submit my individual views on the -
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital 
Cases and the statutory proposals which are made by the Report. 
The careful study by your Committee will cover all of the 
important statutory~ proposals made, and I know you are receiving 
numerous thoughtful comments covering this f?r-reaching statutory 
proposal. Therefore 
' ( ,, 
I will address particular concerns which I ----------
individually have about portions of the statutory proposals and 
statements on them made within the Report. 
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Justice Powell and all the Members of the Ad Hoc Committee 
have obviously given exhaustive consideration to many problems in 
the operation of the habeas statutes. Their commendable concerns 
about the adequacy of representation of indigent death row inmates 
are particularly manifest in the innovative suggestions made in 
the Report. Nevertheless, with full deference to Justice Powell 
and to the Ad Hoc Committee which conscientiously labored on the 
Report and statutory proposals, I must respectfully but firmly 
~ 
disagree with important portions of t ~ Report. 
In 
proposed S 
personally have profound objection to 
257(c)(3) ~ Title 28, That subsection would have 
the effect\__ of d a federal habeas court of any authority, 
when considering a successive habeas petition, to issue a stay of ____. 
execution or any habeas relief, even though the court's confidence 
in the death penalty itself is undermined, Unless the guilt 
determination could be overturned, the statute's bar would apply 
even if there were a showing based on a factual predicate that 
could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence in time to seek relief from the death 
sentence itself in earlier post-conviction proceedings. See 
proposed S 2257(c)(2). 
I agree that repetitive habeas proceedings should be avoided 
and that it is desirable that all claims challenging both the 
deterrnin~tion of guilt and the penalty be aseerted in the earlier · 
phase of any direct appeal or post-conviction proceedings. 
Nevertheles s , ther e have been numerous instances where the factual 
predicate for se rious constitutional claims could not be 
disc~ des pite th e exercis e of reaso nable diligence . 
For this compelling reason the Ad Hoc Committee's Report has 
2 
itself wis@ly provided, in accord with present law, in the 
proposed S 2~7(c)(~) for the assertion of claims of violation of 
the Constitution justifying relief from a guilty verdict where 
euch claims are based on a factual predicate that could not have -been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence in 
~
t irne for assertion in earlier state or federal post-conviction 
proceedings. l)J.A-l-
~;....,,.4-¥ 
S 2257(c}(3) · -1-o 
~/-
any relief where only the death _sentence, and not the t,4«/ 
However, at variance with present law, proposed 
would deny 
guilty verdict itself, is undermined by the showing made in 
support of the constitutional claim. The Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee reasons that such a restriction is proper because if 
there is any doubt about the sentencing phase of a capital case, 
it should be raised during a state prisoner's initial attempt to 
obtain post-conviction review. The Report says that the prisoner 
and his counsel have every incentive to ask whether all relevant 
information in mitigation of punishment was presented and whether 
the sentencing phase was · conducted in a constitutionally fair 
manner. The Report concludes that given the clear incentive to do 
this, the Ad Hoc Committee does not believe that federal courts 
,, '-" 
should have to consider a second petition under S 2254 in a habeas 




The fact ls, ~ however, that the des irable circumstances 
essential for such early presentation of al~ cons tit utional claims 
do not always exist. The Ad Hoc Committee's Report overlooks 
appalling cases where constitutional claims could only be 
presented after the conclusion of a first post-conviction 
II v 
proceeding, with t he discovery of concealed evi dence withheld from 
< . -
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the defendant and his counsel a nd not earlier discoverable 
evidence which seriously undermined the constitutional validity of 
the death sentences involved. If such withheld evidence 
undermines the validity of aggravating circumstances considered in 
the penalty phase, or makes ava i lable a showing of mitigating 
circumstances not able to be considered at that time, clearly a 
challenge to a death sentence itself should be heard in a federal 
habeas case and the federal court should not be deprived of --
jurisdiction to consider such compelling claim~. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), held that "the 
the prosecution of evidence favora ble to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the ev i de nce is material either to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespecti ve of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution." (Emphas i s added). See ~ United 
States v, Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 11 0 n.17 (1976). Thus the 
constitutional rule of Brady i tsel f c learly calls for relief in 
circumstances where the extreme penal ty is thrown in doubt, even 
though the conviction may no t be unde r mi ned. This is a r eal and 
distressing problem, not a n i magina r y one, as repor ted cases 
demonstrate. See,!.!_ .9..:.., Chan ey v~ Br own, 730 F . 2d 13 34 , 1358 
(10 t h Cir. 1984 ) , cert. den ied, 469 U.S. 1090 (198 4); Un it ed 
States ex re l . Almeida v . Ba l d i , 195 F , 2d 815. 819-820 ( 3rd Cir. 
19 52) , cert . denied, 345 U.S. 90 4 (195 3); Orndo r rf v. Lockhart, 
707 F. Supp. 1062 , 1069-1070 (E . D. Ark . 1988) . 
Denia l of ju r isd ic t ion t o the fede ral courts t o grant relief 
1( v 
whe re newl y d iscovered mitigating evi dence, withheld a s a result 
~ ----,--. ----~ 
of a Br ady v iola ti on, shows a deat h s en tence to be invalid would 
al so run d i rectly coun t er to the p r i nciple that " t he sente ncer in 
capi t a l c a s e s mu s t be to co nsi der an re levan t 
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mitigating evidence. . . . " Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 
112 (1982)(emphasis added) ; See also Penry v, Lynaugh, 109 s.ct. 
2934, 2946; 57 u.s.L.W. 4958, 4962, 4965 (l989)(granting relief 
from death sentence and remanding a habeas case and citing Eddings 
and its principle that "a sentencer may not be precluded from 
considering, and may not refuse to consider, any relevant 
mitigating evidence offered by the defendant as the basis for a 
sentence less than death.") ; Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 602 
(10th Cir. 1987)(en bane), cert. denied, 108 s.ct. 116 (1987). 
An equally distressing case would result from proposed -- ~---------.......... ---
s di scovered, after a first federal habeas 
-' 
pet~t1on was denied, that perjured testimony had been knowingly ---------u e e din violation of due process in the bifurcated pena lt y phase 
of a capital trial. Discovery of deliberate use of false 
See Miller v. evidence after a first habeas case has occurred. 
Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 2 and n,3 , 5 (1967)(prosecution•s deliberate use 
in capital case of false ev idence on guilt not discovered until 
second habeas proceeding commenced). 
evidence skewed the death sentence 
If false penalty phase ---------------by 





circumstances, relief would nonetheless be denied by § 2257(c) (3) 
because the earlier guilty fin ding was not involved. 
These are ndt imagined problems. Brady, Miller and other 
cases cited are actual, real life s hocking ~ases. If a statutory 
provision such as proposed S 2257 is to be adopted, in order to 
avoid such gross i njustice s respecting death sentences , proposed 
S 2257(c)(3) should at least be amended by adding a provision 
allowi ng a stay or habeas relief to be granted where the fac ts 
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the court's confidence in the jury's proven, to undermine 
determination of guilt, "or to undermine the court's confidence in 
the sentencer's d@term inat ion t o impose the dea~h penalty." 
To me, it would be profoundly disturbing if statu t ory 
revisions were made which would strip the federal courts of 
jurisdiction,in proceedings for relief under the Great Writ, to 
grant stays or habeas relief in circumstances such as I have 
outlined. Surely in the critical penalty phase of a capital trial 
the safeguards of the Constitution are not of diminished value or 
to be disregarded. It is instead at that crucial stage of the 
trial that those safeguards may be of paramount importance. The 
federal courts should no t be c l osed to those challenging their 
death sentences for const itut ional wrongs occurring in the penalty 
phase of their trials . 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am grateful for 
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I am James L. Oakes, a United States Circuit Judge of 
Brattleboro, Vermont. I am presently Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit and am making this statement in 
writing as my judges have long had scheduled a retreat under the 
auspices of the Federal Judicial Center at Mystic, Connecticut, 
for November 8th and 9th. However, I plan to appear at the next 
scheduled hearing, if permissible. 
I would like to start with three disclaimers. First, I 
would probably not wish to appear at all were the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to have had an opportunity, as a 
majority of its members wished to have, to g~ve fair 
consideration to the Powell Committee report submitted to it and 
were there not the "fast-track'' legislation that has made 
consideration of this terribly important subject matter so hasty. 
Second, I am not testifying on behalf of other judges of the -Second Circuit or elsewhere, including my own court. Rather, my 
testimony is based purely on my personal reaction to the 
proposals for reform of habeas corpus proceedings in capital 
cases and after discussion with some of the country's leading 
death penalty habeas litigators. Third, as a judge I have not 
had any death penalty cases. Of the three states in the Second 
Circuit, two -- New York and Vermont -- do not have a death 
" penalty statute. Although Connecticut has a death penalty, the 
appeals of the two people who have been sentenced to death in 
Connecticut thus far have not yet reached the federal courts. 
I have, however, had considerable experience with habeas 
corpus cases generally, both as a federal judge for almost twenty 
years and, before that, as Attorney General of the State of 
Vermont. In the brief time since the release of the Powell 
report and the introduction of the Biden and Thurmond bills, I 
have studied these bills as extensively as I could. 
I preface my remarks by saying that the following views are 
stated without regard to moral concerns about capital punishment. 
I do have distinct concerns, however, by virtue of close 
observation -- from both the inside and the outside -- of the 
criminal justice system as it is administered in the United 
States. I know from experience that many factors can lead to 
injustice by way of a wrongful conviction or excessive punishment 
in an individual case. There are a number of factors that can 
bring this about: ineffective investigation; a biased judge; a 
biased jury; an unpopular defendant or one racially, ethnically 
or religiously different from the community where the defendant 
is being tried; an exploitative media; a case built primarily on 
eyewitness identification, which is notoriously unreliable; an 
overeager prosecutor with political ambitions; an incompetent 
defense lawyer. Any one of these factors or a combination of two 
or more or all of them can lead to injustice in a given case. 
Unfortunately these occasional injustices are apt to occur 
2 
6 
most commonly in cases that involve the types of crimes that call 
for a punishment of death. These factors, standing in the way of 
fair trials and fair punishments, highlight the need for critical 
_____..J 
safeguards -- safeguards that often can only be provided by _______..,.-
federal review of state convictions -- particularly where the 
punishment imposed by a state is death. 
The Powell Committee was born out of a feeling of 
frustration on the part of some not all of us -- with the time 
interval between the imposition of a death sentence and 
execution. Based on discussions that I have had with members of 
the bar who have been active in death penalty work, I do not have 
the same views as the Powell committee about attributing 
unreasonable delays to federal court habeas proceedings. 
Nonetheless, a ~ ~ at death is an appropriate punishment for 
0 
a limited group of crimes and that there is a need to overhaul 
J 
federal habeas corpus procedure for capital offenses, the 
procedure to ensure speedier post-conviction review must 
incorporate a guarantee that a defendant have a full and fair 
------- ---------------
opportunity to assert all possible claims. Only then ' will the 
num1:Ser of successive petitions be reduced and limited only to 
such areas as changes in the law, claims not previously asserted 
because of state misconduct or claims based on newly discovered 
facts. 
The key to habeas reform, then, is to ensure full and fair 
review of all claims. However, many of 
~










frustrate that goal. Some of these deficiencies are addressed by 
the Biden bill, which, for example, provides for somewhat longer 
timetables for filing petitions and seeking extensions, which 
reflect more realistically the time that is required to prepare a 
habeas petition. But there are several important respects in 
which even the Biden bill fails to provide necessary safeguards 
that must, in my opinion, be required before Congress restricts 
access to the final forum that stands between an unjustly 
convicted or unjustly sentenced defendant and death. 
My comments will cover the provisions that I believe are 
most problematic, including those concerning counsel, time 
limitations and subject matter limitations on petitions. There 
are other concerns that I hope to convey at a future hearing. 
The issue of a petitioner's representation by counsel 
encompasses three distinct issues: to what extent counsel is 
appointed in these cases; what standard of competence counsel 
must meet; and whether petitioners should be permitted to 
challenge the performance of counsel who do not meet that 
standard. 
I( ., 
A requirement of appointed experienced counsel in capital 
~ 
cases is long overdue. The quality of capital defendants' 
representation at trial typically is inad~quatrand is a major 
reason why lengthy postconviction proceedings occur and are 
necessary. Although I think that a f ~ d national legal 
resource center is the answer to adequate representation in ---------------
¾ UJ1.._,c /4~ ~~ ~ ~ 
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capital cases, the Biden bill's attempts to address the issue of 
adequate representation, adding 28 u.s.c. § 2261, is a step in 
the right direction. Properly set up, a system that ensures that 
a defendant charged with a capital crime will be represented by 
experienced counsel during trial, direct review and collateral/ 
proceedings should go a long toward ensuring fairness and r---------------------- ----- --------------------
efficiency. 
The minimum standards of competency set forth in the bill, 
however, are insufficiently demanding. I am sorry to say that 
there are plenty of criminal defense lawyers with five years' 
admission to a bar and three years' experience with felony cases 
who simply are not fit to handle capital cases adequately. The 
standards which were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 
February 1989, in a report entitled "Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases," 
are more appropriate. 
It is also anomalous for the proposal to recognize the 
importance of representation and to attempt to define standards 
fl 1311 
of adequate representation, yet deny a defendant the chance to 7? 
challenge habeas representation that falls below that standard. 
It is just plain common sense that this system should not 
foreclose a claim that representation was incompetent. The 
provision that denies a challenge to the competency of habeas 
counsel undercuts the very philosophy underlying the other 
provisions. Of course, it would be a tall order for a defendant 
who has had appointed counsel under guidelines such as those set 
5 
forth in the February 1989 ABA resolution noted above to prove 
that habeas corpus counsel was ineffective. But given the fact 
that there is not a well-funded body of lawyers doing death 
penalty work, a petitioner's claim of incompetence should not be 
precluded. To do otherwise would be to prejudge the habeas 
representation as per se competent. Review of habeas counsel's 
co~ is perhaps most important because the procedural 
consequences flowing from the first habeas petition, such as 
limits on the filing of subsequent petitions, are predicated on 
the assumption that a petitioner was adequately represented by 
competent counsel on his first petition. 
Some of the concerns about time limits for filing habeas 
petitions are addressed by the Biden bill, which extends the 180-
day deadline to a more realistic 365 days and extends a possible 
60-day extension to 90 days. Even that bill should be revised in 
my opinion to spell out that the time of the limitations period 
does not begin until the conclusion of certiorari proceedings 
seeking review of state postconviction proceedings or the 
expiration of time for the filing of that certiorari petition or 
the appointment of counsel responsible for representing the 
petitioner in federal habeas corpus proceedings, whichever occurs 
last. Otherwise, the year that is contemplated and needed for 
counsel to review an extensive record and to prepare a thorough 
petition becomes more like several months. 
There is no reason to establish a cap on the length of time 
6 
for extensions of the 365-day limit. The granting of an 
extension should be within the discretion of the district court , 
as it is in cases that involve significantly less weightly issues 
than the life of a petitioner. Being closest to a particular 
case, the district court judge is in the best position to assess 
a request for an extension and provide appropriate relief. 
The bill introduced by Senator Biden allows an exception to 
the time limits if "the facts underlying the claim would be 
sufficient, if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in the 
jury's determination of guilt on the offense or offenses for 
which the death penalty is imposed" (adding 28 u.s.c. § 
2257(c) (2)). A similar provision is in the Thurmond bill as one 
of the conditions for relief. In both cases, this limitation, 
which also restricts the permissible subject matter of a 
successive habeas petition, is much too narrow. It must be 
expanded to include any facts that would negate the sentence of 
death. To the condemned prisoner, being put to death because of 
a mistake as to his guilt and being put to death because of a 
mistake as to his proper sentence has the same result. To a 
society based on the rule of law, the result is equally 
unacceptable. Accordingly, the provisions must be amended so as 
to permit claims that bear on the degree of the offense of which 
the petitioner was convicted; the determination that the inmate 
was eligible for a death sentence; and the determination that 
death was an appropriate sentence. Using the example of felqny 
murder, Congress should not prevent a new claim from someone who, 
7 
, 
with the additional facts bearing on the degree of his 
participation and involvement (see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)), would not 
have been subject to death. 
It should also be made clear that the exception to prevent a 
~\' 
~miscarriage of justice (adding 28 u.s.c. § 2257(c) (3)) should be 
interpreted liberally, so as to give broad discretion to the 
district court judge to waive the time requirement when the 
circumstances require such action. 
Two further points on the exceptions to the time 
requirements. The retroactivity provision (adding 28 u.s.c. § 
2257(c) (1) (B)) should be broadened to include retroactive 
decisions of any federal court creating new constitutional rights 
or invalidating settled state practices. The new "factual 
predicate" provision, §. 2257 (c) (1) (C), should be broadened to 
permit the presentation of claims based on substantial new 
evidence if the evidence could not have been discovered earlier 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, even though the 
"factual predicate" that the evidence tends to prove could have 
been or was discovered earlier. Responsible lawyers are not 
supposed to present claims based on known or discoverabl e factual 
predicates when the evidence available to prove the predicate is 
legally inadmissible or too weak to hold any hope of convincing a 
court. 
Although the provision of the Biden bill adding 28 u.s.c. § 
8 
~ 
2259, which deals with the scope of federal review, corrects 
several problems of the Thurmond bill, § 2259(c) {l) {C) improperly 
conflates the standard for determining whether a procedural bar 
.>c:::= 
forbids federal habeas relief under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 
72 {1977), with the standard for determining whether an "adequate 
and independent State law ground" precludes Supreme Court review 
of a federal question. 
Also, the exceptions provided by§ 2259(c) (2) are too 
narrow. The "ignorance or neglect" provision reaches only cases 
in which a claim was not raised in the state courts; it does not 
deal with the situation in which evidence or legal theories in 
support of a claim were not presented to the state courts through 
ignorance or neglect, in spite of the fact that§ 2259{a) {l) 
states that the purpose of the section is to deal with the 
"sufficiency of the evidentiary record [made in the state courts] 
for habeas corpus review." And, as mentioned previously, the 
"miscarriage of justice" provision of§ 2259(c) (2) should be 
construed liberally. 
Finally, there are several, other ways in which I think 
habeas corpus procedures can be reformed that will result in more 
efficient use of the federal courts' resources. I would 
, ) 
recommend the elimination of the ~ rocedural bar doctrine of 
Wainwright v. Sykes~ hich would end time-consuming litigation of 
Sykes issues and ass 
capital petitioner's 
and fair determination of a -._, 
deral constitutional claims on the merits. 
9 
~~-~ tJ~U 
' \ I would also recommend the elimination of the exhaustion doctrine 07'(. ------
of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), which would end time-
consuming exhaustion proceedings and litigation of exhaustion 
issues. In the alternative, I would provide for a stay of 
execution in any case in which a federal habeas court requires 
exhaustion of state remedies and clarify that a federal habeas 
petition filed after a federal court has refused to entertain an 
earlier petition under Rose v. Lundy is not to be treated as a 
second petition. 
Lastly, I would recommend the overruling of Teague v. Lane, 
109 s. Ct. 1060 (1989), which would eliminate time-consuming 
litigation and assure one full and fair determination of a 
condemned inmate's federal constitutional claims on the merits. 
The provision of the Biden bill adding 28 u.s.c. § 2262 appears ---------designed to accomplish this, but it oversimplifies the previous 
retroactivity doctrine emanating from Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
\ 
293 (1967), by failing to recognize that some "change[s] in the 
law" do not constitute new rules that should be subjected to non-
retroactivity analysis under the Stovall standard codified in§ 
2262. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 
(1982); Yates v. Aiken, 108 s. ct. 534, 538 & n.3 (1988). An 
execution must not be permitted when contemporaneous caselaw has 
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It is indeed a privilege to appear betore this a1st1ngu1shad 
committee. I am Chief Judge of the United States court of Appaala 
for the Eighth Circuit. I cm in my 24th y•ar ot service as a judge 
on the Eighth Circuit, As ot January 1, 1ggo, I will have served 
ten yaara as Chief Judge, I am, ot course, by statute a designated 
member of the Judicial Confarenc• of th• United States. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1988 appointed an ad hoc committee 
of the Judici1S.l conrsrence to study federal habeas corpus in 
capital cases. In September a oomnitte• under th• Qble t~telage 
and leader&hip ot Mr. Justice Powell presented ita report to the 
conference. As a proambl• to the report, th• ad hoc ~omro.ittee 
recoI!1lllended that the Judicial Conterence "approve the :.:1 i: atutory 
proposal ra!orred in and attA0hed to thi• report an~ authc c- 1ze its 
transmit~al to the Congres• as th• leqisl&tiva recofflI!landation of 
th• Contorano•·" 
• 
In September of 1989 the conference voted 17 to 7 to deter 
approval ot the Powell Co~.l'llittee report, and its reoommendation to 
congress, until March or 1990, to provide the members of the 
Conference, as well a• th• ontira federal judicicry, ~n opportunity 
to study the proposals, As members of this committee know, chiof 
Justice Rehnquist interpreted l•~ialation then exis~ing to require 
him to 1uea1ately transmit the report notwithstanding tho absence 
of th• Conforano• recommendation. The Chie! Justice 1 • 
1nte:-pretat1on ia understandable, and I am certain that every 
member of the Conterence ia convinced that he felt that he had a 
St.':ltutory obligation to immediately transmit the report. Thia 
c~mmittco, ot cour5e, now ha• the report for consideration. 
, 
Unf0rtunately, th• propo•al do•• not include a policy • tatement of 
the repraaentative cQdy ot th• Judicial conterence of the United 
States, and none will ba obtained until March of 1990, I make this 
prefatory remark becau&• I want to ae• ure th• oolltlllittee that my 
views de not represent t~9 Judicial r.nnfAranre . Th• Contoronoa ea~ 
only act by composite vote and unfortunAtely, tim• did not permit 
the Conference to ao act and will not permit the Conference to so 
act until March of l990. Whether this date is too late tor this 
committee to make its recommendation to the Senata or for CongraG& 
to enact final legislAtion is, ct course, entirely up to the 
committee and the Congress itself, 
Al though I am not e>cprasaly authorized to • peak tor the 
Judicial conference, I teel that I can say with great aasurance , 
not only on my behalf but on behalf ot the entire Judicial 
conference of the united States, that we are all deeply indebted 
to Mr. Justice Powell and to tho committee of distinguished judges 
who served with him, in submitting to the conference the Powall 
Committ ee Report on tedaral hal:>ec• corpua in cGpital cases. The 
Judic i ~l conterence or the United States ha• long bean intorested 
in ach ~e ving the moct expedi•nt and y• t tair procedures a!fecting 
the rec1eral judicial process, Early in 1g7 4, th• Judicial 
Conferonc• approved G drAtt bill propose4 by a special committee 
on habeas corpus intended "to eliminate repotitivo petitions, to 
avoid pieoe~ea.l cpplications by requiring that all grounds tor 
relief, subject to certain exceptiona, be included in one petition, 
\ to achieve c re4sona~l• degree ot finality to criminal sentences, 
to stimulate early tilingg and resolutions ot matters, and bring 
cbout a reduction in the number of tilinq1 which ar• wh0lly 
trivoloua." In Septo:mber, 1985, th• ccnterence vo~ed to amend 
28 o.s.c. 9 2254(b) to permit an application tor a writ of habeas 
corpus to be denied on th• merit• notwithstan~ing the failure ot 
the applicant to exhaust· the remedies available in atate court." 
This procadur• wa• deemed expe~i•n~ in order to avoid exhaustive 
study of procedural bara as a predicate to axa=inin9 th• ~•rit~ of 
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p•tition• Which were trivolou• or obvioualy without merit. At the 
same ti~• we opposed e.nactment ot S.238 to the extant that it would 
anend 28 U.S,C. 5 2253 to contor axoluaive authority to issue 
cortifioates of probable case to the judge• or the courts o! 
appeal, Thus, the Conteranca voted to retain the current author1~y 
of district courts, Who have the working knowledge ot th• habeas 
claims, to certify !or appeal tho•e oases deemed to have colorable 
olaims in habea• corpu•• Presently this committee is studying a 
clause ins.as which propose• to give thia exclusive authority to 
the court or appeals judges, Th• Conference has oppoaed thia for 
the obvioua reason that this would place more work on the judges 
ct the courts ot appeala and would tail to provide the court• ot 
appeal£ the valued judgment or the diatr1ct court aa to whether or 
not a cla.it:i is colorable. On auch ahort time r was unable to 
obtain the exact date and null\ber of tha proposed legialation, but 
the Conference, in 1985, also tabled and deferred for further study 
by a Conference committee, a bill that contained generally the same 
provisions as S.88, ~t that time, I !eel at liberty to say, the 
overwhelming majori~y ot t hose attending _th• conference expressed 
a view that the provf sionG like the preaently proposed S,88 would 
add 1:1 much greater 0urde n to the fed•ral courts in resolving 
procedural issue• and would further preclude tederal court, from 
giving any meaningful review to constitutional gueation• in state 
proceeding•. I montion th••• particular ac~iona cy the Conference 
simply to retlect that the Judicial Conforence ha• long taken a 
keen intereat in habeas corpus reform. Every Article III judge in 
America would endorse th• concept that th• federal process should 
be an efficient and expedit1oua process, but at the same time~• 
must take caution th&t maaninqtul ri~ht• ot individuals are no~ 
discarded simply tor ~b• sake ot expediancy, 
The Powell Commi ttae' s Report on Federal HabQas Corpu• in 
Capital Casas, and th• Sen~te's reapons• to the report, should do 
much to tocus the legal community 1 • attantion upon the 
possibiliti~• for habea• reform, Whatever the !ate of these 
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i • auaa, it i• certain that caretul attention during the lagialative 
proc••• will help to en• ura that policy in thi• important area ia 
decided by the peopl•'• electe~ representatives, rather than by 
judicial interpretation of am.biguoua atatutes. 
I can only express my ainc•r• hope t.hot this cOlnlilittee and 
Congraea will derer r1r.al action and study on any leqislative 
reform ot habeas corpu• until th• conference can cct, and until 
other representative bodies, particularly the American Bat 
Association Task Forco on Habeas Corpus, cAn make recommendations 
to Congress. 
I suggest to th• committee that any rule or legialation that 
~ould re&trict federal habeaa corpu1 should be ~easured against 
.:rustice Frankfurter's caution ye~r• ago in th• landroark coee ot 
3rown v, AlltUJ, 34• o.s. 443, 498 (1953), that: "The complexities 
of our federalism in tha working• ot a scheme o! c;overnment 
involving the inter-play or two governments, one of which is 
subject to limitations antorceabl• by the ~ther, are not to ~e 
•sca.p&d by simple, r1g1<1 rules which i by avoiding some abusa•, 
generate others. 11 In other word•, it i• imperative that congress 
study existing problems oare!ully and aubject proposed language to 
exactinq scrutiny before passing Any h•:bea• corpus reform act. 
Otherwise, we may generate more problems than we obviate. 
Wi thnnt meaning to l'l'Olon; thl• statement, '~mien. should deal 
as specifically aa poe• ibl• with t.h• proposed legislation, I think 
1~ 1s imperative that allot us consider tho baokground, purpose, 
and naoosaity ot th• great wr1~ ct habeas corpus. I find a general 
misunderstanding of habeaa corpu• even by many who are 
bcwl&dgeable in the tield ot criminal law. Critics have oftQn 
asserted that ther• should b• no f•deral review ot sta~• prisoner 
cases whatsoever -- that federal habeas ccrpu• is simply anothar 
procedural v&hicl• by which we coddle the guil~y and allow 
criminals to go rree. This attack upon habeas corpu• i• nothing 
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n•w· Tne crit1ca g•n•rally approach th• entire qu••tion in tarrn• 
of the need to protect the etticiency ot the courts and tinality 
or the state court decision making proc•••. I think many who 
attuipt to attack the great writ misconceive its very purpose when 
Uley look upon it as a procedural vohiol• to allow the guilty to 
go troe. This &allle criticism haa often been made o! constitutional 
procedures and rules that proteot th• individual taced with 
deprivation 0! his liberty or lite. I think the best response th8t 
can be made to that attack -- and I silllply parcphrasa this -- is 
th4t the rights or the best o! people are only secure&• long ac 
the riqhts of tho wor&t ot people ere kept •acrosanct. 
The writ of habeas oorpua tinda it• origins as rar back as the 
Magna charta. let, after Parliament p~aaad th• Habeas Corpus Aot 
of 1679, th• crown, in angry retaliation, abolished Parliament. 
our constitutional history • hows that our toretather• considered 
the writ ao well established by common law that the Constitution 
did not nead such an affirmative grant. The constitution 
prQauppoaee the existence ot the great writ in its only mention ~! 
habeas corpu1: Article I, section i, ctate• "the privilegtJ er t m~ 
writ ot th• habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in casas 
ot rebellion or high traaaon or inva•ion or when the pul:>lic satety 
requires it." 
chiet Justice Marshall coined the phrasa: "Th• Gr$at Writ." 
Samuel Cha•• aaid it i • the b••t and only sufficient detense ot 
or.e's individual liberty. Chiet Justioe Earl Warren called it the 
graatest aymbol and guardian or personal freedom. In Ex Parte 
:!1rger, 75 U.S. 85, 95 (1868), Chief Juatic• Salmon Cha• e remarked: 
''Th• 9r••t vrit o! habee• corpus has been tor centuries esteemed 
the best and only au!fici•nt detenoo of ~r•onal freedom." The 
renowned Chi•t Juat1e• Of the Supreme Court ot Illino! •, Walt•r 
Schafer, many yeara ago wrote in th• Harvard Law Review, 70 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1, 2, (1956): "The aim which justitiea th• exi • t•noe of 
habeas corpus is not fundamentally ditferent trom that wnich 
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intocm• our criminal lav in qwn• ral, that 1t 1• l:)ett•r that a 
guilty man go fr•• than an innocent on• be puni•h•d·" 
In our modern era, that i• aince 1g44 when Justice Jockson 
~arnod that the court was opening the flood gates to abusive filing 
of prisoner petitions, writinga and opinion• by l$orned acholars 
and judges have called tor procedural reform of habeas corpua in 
order to allow greatar finality and more prompt ad.ministration o! 
justice. In response to some or these early critici£ms, 
particularly thoae calling tor mer• e!ticient judicial 
ad.Jninistration, Justice Rutledge cautioned: 
The writ should be available whenever thara clearly ha• 
been a rundamental miscarriage ot justice tor whioh no 
other ade~ate remedy is presently available. Bo• ide 
executing its great object, whieh is th• preaarvation of 
personal liberty and assurance against ita wrongtul 
deprivation, consideration• of economy of judioicl time 
and procedures, important a.-: they undoubtedly are, become 
comparatively insiqnificant. 
To this a majority of th• Supr•n• Co't.lrt later added: "The 
p::::-ev•nt!.on of 1.mc1u e reatrainta on liberty 1• more important than 
!llechanical and unr111ali11tic administration of the tederal courts." 
Wade y. MAYO, J34 u.s. 672, 681 (19.8). 
To~ay, rerormers atill urge: (1) the need for finality in our 
system ot juriaprudenoe, and (2) concern a.bout !aderal encroachment 
in a dual system ot justice. I briafly addreaa these two concerns 
because I feel they underlie the Committee's consideration of the 
froposed legislation now batore us. 
The sentiments or thoaa who advocate o deci• iva conclusion to 
dra~n out litigation were echoed by Justice Harlan, who 
dcknowledqad that th• int•r••t• of concluding litigatlon may well 
outweigh the c011\pet1ng interest in readjudicatin; convictiona. 
Justice Harlan, hotifevar, w•e convinced that "the consequence• ot 
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inj~atic• -- lo•• or liberty and • 0111atim•• lo•• of lite -- are tar 
too qr11t to p•rmit th• auto!Ultie application ot an entire body ct 
technical rules whoae primary relevance lies in the area ot oivil 
litigation." Sand9ra y, United StQtes, 371 o.s. 1, 24 (diasenting 
opinion ot Harlan, J.). He criticiaed the idea of an arbitrary 
cut-otf point tor habeae petitions, s~ating "there is little 
societal interest in permittinq th• criminal prooess to rest at a 
point whar• it ought properly never to repose." Maki v, United 
atates, 401 u.s. 667, 693 (1971). 
Balancinq human lit• •~•inst judicial atticiency 11 indeed a 
difticult process. The Supreme court recoqnized the great weight 
to be accorded life and liberty when it stated, 1n sanders, that 
"(c]onventiona.l notion• ot tinality ot litiq&tion have no place 
where lit• or liberty is at atalte an(1 intr1ngement of 
constitutional rights is alleqed." sander• at 8. still, Sanden, 
gave consideration to the other side o! the balance: "nothing in 
the traditions of habeas corpu• requires the federal courts to 
tolorato needles• piecemeal lit\gation or to entertain collateral 
proceeding• whose only purpew• is to vex, hl:lrasa, or delay." 
sanders ct 1e. sanders was writ t en in 1963. Since that time, th• 
enactment o! rule• to prevent abu•• ot process -- 2 8 tJ. s. c. 
§ 2254(d) and RUla 9(b) of the Rule• on Habeas Corpus -- hav• mad• 
great strides in t-.h~ direction ot t1'.i• balanc•. Th••• rules, 
howo"v111J.c.·, !n attemptlng to assure that th• ends of j uatic• will be 
done, do not aet torth an a~solute termination point which, once 
reached, can never be p~saea. Thfll wisdom of thic ~ppiaocHA is 
revealed when, a~t•r repetitive petitions are filed, it suddenly 
becomes apparent that the insistent petitioner haa aome merit to 
hi• clai.ll. Thi• i• p~rticularly relevant when cor.sidering the 
irrevocable death sentence. A• J'udg• Walter Pope o:ic• re:cinded ua: 
11 w• muat need • • • dredge much :barren ground to tind a 11 ttle 
gold," 33 F.R.O, 409 at -41P. 
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I nov turn to th• aonc•rn about th• prc~l•D or encroach1nq 
tederali•m· In Harri• y. Nel•Q.D, 394 u.s. 28~, 299-91 (1968), thQ 
Court observed: "the writ of habec • corpus 1• the rundamental 
instrument or safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and 
lawless state action. 11 There ia no question that the landmark 
cases creating constitutional procedura• throughout the states ha.ve 
servad aa an irritant to harmonious relation• between the state and 
tec1eral judiciary. However, as Mr. J'l.1stioe 1'rankfurter e~rly 
atatod in Brown v. tillt!J: "the sta~e court cannot have the last say 
when it, through unfair conaid•ration of what procodurally may be 
daamed fairness, may have misconceived tha federal constitutional 
right. 11 Chi et Justice Marshall counded this concern early in 
Cohens v. Vir9inia, 13 u.s. 264, 387 (1821), when ha said: "Th•r~ 
is certainly nothing in the oiroumatanees unaer wn1cb our 
Constitution was tormed--nothing in the history ot tha ti:in••--
which would justify th• opinion, that the contidence reposed 1n the 
states was so implicit, aa to leave in them and thair tribunal• the 
power ot rasiatin~ er defoatini, in the term ot law, the legitimate 
measures ot the union." 
Former Attorney General John Mitchell onoa wrote thct the 
present poat-oonviction process provides: 11a hydra ot excess 
procedure," Mitchell, rn ouest of sp19dy Justice, 55 Judicature 
139, 141 (1971). However, more germane are the enduring remarks 
of Chief Justice John Marshall, who reoo~niz:ed thst "it sta~e 
courts were given tinal jurisdiction aver tederal causeg, the 
result would be 'a hydra in government. from which nothing but 
contradiction anc1 confusion can proceed.'" 19 U.S. 264, 387. 
In ~aurmon v. unit•~ stot1•, 294 u.s. 21,, 22a (196P), the 
court said "th• riCJht ••• i• net maraly to a tederal forum but 
to tull and fair consideration ct conatitutional claims," Justice 
Harlan in the H1JS.i c:a• a aummarize<1 the underlying rationale ot 
habeas corpus decisions in thi• taahion 1 "Th• pri1:1ary 
justification given by the court ror ex~ending the scope o! habeas 
-:e• 
to all alleged con• titu~ional error•, 1• that it provides a qua• i-
appellate review tunction, forcing trial and appellate courts in 
both th• tederal and •~ate systems to toe the constitutional mark. 11 
- ---••- - I 
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With t.hia background in history, I 
spec1tic case vhich arose in our court. 
execution in th• Eighth circuit in ~h• 
would like to address a 
There ha• bean only one 
last twenty-five years. 
That wa• the case ot a Missouri prisoner, George Morcer, who wo.a 
executod at 12101 a..m, on January 6 1 1989. Mercer's claim 
proceeded through the normal channel• ot r•view. His tiret habeas 
petition was initially ~enieQ by th• district court, and our court 
affirned on April 21, 1988. Attor the supreme court denied 
oortioro.ri, tbo ~ypremR ~ru1rt o! Kircouri oat Oetob•r 20, 1,sa at 
12:01 a.m. as the nev date tor •~ocution, Mercer filed a second 
petition tor writ or habeas corpus in the District Court for the 
Western District ot Missouri on Ootober lJ, 198B. The district 
court summarily a1sm1sse~ this petition on the same day and d@niad 
Mercer's request tor a ctay of execution, Mercer tiled an appeal, 
along with a motion to stay execution in our court. Th• motion wa ~, 
a ssiqned to the p-n•l of judqes ~ho had passed on the ,first habeas 
case, I was on• of thoae judges. We temporarily granted the 
motion to atay beoauae it w~• preae.ntad at a time when the court 
was in session, It waa impossible tor ua to adequately review the 
rn4t@rial p~ior to th• designated time ot the execution. Mercer 
ra1seQ new issue• in the case. In hi• new application, h• claiced 
that th• proaec::ution had withheld certain mitigating evidence 
relating to his death sentenc•, and that the sentence en th• death 
penalty waa unconstitutional in that he had received inettective 
assistance of counsel in &overal particulara. By now Marcer had 
chrtnn',..,; rnnn••l "'.,_" ._ •• ,., .. , 1.1 __ 1,. ____ ,_,.._ ............. "'1 ~uc .L.J..LZS\. 
h4kleas corpus appeal failed to raise the ine!factive acai•tanc• of 
his trial coun••l• over the vigoroua objec~1on ot th• state, we 
grante~ the stay on an emergency basis. Th• statG challenged us, 
not only in pleadings but in th• newapapera, a• delaying their 
-,-
lawtul right to carry out th•ir execueion, They urged that Mercer 
llad engaged in repetitive or auc~assiv• petition writir.9 and had 
abuGed t.he writ, 
In reviewing the new habeas appeal, we had several concerns. 
First, under the Suprem• Cour~ rul•• ct Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
u.s. 72 (1977;, we neede~ to examine tha !ilea to deteniine ~hether 
thare was a ~rocedural barri•r which vould preclude the examination 
o! his new claim. once this research was done, we folloved thQ 
exception to tha procedural by-paee rule, which is round in t..~e 
Suprome cour~ dec1 • icn ct Smitn v, Murray, 477 u.s. 539 (1986), 
that if the claim• which petitioner raised a!tected the guilt 
determination or undermined the sentencing process in an 
unconstitutional manner, that we would nevertheless hav• the duty 
to review such claims. Because of the irrevocable nature of the 
daath penalty, we painstckingly reviewed tha claims in terms of 
whe~her or not they went to quilt or innocence or raised a question 
wn~ch •~taoted the sentencing process. There was no doubt that 
Mercer's allegations challenged both guilt dotermination and the 
a c.c:uraoy of the H intencing procas•, we exuined hi• claim• in that 
:..ight and ultimate l y denied them. 'I'h• review ot this second 
p~ocedure took a period ot two and one-half months. Be~auae of the 
sincere, but in my j~dgment, mi•guided arguments made by the s~ate 
th~t Mercer abused the writ, I wrote the following stAt.am@nts 
within t.ha Mer;9r opinion, which are directly apropos to this 
co-c.~1ttee•s conaideration of the proposed leqialation: 
Human lite i• our most preciou• po•••caion, our 
natural inatincta guide u1 trom birth to auatain life by 
protecting ourselves and protecting others. All notion~ 
ot morality focus on the riqht to live and allot =an'• 
law• seek to pres•rve this mo•t important right. When 
preaented with challenqes to a capital ••ntence, it would 
be aa• y to re•pond rhetorically by ••king, ""hat abo\.lt 
the victim who the datgndant ha• been found guilty o! 
unmercifully killing." But this approach tails to 
reflect on th• idaal that a CJOVernment founded by a 
moralistic and civilized • 00iety should not act as 
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unmeroitully a• th• d•tendant 1• aceu•ed of acting. It 
th• oriqinal murder ca.nnot be ju1t1tied under man I s laws, 
it is equally unlaw!~l and inhumane to commit the same 
atroc:,ity in th• name or the state. What separates the 
unla~tul killing by man and the lawful killing by the 
state are the legal ~arr1ers that ex1• t to preserve the 
individual's cona~1tu~ional rights and protect against 
the unlawful execution of a death sentQl'lce. If the law 
i• not given strict adherence, then we as a society are 
just as guilty ot a nainous crime as the condemned talon, 
It should thus be readily apparent that the legal process 
in a c1v111zec2 society must not rush to judqment and 
therea!ter ruah to execute a person found guilty ot 
taking ~he lite of another, 
* • * 
The apparent question is whether thera exists 
suttic1ant means within the framework of th~ law to 
prevent vexatious delay resultinq from st&ta priaonQr• 
who seek to abuse th• writ. In conaidoring thi• 
question, certain preliminary factors mu• t be takon into 
account. First, it must be recoqni2ad that• convioted 
defendant sentenced to death will &ttempt to aaaart every 
means available to prevent hi• execution, Th• 
instinctive human desire to live accounts tor the 
proliteration of petitions for writ• and ataya, Nothing 
short or a complete bar to such petition• will prevent 
their continued filings. 
Second, lawyers should not r>• faul t&d tor their 
services to indiqent condarnnod prisoners in atte~pting 
to set aside a capital ••ntenoe, court• appoint lawyers 
to serve these prisaonar11 to aaeure that no condemned 
person shall die by reason of 2ln unconstitutional 
process. It i • i~portant to undarstcnd the iserious 
nature of the volur.tary oervioe involved, The American 
Bar Association ha• initi~ted, and the JU~icial 
Conference ct the United Ststes ha• supported, the 
establishinant of Death Penalty :ae• ource centers. The 
purpose of thaso center• i • to increase ~h• availability 
of compatont attorney• to reviaw the state processes an~ 
assure comp•tant and ettectiva representation of 
individual,; sentenced t.o death. This project is inspired 
by th• taot that. competent representation is ditticult 
to aoeuro. Th• acarcity or volunteers among lawyer• is 
undor•t~ndable c:on• idering the tact t.hat th• average time 
that a competent l ·awyer labor• in post-conviction review 
of a • ingl• deAth • entence 1• approximately one-quarter 
ot a lawyer'• bill~bla hours tor one year, These lawyers 
rooe!ve little or no compensation for this service. 
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It i • ••••ntial to remelU)er ~hat counael i• 
appointed to •n•ur• th• pn• ervaticn ot the defendant'• 
con• titutional ~ight• and to malce certain that unlawful 
oxeoutiona do not occur. The procedural mechanism for 
reviewing theee petition• must strive to promote these 
same principle•• The ta~eral judiciary must there!ora 
take p~rticulAr care in death penalt)' cases to give 
patient. and thoughttul review ot claims presented by 
petitioners through their appointed counsel. 864 F.2d 
CLt 1431•33. 
Reg4rdl•s• 'tfflether one is in favor or aqainst capital 
punishment, I taal the short stay occurring in th• Mercer case anQ 
t.hs exacting analys11 ot his claim• ware clearly justifiad. The 
review procedure evo.n in a auooeseiv• petition aerved to vindicate 
the nation's conscience that the state did not deprive a parson of 
life without due proo••• of law. 
I now turn to a specitic discussion Of th• ~wo proposed bills, 
S.1757 and S,1760. I will then add a ahort con.clusory critique of 
s.ss. In many places, I have illustrated my points oy reterring 
to alternative way• ot phrasing the new statut•• r n these 
il1u~trations my addition• are underlined and stricken mate~ial i • 
bracketed. In several places, I have inet.ead illustr ated my 
oonoerns by comparing the Powell Committee' • recommendations to 
Chairman Biden•s "Habaaa Corpus Reform Aot ot 1989," s.e. 11,1, 
(1) Section 225§. Thi• ••otion i• th• centerpiece ot the 
•ov•ll Comlll1ttea 1 1 pr~~v•cu amendments. It permit• States to opt 
into tha aystam of aocalerated federal review it they provide 
counsel for state po1t-convieti0n remedies. Th• report gives: 
admirable attention tc the need tc provide counsel. It may be 
desirable to consider elaboratinq upon th• language auggest•d by 
the committee in S2256(b), • inca the committee does not explain how 
~~• competency of counsel should b• judqed. Th• criteria propoaed 
by ChairJnan Biden in 922cs.1 ot s,a, 1757 indicate the form such an 
elaboration might take. 
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aoth bill•, ot cour••, recognize that without coitpetent 
coun•tl 1pp0int~rl at the poEt•aonvie~left l•v•l, LI,.cc ~an bo nc 
~~suranoe of c fair and exnaustive review of the trial proceedings. 
However, one ot the important attribute• of Chc.ir?:lcn !5iden' & 
proposal is the application of standards !or competent counsel who 
ara to be apPQinted at the tim• th• defendo.nt is cnarged in a 
cc.pit.cl o!tense. !n addition, these atar.darda would be applied to 
both tederal and state po•t-oonviotion proceedings. Under the 
Powell Committee Report, state standards for competent cow,sal, 
whatever they may be, would apply only to state poat-conv1ct1on 
procee~1ngs. Tha application ot competency stand&rd• to trial 
counsel is aasential beoauee the common challenge ot 1netfect1ve 
counsel usually relates to counsel's performance at trial and not 
at the tim• ot poet-conviction proceading•. 
In tho i:mrnedic.tely following subsection, §2256(c), the Powell 
Corn.mittee wisely suggest• that a datandant may not waivo hia right 
to appointed counsel without a hearing to ensure that the defendant 
u~derstands the rights beinq waived. Th• committoo requires such 
a hea r.ing be held "it necessary." Yat it i • difficult to see how 
the net.:essity of a hearing could bo judged without a hearing. Such 
an alnbiguity threatens to give rise to needless litigation, 
confusion, and delay. At a minimum, it would be dei,irable to 
consid•r str1X1ng tl'le phrase II it neceaaa.ry. 11 However, greater 
specificity, ct th• kind described by !2256(c) ot s.e. 17~7, could 
reduce s~1ll rurther the error and dolay that miqht result from 
ambi~uous procedural requirements. 
The final subs•ction ot t 22,«s provides tor t.n• removal of 
incompetent counsel. The Powell Commi tt•• Ra port 1 • commentary 
explaina that, " ( iJ t at o.ny time c1urinq stata or tederal post-
conviction ~•view it appears that appointed counael i • unable to 
di~charg• his obli90.tion• in a ~1m•lY and competent manner, th• 
remedy is for the court to appoint a replacement, and to permit 
poet-oonvietion review to go rorward. n Such a substitution of 
-13-
\ 
coun••l mi9ht l•ave th• newly appointed coun• el with littl• tin• 
to Pft~rl a c~~~, ~articularly it~• en•~~• ~~~u.- L~tor• toderc~ 
prooeedings commence, New counsel's preparation might well cons"!.lllle 
the strict time limitation impoaed by Section 2259. It would 
therefore be dea1ral:)le to cons!.der supplementing the suggested 
language in a way similar to what follows: 
i225~(•) . .. Thia li~itation shall not preclude ~he 
appointmant ct dif!Qrent coun•ol at any phase ot state 
or faderal po•~-oonviotion proceedin9a. I! new counsel 
is at any ti~• appointed because previous counsel was 
ine!factiyo. or beoause previous counsel 1s torced !or 
health or other peroonal rea100, to xithgrav. a federal 
court ahall upon ex pc.rte application restore to the 
period apecitied in 922:,s any time consumed .by the 
petitionor•a previous coun1el, unless it is clear that 
petitioner boo in no way been prejudiced by th• lapse of 
that time, 
(~) ~tion 22,1. This section o! the Powell Committee 
proposal provides for an autotnatic atay on th• fir•t petition for 
federal habeas, and severely limits the availability ot federal 
writ~ on S\\coeccivo 0..Pl' l ~ ea.~i6l\•. P'Yur A• pfiaot• ot ~ni • .1.im.1.taticn 
deserve speciAl at~ant1on First, the amendments limit relief en 
a second or later patit i on to those priaoner• preaenting claims 
which "~ndermin• the court'• confidence in the jury'• determination . 
of quilt. 11 Yet in capital caae•, to which thi• sta-cute applies, 
court•,;; are frequently presented with constitutional claims that 
bear upon th• proprioty ot the death penalty but not upon guilt. 
such would be the caaa, for example, if, after tha prisoner'• firat 
hateaa petition waa complete, th• prisoner lapsed into a state of 
m~ntal incompetence randerinq the death panalty ccnstitutionally 
inappropriate, Under th• propo• ea amend.ments, such a federal 
prisoner would have no avenue tor ttlderal relief. 
Second, the proposal indicate• that a oonatitutional attack 
on th• p~oceas at trial must include a claim ot tactual innocence. 
Here again, proof of a fundamental con• tituticnal detect in the 
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trial or aantanoinq •hould • uttic• •• a ba•1• tor a auccessive 
petition, without need to alao ca• t doubt on th• jury'• 
detormination ot guilt. It ia not clear what receral interest is 
served by interposing a procedural bar to dotaat the right of an 
inmate who i• ~ble to show a constitutional detect in hi• trial or 
sentencing. 
Third, S. l 760 conte.mplataa the po• saibility that some priaoneri, 
ttay be prevented by 5tate action from ra1• ing claim• on the i r first 
federal habeas petition. Yet, th• • tatuto perlllits such claims only 
it they meet other requirement•, When the state itselt is 
responsible for preventing a priconer from raising claims en an 
initiAl collatgral at'taek, it .i.a unclear why the state should 
benefit from epecial procedural bar• on th• petitioner's second 
attack. 
• • I I _I I I I • I - I tit - • - - • -- • I II t • - • • 
F~urt.n, s.i1~o leaves no "pressure valv•" to accommodate the 
extraordinary ccs•s which intrequently bu~ inevitably arise in the 
criminal justice process. The limitati~., on the relief that 
tadGral 0ourts can grant appears to ae~rive r he federal courts ot 
authority, even under the All Write ~ct, to v~o•t• a death sentence 
unle• a th• specitied conditions are met. 
Accordingly, the ccl'lllll1ttee may wieb to consider whether 
revision, or the fnl 1 nwi na cnr+ um,, r4 .,.I'J'»•p•i•••1~ .... ll'Y. l.l.-
purpoaes ot h~beaa reronn: 
! 2251 cc) . . . . c 3) nie pri•oner i • able to praseot 
· evi~ence whic;h, PY i tsel: or in combinotion with the 
prisoner•• constitutional (tacts undarlyinq the] claim, 
woul<l be 5U!fic1ant, it the claim 11 proven, to undermine 
the court 1 1 confidence in either CA) th• jury' • 
c1etern1nat1on ot guilt on the otten•• or offanaes tor 
which th• death penalty wa• impoaed, pr CB) tho 
sentencing court's determination that tb• death pen11t~ 
was a~propriate in petitionar'• oa1•- However. in any 
case in which the petitioner's failure to rnjse tho claim 
in the tirst collateral attack 1• tb• re,sult of 1tat.1 
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3ction in vio11tion ot tb• ccn• titution or 1aw1 or th• 
united &t•t••. nothing in tbi• s1ction 1ha11 bar the 
p9titioo•r trom tiling a 1ucce11ive pee1t1on, nor •hall 
i.t bar the tedercl courts rrom granting a11 appropriate 
relia!. 
!i257(d) Nothing in th1a Act shall bt construed ~o 
amend the All Writs Act. 
Alternatively, the aecond, third., and fourth ot my concerns 
might be aCCOffll!IOdated by language like that in S,B. 1757, which 
allow• "manitest injustice" as a ground tor a successive petition, 
and which makes 12257 (c) p) ot the Powell Repox-t--the "actual 
innocence" proviso--a ground for relief alternative to, rather than 
conjunctive with, 112257{0) (1) and ~~!7(o) (2) of the Powell Report. 
see S.8. 1757, §2257{c), The first of my concerns, reqar~inq the 
"actual innocenc•" proviao and the euit4bility o! the death 
penalty, would however also require ?:1odification ct s. B. 1757, 
§2257(c)(2): 
, 4 :2 s, ( o > • • • • c 2 ) <!!id en p 111, s . e. 1151) The 
pri1onor ia able to present eyicence whicn, by itself or 
in combination with the prisoner's constitutional (tacts 
undorlying the] claim, would ba autt1c1ant, 1! the cl~i m 
i• proven, to undermine the court's con!l~tn~• 1n •ithftr 
.!Al. 1..1~- J i.u:y, • C1e-cerminao;10n ct guilt on the or:rense or 
ottonaea tor which th• deoth penalty was imposed, or (B) 
th• sgntenoing court I I determination that the death 
penalty vas ARPropriate in petitioner•• case. 
In addition to supplying a mechanism that limits the 
possibility of successive petition•, §4457 also deacribe• a 
procedure by which capital prisoners nay waive ":hair right to post-
conviction review. Saa &2257(b) (l). A• proposed by the Powell 
Report, the waiver provisions itight deprive fedaral courts ct 
jurisdiction to bar the •x•oution ot an inmate who waives 
collateral proceedings even it the • tat• is without substantive 
authority to execute th• innate--e1• would be th• case ir the 
inmate's crime was insutticiant to make the inmate death-•li9ible, 
or if tho inmate booama incompetent to be executed, Under such 
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Qircnrm"'t,1'1,i,:,es, t.he •tato weuld h&Y• n~ l~.l.Ll.mct.• J.nt• r••t in 
executing th• prieon•~• and the inmata might not oth•rwi•• havo the 
right to opt for th• death penalty. T?le Powell Report's waiver 
provisions also make no mention of caaaa in whioh a prisoner first 
vaive• the right to post-conviction review, and then atte~pts to 
retract the waiver. Again, it i• not oloar what purpoee would be 
aerved by interposing a tede.ral procedural bar to relief in such 
cases. These ccncarn• might b• addressed by considering lansuage 
like the tollowing: 
§2257(:b) . . • p) A stay of execution qranted 
pursuant to subsection (a) •hall expire it: ... Betore 
a court o! competent jurisdiction, in the presence of 
counsel and atter having been advised of the consequences 
of his decision, a state prisoner under capital sentence 
waives the right to pursue habeas corpus review undar 
section 2254. such a waiver does not Precluda tho 
tederal courta from granting: rel 1•t in a proceed inc; 
alleging that the state is without con@titutional 
authority to execute the prisoner by any procadur1 if th9 
court finds that the claim is one that th• prieon1r 
e:10e; ;;cP:;t1'i~1 ~~;;~t!~t:ay, ~tpa!;o;:f ni hd~r::1 ifi; 
period in which the stay arant•d pur1uant to aubseotion 
(a) wouJ,,d, .have been in attect but :or th• vgiv1r, retract 
t he waiver by filing a ootioe with th• court. 
(3) SeQtipn 2258. Thia aection provide• a 180-dcy time limit 
for the tiling ot a rederal habea• petition, and permits extension 
of this limit up to ~40 day• upon a • howing of sood ca~se. The 
length or this period is of obviou• importance to both of the 
Powell committee'• objectives& makinq criminal proceedings more 
ertic1ent, and providing competent counsel. It would be desirable 
tc conaide.r wh•t.h•r th• period aa 11pecitied };)y ! 22,a, and as 
measured by compariaon with th• substantive requiremant• elsewhere 
i=poood by t.he Report, i• too ahort to permit counsel adequate 
preparation. Although six montha :may 11e•m an appropriato tirn• 
li.Jnit upon a • ingl• tiling, it should be no~ed that the time limit 
begins ~o run from th• appointment of counsal: that couneal may 
have no prior acquaintcnce with the case and might have no warning 
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ot th• appointment, tha~ the • ix ~onth period include• ooth th• 
time prior to tiling of a state collateral ~•tition and tho tim• 
botween oonoluaion ot atnte court proceedings and commencement of 
federal proceedings; that the tim• prio~ to filing ot the state 
collateral p•tition JIUIY itselt encompaa• both the time after the 
Supreme Court dispose• of a petition tor certiorari and, the time 
between the ~ppointment or counsel under§ 2256 and the filing of 
a petition !or certiorari with the Supreme Court, and thct th• 
exhaustion require~ent or §2259(a) put• a premiWI on proper 
preparation of th• initial, • tat• collateral petition, The 
provision or a single period tor the preparation ot both the state 
and federal patitiona i• aapooially noteworthy since errors during 
the state proceedings may require substantial research prior to the 
federal proceoding--a•, for eKample, it the state court invokes an 
ambiguous or inconsistently applied procedural bar. 
Concerns of this kind might ba alleviated hy amending tho 
Powell Report in th• manner o·f s. B. 17-'7, which expands the base 
time period from 180 to 365 days, and allow• for a fl.lrther 
axtenaion up to 455 dCly• up, , an appropriate showing, see S. B. 
1757, §2258. Senate Bil l 1757 also • paake to thoc• conc•rna by 
alleviatinq the initial bu~~•n upon appointed counsel by 
accommodating unaxhausted cl&im• within th$ federal prooees. See 
s.s. 17!57, l2~!59(c)(2), It would al• o be desirable to address 
these concerns by initiating th• •i~-month period upon th• 
concluaion ot • taee court proc6edings, rather than upon appointment 
of counsel. A form ot 522!8 revised along these lines ~ight read, 
i 2258. Any p•ti tion tor habeo.a relie1' um1er aec~1on 
2254 ot thi• title 11u• t be tiled in the approfriate 
district oourt within ill. day• trom the conclUO on o! 
stat• po1t-ocnviotion p;:9ce1ding1 (tiling in ~ne 
appropriato • tate court ot record ct an order 1• aued in 
compliano• with • ection 22,6(c)J, 
-1a-
A modification along th••• line• niqht alao r•quir• deletion 
or revision ot related section,. Sae, ••9•, 12258{b) (tolling 
during pandonoy of state proceedings). 
Tho Powell Co1tU11ittee'• propc&al provides tor tolling or t.he 
six-month period while state procee~inga are in progres~. Th• 
proposal, however, allow• such tolling only during any period "in 
which a state prisoner under capital sentanca ha~ a properly filed 
request for post-convictign review pending, •• " 12258(b) (emphasis 
added). In some instanees, it will bo unclear whether a petition 
wee properly tiled in light ot state procedural requirements. The 
state courts miqht adjudicato thi• point advaroely to a capital 
defe~dant only atter lengthy litigation. It might be desirable to 
consider omitting tha word "proporly" trom 5~~5S(b). 
The Committoo Report doe• not provide tor tolling durins the 
pandency or certiorari petition att•r • tate post-conviction review. 
see 12258(b). Th• propoeal thu• might be thought to pre~icate the 
supreme court's jurisdiction over such petition• upon whether a 
federal hab4aa oorpu• petition had been til ed . It mignt be 
desirabla to consider incorporating lanquage suer. as that in the 
Bidon bill, whioh provide• tor tolling until r1nal disposition of 
int CIIG by thA Anprame Court if a timaly Jat!!.i~lel'\ for 2.'•vi•w l. 
tilgd, Gee S.B. 1757 1 t22,a(2), 
(4) section 22,,. Tn1a provision provides a limited 
exception to the exhaustion rule for claim• baaed on evidenoe th~t 
could l'\o~ hav• 1=1611!=1\ ~•al:lium1bly discovereCl, tllat are the result ot 
unconstitutional or unlawtul • tato action, or that are baaed on 
recognition ot a constitutional right that 1• retroactively 
available. Although th• proposal doe• nc~ anywhere ep•ci!ically 
proh1bit a defendant rrom returning to stat• court to exhaust on 
claims that do not aati• ty th••• criteria, the Commentary atatea 
"The prisoner cannot return to state court to exhaust even if ha 
would like to do • o. 11 Thi• cppee.r• to b• a restriction on the 
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reliet th•~ state• may provide. tt uy >:>. de• irabl• to oon• ider 
whether capital defendant• should be a~l• to make use o! a state 
forum go long aa the State provide• one. 
Addi~ionally, it should be considered whether the proposed 
statute should indicate more clearly that a claim of ineffective 
assistance o! counsel is a claim of state action in violation ct 
t~• Constitution that permits a federal court to entertain a 
defaulted clAim on habeas. 
~oth ot these revisions to 12259 m1ght b• taxen into account 
by lanquaqe comparable to that in tha Bidan bill'• raviaion of the 
exhau&tion requirexr.enta. see s.a. 1757, §2259(c) (2), which 
clarifies the grouhda upon which a fodoral court may reach claims 
not passed upon oy tne state and which ameliorates the otherwise 
harsh consequence• ot limiting the pri•oner 1 • ace••• to atate 
court. 
(5) Retroactivitv (S.B. 1757, 12262). Although §2259 of the 
Powell Co~itte•'• propo•ea statute i• entitled "Doope of fede~cl 
review," the Report nowhere addresses th• retroactive application 
ot new rule• of law to eapit~l cases during collateral proceedings. 
This topic has, of course, been the aubjact ot some debate in the 
supreine Court in Teague y, Lane, 109 5,Ct, 1060 (1989), and Penry 
v, Lynauah. 109 s.ct. 2934 (1989), Inao!ar aa it would be 
deoirabl• tor thia is• u• tc., t>• raaolved t>y legislative action 
rather than judicial interpretation, tha r•troactivity qua• tion 
might be taKen up in connec~1on with the Powell Repor~. certainly 
~he subject is garman• to habeaa reform, and, indeed, S.8. 1757 
includes a new section devoted to the topic, 
Since the Powell Report anviaions more speedy disposition of 
habeas petition•, adoption ot t.h• Report might be thought to 
diminish the weight ot interest• thought to tavor a purely 
pro~pactiv• application ot constitutional rigbt• z 
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because 
petition• would be diapo• ed of mer• axpediticu•lY, new rule• would 
be tewer and the delays re•ulting tron them •horter. AcC()rdingly, 
it might b• doei~&ble to oonaider wheth•r a provision addres5ing 
retroactivity should be enacted: 
§2262 <new}; In cases subject to this chapter, any 
petitioner shall receive the benetit of any rule of 
federal law new by comparison »1ith the date of the 
petitioner's conviction except Whee the state estahl isbes 
that retroactive applicatt00 o! tho x:ule would place a 
manifestly unreasonable burden upon the law enforcement 
activities o: the state. 
Alternatively, it ~ight bQ poesible to addr•~• thi• topic by 
a provision simila~ to that 1n the Biden bill: 
§2262 <Biden Bill, s,B. 17SZ): In cases subject to 
this chapter, all claims shall be govGrnad by the law as 
it was when the petitioner's sentence became final, 
supplemented by any interim change in the law, unless 
(i!J the court determines, in liqht of the purpose to be 
served by th• change, the extent of reliance on previous 
law by law enforcement authorities, and the effect on the 
~dlllinistrat i. on of justice, that it would be unjust (just] 
to g1v~ the r- risoner the :benefit ot the interim change 
in the law. 
Although these points certainly do not exhaust the possibl~ 
areas of legislative inquiry, I hope that they may prove a usetul 
supplement to the proposed legislation contained in S.1157 and 
S.1760. 
I now speak brier1y concerning th• proposals contained in 
S.88. As earlier stated, th• Judicial Conference is already on 
record in support ot the provisions o! S.88 that would allow a 
federal court to revi•w and d•ny a trivolou• or non-ffleritorioua 
claim even it state procedur•• had not been exhausted. This 
sensible provi• ion would obviate the onerous burden i.mpo• ed by the 
procedural rule precluding tederal review ot aven trivoloua claims 
i~ thQy hav$ not been e>Chau• ted in the • tAte court. I also have 
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previou• ly indicated that ~• Judicial Conteranoe i• on record 
opposing the provision ot s.ss which would give the circuit courts 
of appeal the excluGive power to grant c•rtificatea of probable 
cause to appeal a denial of habeas. This provision would increase 
th• burden on the oourt ot appeals jud9ea, and would preven~ us 
rrom considering the district court•' judquent that the claim., 
although denied, ia colora~le in either tact or law. 
The purpose ot s. ee is clear: "to minimize P'ederal judicial 
interference with State criminal convictions" and "to accord more 
Appropriate weight to state procedure• in criminal adjudications. 11 
To implement these purposes, s. 88 preclude• habeas corpua relief 
where the issue haa not been properly raised below, or where it has 
been fully and fairly litigated in stat• proco•dinga. s. 88 alao 
establishes a one year limitation on filing ot petitions by state 
prisoners, as wall aa oth•r chang•• affQoting the scope of the 
re~eral courts' role in collateral attacks on crininal convictions. 
The scope of th• changes propo~ed bys. 88 is unprecedented. 
Tha• e chang•• would recult in a f\tn~~mental re•tructuring of th• 
nature of habeas litigation, throw,L,g it back to 1915 and the 
unfortunate ruling in frank v, Mangum, 237 u.s. 309 (191~). In 
Frank, the supreme court refused to review the constitutionality 
o~ a mob-dominated trial in Georgia simply because the 
constitutional questions had received tull review in th• Georgia 
supreme Court. A• many ot you know, a short time ago ~he Governor 
ot Georgia, •ome 70 year• too lata, iaauod an unconditional 
posthumous pardon to Leo Frank. senate Bill 88 represents an 
abandorunent 0!, and a ratr•at from the expro•• oonatitutional role 
of the tedaral judiciary a• the protector of constitutional rights. 
senate Bill 88 attempts to •xpand the limited preclusion 
doctrine of st.one y. PQWtll, 4:Z8 o.s. -465 (1976), that habeas 
petitions alleging a tourth amendment violation in a stata court 
proceeding cannot be h•ard in a federal habeas petition, to all 
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claimod conatitutional violation• rai••d by • tat• prisoner• • Thi• 
r~atrictiv• approach to federal habeas already has been rejec~ed 
~Jy th• Supr•1n• Co\lrt, and for good roasion. In Bo•• v. Mitc:h1ll, 
443 u.s. 545 (1979), the court refused to extend stone's precluslve 
eftaot to habeas petitions alleging discri~ination in tha eeleotion 
of a grand jury. In Jackson y, Virginia, 443 u.s. 307 (1979), the 
Court retused to extend Stone to ohallenge• alleging a 
constitutional insufficiency of the evidence. In Kinunelman y. 
t;orrieon, 477 o.s. 365 (1986), the Court, with Justice Powell 
joining in the majority's conclusion, retused to preclude claims 
of sixth amendllle.nt violdtiona ot inettective a5Biatance of counsel 
based on counsel I s failure to raise in state court a fourth 
a~endment violation. In each one ot these cases, the !upreme Court 
recognized the !undamental right at issue, and its role in assurinq 
that a state prisoner's constitutional rights oe diligently 
protected notwithstanding the existence of direct review by the 
s-ca~e cour~s. 
Senate Bill 88 woulcS give binding force to state court 
detarminations: Gvon where the atate court may have mi•e ~c t"lcoivod a 
constitutional right. The Supreme Court I a incapacity to grant 
direct certiorari reviow ot all final stat• oourt doaision• means 
that adequate federal review o! state court determinations of 
oonatit~tional rights would be unavailable it the federal district 
courts could not use habeas review. Many state procedural rules 
already bar p0st-0onviction review where _the pri•oner'• challenges 
were not raised on direct appeal, To further preclude review in 
the federal aystem simply because the estate court has already 
reviewed the issue abandons the role ot the tederal judiciary as 
t..~e protector or tederal constitutional rignta. Tne guilty as well 
as the innocent are antitlad tc atfactiva taderal review of 
constitutional claima. The desire ors. 88 to accord "appropriate 
weight" to ctat• court determination• doe• not d•••rv• greater 
i~portance than the protection of constitutional rights. 
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I hav• attempt•d to addr••• myaelt to the • pecitic ~~~po•od 
legislation involved. I reapecttully submit that the moat 
a:xpadient and fair way to mak• e•rtain th.at tho right• ot all 
prisoners, and particularly thoae individuals who are sentenced to 
daa.th for oftanaaa tor whioh they should not bo oxooutod, is: to 
make changes in •xisting law. First of all, I teel the existing 
rulaa on suooaeaive petition• and abuse of potitiona are auttioient 
to protect against trivolou1 petitions. In this area no uendment 
is actually neo,useory. Aauuminq state exhaustion ot re:ieclies 
following an initial federal habeas corpus petition, the rules of 
s~ith v, Carrier and Murray y, Co[tie, could be codifi•d to allow 
every claimant who is under death sentence to assert successive 
petitions only on~ showing ot tacts that suggest the innocence ot 
the party or that undermine the sentencing procasa. I! such a 
fedsral review could proceed without concerns ot state procedural 
bars, federal habe&s reviaw would mova much more expeditiously. 
Tod&y th• time and delay in procaasing all habaa• corpus 
pet .ttions has drawn the criticism o! many members ot the federal 
judiciary. Thia criticis:m ariaaa trom the need tor the buay 
reQeral judge to spend time and skill painstakingly evaluating 
whether or not pro0•dural bar• exclude the claim. The judge muet 
decide, under Stone v. Powell. whether the state court has given 
a full and tair hearing to fourth amendment c:ases, or whether, 
under Ro11 v, Lundy, the petition include• unexhauated sta~e 
oloims, or more siqniticontly whether, under Wainwrisht y. Sykes, 
a state procedural bar precludes examination ot the merits o! the 
claim. I! a etAte proced.ural bar exists, usually it is be~ause 
counsel did not raise the claim at tha origin&l trial. Th• court 
must then consider wn•th•r there existed cause, a jus~1r1able 
reason for not raising the claim and prejudice arising therefrom . 
I auggeat that th• precont-day complaint• by an overwhelming 
number of federal judgea demonatrate that the attempts to give 
deterenco and comity to tho •tat• rule• ot tinality, in all duo 
-~~-
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reapeot, have cauaed a qreat d•al cf dalay and onerou• work for 
~• federal judiciary. Th••• judges must 1tudy the•• procedural 
bar• to dotQrmin• whether or not the petitioner ia even eligible 
to go torward and submit for consideration to the court the merits 
of hie p~tition. To many this etatoment may seem to denigrate 
princip:!.es ot re'1eral1sm, or to ignore the traditional values 
attached to prinoiplea ot finality. r beg to differ. As earlier 
discur,aad, procedural rules which bar review of state court 
deci~iona should not ov•rbolance the concerns of constitutional 
adjudication when life or liberty is involved. Nor should such 
concerns outweigh the need for a lilore efficient and expedient 
process in the fedaral courts. 
In the vast number ot cases, the merits ct the suit are either 
frivolous or certainly non-meritorious. It thus appears that the 
state courts are indaad teaing the oonatitutional mark. Most of 
t.l'le constitutional ~er1c1enc1es raised are now aired and ventilate~ 
in tho stato courts and can be adjudioat.ed by federal courts on the 
oasis or what the state court ha• don•• We should all be 
encouraged by thi• f li c-,t , but it doaa not augga• t we ahould simply 
bar federal court. revief1f as s. 88 attupts to de. . I respectfully 
submit that hietory ha• shown atate oo~rt• toe tha constitutional 
mark in part because of federal habeas review. 
My point i• that federal habaa• could be handled much more 
etficiently, end this is p•rticularly true of death cases, it there 
ware not the procedural barriers to the•• claim• which require 
federal juages to examine with great scrutiny whether or not they 
can review the merits. Th• vast number of chslla.nges of 
inettect1ve counsel are made primarily to snow "cauae 11 ~o allow 
fQdaral ravi~w in cpite of a state procedural bar. Suffice it to 
say, ~here are very few tederal judges or lawyers or legal scholars 
who agr•• with the propo• ition that a par• on ahould lo•• hi• lite 
because ot a procedural bar, when, it an investigation ot the 
merit~ wore allowed, it would uncover a oonatitutional d•tioienoy. 
-25-
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Yet, that i• ~• rule that we •xi•t under today. I raapect!ullY 
submit that legislation should alter this rule, 
I thank the Committee for this time to present these views. 
-2,-
~ JuJf- c1~l,'s le>+,;,~, t' "'·.J 
In introducing his proposed legislation, Chairman Biden 
articulated the Senate's two major concerns about existing 
habeas corpus procedures, delay attributable to repetitive 
applications and lack of competent counsel. These same con-
cerns were addressed by the Powell committee. We proposed a 
blended solution to the separate problems involving an ex-
change of compensations, If states would voluntarily 
provide competent counsel in state post-conviction 
review--counsel they were not constitutionally required to 
provide--they would be entitled to modified federal habeas 
corpus procedures which eliminated or controlled many 
presently available opportunities for delay and moat 
successive petitions. The aim was to create for capital 
cases a procedure whereby the defendant would be represented 
at state expense by competent counsel at trial, on direct 
appeal, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United 
States from that direct appeal, on state collateral review 
1 
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at trial and on appeal. The federal government would then 
provide counsel for federal habeas corpus review at trial, 
and appeal, and for a secon 1. certiorari proceeding. The 
collateral procedures would be freed from time pressure of 
impending execution by automatic stays. 
In exchange, the state would be guaranteed that counsel 
would limit the ti.me when no proceeding was pending before a 
court in the state system to a total of six months, plus a 
good-cause savings period of an additional 60 days. 
Successive writs would be barred and the system would permit 
subsequent petitions raising new grounds only where factual 
innocence was a5serted. 
Chairman Biden's proposed bill would add new costs, and 
in some caBes unknown costs, to the price states would have 
to pay to opt in to this system. It would also take away 
from states procedural rights they possess under present 
law. The question this committee must ask is whether those : 
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additional weights so freight the offer ae to make it 
unattractive to the states who are urged to assume hundreds 
of millions of dollars in litigation costs they are not 
constitutionally required to bear and whether adding such 
costs will have the effect of making the proposed 
legislation ineffective. 
In introducing his bill, the Chairman characterized the 
Powell committee's recommendations as limiting the capital 
case defendant to 11 one bite out of the apple." This 
characterization does not consider the Powell committee 
recommendations in context. Every defendant subject to a 
capital charge is now entitled to be represented at trial by 
competent counsel; most ti.me6 two such attorneys are 
appointed. If convicted, he has a right of direct appeal, 
again ·with competent counsel and, under the law of many 
states, different counsel from those who represented him at 




defendant has an opportunity to seek certiorari revi ew of 
the state appellate court's decision in the United States 
Supreme Court, with, of course, the assiBtance of counsel 
for that purpose. If that fails to produce relief, the 
defendant may petition the state court for collateral 
review. The critical ingredient of the Powell conuni ttee 
recommendation is to encourage states to furnish competent 
counsel to represent the defendant in all phases of this 
collateral attack. Most such procedures are now handled by 
the defendant himself without counsel and in many cases are 
concluded without a thorough presentation of potential legal 
issues. 
If counseled state collateral review proves ineffec-
tive, the defendant has three additional opportunities to 
seek relief. He has the opportunity to present to a United 
States district court a petition for habeas corpus relief 
and has the right to counsel to assist him in that 
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proceeding. He has the right of appeal to a United States 
court of appeals and may seek certiorari review in the 
United States Supreme Court. Thus, under the Powell 
committee's recommendations, a defendant whose death penalty 
ultimately becomes final has had not one bite out of the 
apple, but a minimum of eight opportunities with the help of 
counsel to present issues relating to his guilt and 
punishment. It is only after this thoroughgoing check upon 
check upon countercheck that the committee recommends 
further litigation be limited to new factual claims of 
innocence. 
A section-by-section tabulation of the specific 
changes made by the Chairman's bill, with the predicted 
effect of each, is attached to this statement. 
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Changes and Effects 
Counsel appointment mechani5m is governed by 
federal drug case standards and the appointment process is 
broadened to cover all trial and direct review proceedings 
and litigation expense. 
Effect: 
This incongruous regulation exceeds the bounds of 
the problem addressed--habeas corpus procedures. 
Legislatively-set state maximums on fees and expenses of 
trials and direct appeals would be preempted and left open-
ended. If states opt in to this amended scheme, they must 
anticipate that their present constitutionally imposed 
litigation expense will increase exponentially and they will 
still have the additional expense not now required of 
providing counsel for collateral proceedings. 
Section 2256(c) 
Change: 
A hearing is mandated on waiver of counsel at 
which competency as well as knowing voluntary waiver must be 
established. The prisoner and the attorney offered must be 
present. 
Effect; 
This change createB added expense and consumes 
time and judicial resources. It would only operate in a 





The conjunctive requirements of the Powell bill 
relating to new clabns have been separated. No longer is 
the undermining of the court's confidence in guilt required . 
A new claim must be entertained if it was not raised as a 
result of unconstitutional state action or if it is based 
upon a new retroactive decision of the Supreme Court or on 
newly discovered evidence or would undennine confidence in 
guilt. A fifth basis is added--"necessary to prevent a 
miscarriage of justice. " 
Effect: 
In the broad scheme of the bill, eliminating the 
undermining of confidence in guilt as a requirement may 
withdraw little of substance from the states. Certainly it 
would add only minimal expense; however, the new requirement 
of allowing claims 11 necessary to prevent miscarriage of 
justice" opens a path of undefined breadth. While no one 
can favor a miscarriage of justice, the problem this 
amendment creates arises from the fact that it takes only a 
stroke of the pen to assert that a failure to relitigate an 
issue for a second or third time is necessary to prevent a 
miscarriage of ju5tice. In this way, a prisoner may present 




Thie doubles the total time a habeas corpus 
petitioner represented by competent counsel can deliberately 
stay out of state court and still maintain a federal habeas 
corpus proceeding. 
Effect: 
No time during which a state judicial proceeding 
is pending would be counted against a petitioner under the 
Powell bill. The present average length of the "down time" 
is only a few days more than 12 months. This change 
effectively increases permissible delay to its present 
average. It not only defeats the purpose of minimizing 







Tolling of time limits for certiorari petition to 
the Supreme Court at the conclusion of state collateral 
proceedings. 
Effect: 
Less than 2% of such petitions for writs of 
certiorari are now granted. No issue which could be raised 
in such a petition is lost by waiting to seek the writ until 
after federal habeas corpus proceedings are concluded. 




A extension of time for good cause shown is 
enlarged from 60 to 90 days. 
Effect: 
The time allowed is court-controlled and the 




Federal courts must consider claims which would be 
barred for procedural default under existing Supreme Court 
precedent if the petitioner asserts the default occurred due 
to (l) ignorance or neglect by petitioner or counsel, or (2) 
would result in a miscarriage of justice. 
Effect: 
In addition to voluntarily furnishing counsel at 
state expense for habeas procedures, which is not now 
constitutionally required, the state is asked to give up a 
substantial part of its present right to invoke procedural 
defaults. There is a clear semantic appeal to avoiding 
defaults due to ignorance or neglect and avoiding defaults 
that would constitute a miscarriage of justice. The problem 
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is that this semantic appeal is not matched by pragmatic 
persuasion for states to go beyond present constitutional 
requirements to enforce their law. Any persuasive effect is 
, , certainly offset by the uncertainty of terms used and by the 
opportunity created for abusive delay. 
Section 2261 
Change: 
This section sets the standard of experience which 
states must require appointed counsel to have. 
Effect: 
See comments under 5ection 2256 above. 
Section 2262 
Change: 
Principles of law developed subsequent to the 
sentence are made applicable to habeas corpus cases. This 
creates another rule against finality which differs from 
current Supreme Court precedent. 
Effects 
Here, as in the change made by section 2259(c)(2), 
states are asked to give up pre5ently established rights of 
significant import without receiving any corresponding 
advantage. 
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